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In a work describing rhetorical agency as multiple, it’s 
appropriate to begin with thanks to those allies whose 
influences (sometimes oblique, sometimes countervailing) 
have contributed to making even the beginning possible. 
They include family members: Sylvia, Jenny, Pearl, Walter, 
and Pokie Dog. They include colleagues, friends, and 
students: Ben Attias, Helen Bunn, Galust Mardirussian, 
Ralph Pililian, Joseph Soltis, Kathryn Sorrells, Fleur Stein-
hardt, and Konrad Wilk. They include Eileen Joy and Mike 
Smith at punctum books, together with the anonymous 
reviewers whose feedback has so strongly shaped the results. 
They include, though in a manner circuitous indeed, Clay 
Spinuzzi at the University of Texas at Austin and Mikael M. 
Karlsson at the University of Iceland. Most of all, they in-
clude Peter Marston at California State University, North-
ridge, without whose insightful pragmatism and patient 
engagement the project would never have arrived at its form. 
Yet rhetorical agency is capacious, with room for the indi-
vidual as well as for the collective. In accepting responsibility 
for every error, misstep, infelicity still included, I recognize 
each to be my own. 
Preface
If the upcoming chapters ever imply any camouflaging of 
the authorial persona, that impression may simply derive from 
the humility at stake in arranging for collisions among the per-
spectives of others. But I’m in the neighborhood anyway, so I’ll 
introduce the work as a whole by previewing the places where 
the main topics and lines of reasoning are located. (Let me add 
from the outset, though, that I’m breaking with tradition by 
previewing the places slightly out of order.) In the process, I’ll 
contribute a few autobiographical anecdotes, each connected 
with an insight about rhetorical agency. These little stories, just 
the four of them, might serve as bridges between my sense of 
the situation and yours. They might also model some of the 
applications that I hope will come to mind in the rest of the 
discussion, where rhetorical agency as it works for the theorist 
meets rhetorical agency as it works for the practitioner.
When theory does refer to “rhetorical agency,” the focus 
generally falls upon the respect in which communication might 
involve agents who act — instead of patients, as it were, that are 
passively moved upon. And then a question arises as to what 
rhetoric might contain (or unleash) that empowers its users to 
cooperate in action. It’s an important question, though it most 
often gets a quarter-hearted, not even full-throated reply. For 
rhetoric is credited, and that’s about the size of it, with enig-
matically managing, or activating, or supervening upon the 
most crucial of the forces, or capacities, or proclivities which 
travel along with writing and reading, with speaking and lis-
tening, with teaching and learning — with communicative pro-
duction and reception. So Chapter 1 frames the important 
question itself as a problem of productivity. 
As for the answer to the question, at least the answer uncov-
ered during the present investigation, it’s translucent enough to 
state in a sentence but four-folded enough to explain at length: 
Rhetorical agency is an assemblage made out of subjectivity, 
conventionality, materiality, and transcendence, each of which 
is still under construction. Chapter 2 therefore lays out the 
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essentials of the answer, all of them in the same spot. That’s not 
to say there’s nary an air-bubble in the answer.  To the contrary, 
there’s a glitch meandering all the way through it, and this is 
that almost everybody studying rhetorical functionality is cur-
rently positioned to discern only one of the components, only 
one of the constituents of rhetorical agency at a time. 
But that reminds me of when I went to see the den-
tist, the one who asked how Barack Obama’s speaking style 
could ever have gotten the guy elected president. Temporarily 
supine, familiar with enough of those horror movies to know 
the drill, I plumped for diplomacy. Why, said I, the explana-
tion had surprisingly little to do with speaking style. It was just 
that Obama, by invoking certain recurrent ideals, virtues, and 
aspirations (and this is where I remembered to emphasize not 
only hope but also change) had managed to create the requisite 
identification between himself and the public.  
Later on, speeding from the scene, I congratulated myself 
for producing, and under such unnerving conditions, the irre-
fragable response. For mine had been the sort of reply, give or 
take, that ought to meet the approval, or so I decided, of con-
temporary rhetorical theorists such as anybody. Yes, Barack 
Obama had proven himself to be an agent, and he had done so 
by invoking certain recurrent ideals, virtues, and aspirations, 
and my dentist had not demurred.
Surely, as many a recent textbook on argumentation or 
public speaking would confirm (in a section, say, on the place 
of “warrants” in the Toulmin model), rhetoric operates not so 
much, if at all, through eloquence as through leveraging those 
hoary, durable values which the recipients of a message share 
with the sender.  For what else, if not guidelines held (or, bet-
ter yet, guidelines valorized) in common could explain why, 
periodically tabling our atomistic selfishness, we accede to the 
collective, if still worthy-of-us endeavor?  From this perspec-
tive, rhetorical agents do not possess any rhetorical agency, 
certainly not as their private property. They share it with those 
others in the community who happen to share the same values. 
So I’ve continued researching that entire way of thinking, a 
line of reasoning which remains every bit as true, as ready-to-
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hand, and — frankly — as mobile as an Arctic icescape. The 
results are featured not exactly where you’d expect, but some-
what further along, in Chapter 4. They are (re)visited wher-
ever the text mentions the rhetorical-humanistic perspective, 
according to which rhetorical agency inheres in conventional-
ity. 
Yet there was that other occasion when, eavesdropping 
upon the conversation between a couple of graduate students, 
I grasped with some finality that the irrefragable response was 
not what it used to be. The discussion was about the Mexi-
can-born Selma Hayek, topical for having so recently received 
U.S. citizenship. And what difference would switching pass-
ports make for a celebrity of that stature?  Would it alter her 
talent as a performer, her ability as a director — would it mod-
ify her financial wherewithal, her engagement as a political 
activist? No, but it would still increase her “agency.” 
If that were the case, or so I began to suspect, then one 
could probably factor out the appeal of any shared values 
expressed in Salma Hayek’s performances, projects, or plat-
forms, since the shared values themselves would remain 
equally appealing regardless of Salma Hayek’s nationality. But 
then the numerator, or what accounted for this upgrade in 
Salma Hayek’s agency, would be the hegemonic power with 
which Salma Hayek had just now become identified.
In other words, these graduate students, here reduced 
to anonymity but still shepherded along by their up-to-
date reading assignments, had every reason to conclude 
that agency accrued not so much, if at all, to shared val-
ues as to the control mechanisms locking down the group. 
Remembering the dentist’s office, remembering Barack 
Obama (remembering, that is, a rhetorical situation 
lined with X-ray images, with testimonials to expertise), 
I realized that what the graduate students were saying — 
that agency belongs to the state — was, regrettably, correct. 
From this perspective, rhetorical agents neither possess nor 
share any rhetorical agency: they lease as much of it as allowed 
to by law.  
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So I’ve continued researching that entire way of thinking, 
a line of reasoning which remains every bit as true and con-
flictual as a traffic ticket. The results are featured back there 
in Chapter 3 and (re)visited wherever the text mentions the 
social-structural perspective, according to which rhetorical 
agency inheres in subjectivity.
Then a certain communication instructor briefly contracted 
the flu, which briefly became associated with pneumonia, 
which briefly resulted in hospitalization. There were doctors, 
nurses, visitors, medical assistants, some of whom, dropping 
by to maintain the IV drip stuck into a left arm, might have 
observed the tapping out, with a right hand, of e-mail mes-
sages to persons.  
But where oh where was my rhetorical agency then? It 
wasn’t located so much, if at all, in a set of shared values or 
ideological pronouncements as in a relational-yet-tangible 
mesh. That alliance, so far as I could tell, included not only all 
of the preceding but also quite a few buildings, pillows, forms 
of medical knowledge, students, healthcare systems, sensations, 
pieces of specialized equipment, affiliations and livelihoods, 
sheets, perceptions, viruses and germs, interests and agendas, 
ideas for thesis statements. 
In short, what must be accurate to say of agency (and, 
while we’re at it, of patiency too) is that it’s distributed irreduc-
ibly among all sorts of actors pulling together, regardless that 
most of them aren’t even human. From this perspective, rhe-
torical agents neither possess, nor share, nor yet lease any rhe-
torical agency. They emerge, together with rhetorical agency, as 
network effects. 
So I’ve continued researching that entire way of thinking, 
a line of reasoning which remains every bit as true and inter-
nally heterogeneous as an alloy. The results are featured all 
the way over in Chapter 6. They are (re)visited wherever the 
text mentions the material-semiotic perspective, according to 
which rhetorical agency inheres in materiality, albeit the kind 
of materiality that’s relational as well as tangible. 
Nevertheless, lying as I was in my hospital bed (though 
that’s an allusion both to Bo Diddley and to the New York 
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Dolls), I kept registering that the typing hand, the one tap-
ping out those e-mail messages to persons, wasn’t somebody 
else’s. No doubt the abstract-and-concrete totality did seem 
more real than it ought to be. But to the extent that it existed, 
then it existed, if at all, not so much for better or worse as for 
me.  There’s undeniably something for each of us, isn’t there, in 
Sarah McLachlan’s “Fumbling Towards Ecstasy”:  “It’s my heart 
that pounds beneath my flesh / It’s my mouth that pushes out 
this breath.” From this perspective, rhetorical agents neither 
possess, nor share, nor lease, nor yet sit around waiting for the 
emergence of any rhetorical agency.  They stake a claim to rhe-
torical agency despite their enmeshment in the network.
So I’ve continued researching that entire way of think-
ing, a line of reasoning which remains every bit as true and 
(shucks) improbable as your presence. The results are featured 
in the place that’s been missing so far — namely, Chapter 5 —
and they are (re)visited wherever the text mentions the existen-
tial-transversal perspective, according to which agency inheres 
in transcendence.
Those little anecdotes, all four of them, might yet become 
bridges and models, entrances into the study of a four-folded 
rhetorical agency. Chapter 7, the conclusion, even offers a 
suggestion for bridging the models, but without effacing the 
boundaries among them. As to whether theory takes the hint, 




Productivity as a Context for Theorizing 
Rhetorical Transaction
In the following study, applying an assemblage-theoreti-
cal approach to a canonical text, we’ll investigate the prospects 
for conceptualizing rhetorical agency as the enactment — the 
production — of social change. Certainly, rhetorical agency is 
often studied as a potential, a capacity first held in reserve by 
speakers and listeners and then, in principle, brought to bear 
during rhetorical transaction (see Campbell or Herndl and 
Licona). Yet it’s important to theorize rhetorical agency as a 
kinetic manifestation, not just as a possible supply of commu-
nicative energies. Doing so would justify our seeking rhetoric’s 
effectivity, our circumventing the suspicion that communica-
tion might only be to mirror the conditions already in place.
Is it possible conceptually to link rhetorical functionality 
with social change? It ought to be. While definitions of “rhet-
oric” abound, the most familiar must be that furnished by 
Aristotle, describing rhetoric as an ability to find the available 
means of persuasion, and thereby affirming that rhetoric’s very 
rationale is to create change. Elsewhere in the Rhetoric, Aristo-
tle adds that “most of the matters with which judgments and 
examination are concerned can be other than they are, for peo-
ple deliberate and examine what they are doing, and [human] 
actions are all of this kind” (Aristotle: On Rhetoric 42). Simi-
larly, in the Nichomachean Ethics, he portrays “the deliberative 
faculty” itself as that through which we engage “things that are 
variable” — not things that simply “move,” but “things that in 
their very being can be otherwise than they are” (McNeill 32).
Today, we are all the more inclined to view social rela-
tions as among these variable, contingent things, these mat-
ters which, through deliberation and other forms of collective 
enterprise, can be made otherwise than they are. In that case, 
it should indeed be possible conceptually to link rhetoric with 
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social change, and even to demonstrate how the former could 
produce the latter.
However, an array of theorists have come to deprecate the 
Aristotelian model as instrumentalist, as attributing to rhetor-
ical utterance the causal efficacy of some philosophical sling-
shot. Commentators have even discerned in that framework a 
“primeval elitism,” the ascription, to certain special speakers, 
of an uncommon will to suasion, an inherent ability to galva-
nize such audiences as would prefer to remain inert (McGee 
22). To be sure, not everyone in rhetorical studies has found 
the Aristotelian view so exceptionable. It does, after all, situate 
the audience as “more than a target, more than a consumer,” 
indeed, as “a kind of collaborative agency for making ongoing 
judgments” (Farrell 96). Still, rhetorical theory has persistently 
developed strategies for exiting from instrumentalism — each 
of them, come to think of it, according less and less agency to 
the human actors who would have to operationalize any genu-
ine social change.
By now, those alternative means of escape have evidently 
allowed researchers to depart from an outworn “logic of influ-
ence,” this latter being the allegation that rhetoric can “modify 
attitudes or induce action on the part of consummate individ-
uals” (Biesecker 232). Thus the successors to the Aristotelian 
position (that cornerstone of the traditional stance) have out-
stripped both the notion that rhetoric might express the resist-
less will of the rhetor, and the notion that rhetoric might stage-
manage the thoughts and behaviors of subjects imagined as 
stable, fully formed, self-sufficient. Even so, the counter-Aristo-
telian approaches have not abolished every last trace of instru-
mentalism, causality, or influence, for they have not left us 
with a vision of rhetoric as contributing nothing. Instead, as 
an overview of the last quarter-century’s worth of rhetorical-
theoretical development could show, each of them has merely 
displaced the locus of rhetorical effectivity.
For, although there have been shifts in the characterization 
of the properly rhetorical mode, rhetorical effectivity is still 
located somewhere. Clearly, it’s no longer located, not exclu-
sively so, at the instrumentalist site of a purposively collabor-
ative intentionality, or at the epistemic site of intra-collective 
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knowledge, or at the critical-constitutive site of interpellative 
expression, or at the just plain constitutive site of self-regen-
erating symbolization, or at the articulatory site where “this 
practice” is linked unobtrusively “to that effect, this text to 
that meaning, this meaning to that reality” (Grossberg qtd. 
in Greene, Another, 34–35). Instead, rhetorical effectivity is 
apparently located at all of these sites, the lot of them inhering 
within what some commentators might go so far as to call the 
social totality.
If we were to reflect on these contemporary viewpoints 
on rhetorical functionality, all of them involving the (often 
occluded) assumption that rhetoric does retain some effectivity, 
we would see that they turn out, without exception, to share an 
emphasis on rhetoric as productive, whether or not that label 
is highlighted in their description. Therefore the point remains 
that, so long as there’s rhetorical effectivity (so long as rhetoric 
is, indeed, productive), we really oughtn’t to have much diffi-
culty finding a theoretical justification for linking rhetoric (say, 
by way of collective action) with genuine social change.
Unfortunately, rhetoric nowadays is not only epistemic, 
duplicitous, constitutive, and articulatory, but also woven into 
an autopoetic social logic, a collective trajectory within which 
speakers and listeners are caught up, but over which they have 
precious little say. Our own project, therefore, will be to help 
repopulate rhetorical transaction by locating precisely the sort 
of agency through which rhetoricity could articulate with social 
change. The contribution here will be to lay out, in contrast to 
much of the rhetorical-theoretical common sense about such 
matters, a conceptual argument designed to upset some wide-
spread notions as to rhetoric’s productivity, and, more specifi-
cally, to counteract an otherwise unfettered trend to diminish 
the role of any human actors. Yet the point of our diverging 
from that trend isn’t to bypass the study of agency as practiced 
within contemporary rhetorical scholarship, nor is it to demol-
ish the most salient of the stances already taken. Instead, it’s to 
protect those positions in their own terms, merely reworking 
their disclosures so as to arrive at a solution.
We should begin by sizing up the problem which the solu-
tion is to engage. It’s that research has arrived at an impasse 
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such that all the different conceptualizations of rhetorical func-
tionality are, in effect, colluding to undo the agency they ought 
to be uncovering. That’s because not even the theorists of an 
epistemic, critical, constitutive, and/or articulatory rhetoric 
can, at present, offer a cogent account of the manner in which 
rhetoric would indeed link with social change.
A Miscellaneously Self-Effacing Rhetorical Agency?
To explain rhetoric’s effectivity in keeping with the accounts 
provided by contemporary theorists is quite a task. Many such 
commentators, it’s only fair to add, would object that, but of 
course, the whole purpose of their theorizing is to “reestab-
lish the primacy of rhetorical agency,” the reestablishment of 
this primacy being prerequisite to any arguments about what 
rhetorical agency might be able to accomplish (Gardner 203). 
So, to rescale the objection, to bring it down to size, let’s note 
that rhetorical theory has, at present, surprisingly little where-
withal for actually reestablishing the primacy of rhetorical 
agency. And let’s even attempt a glancing survey of the lexicon, 
the idiom, in which contemporary theorists are talking about 
the sorts of agency at stake in rhetorical transaction. That way, 
we ought to be able to see that the salient conceptual vocabu-
lary militates against the claim that there’s any agency proper 
to rhetoric to begin with.
Citing Ahern, citing Geisler, citing O’Hair et al., citing 
Turnbull, citing Campbell, and citing Koerber, Amanda Young 
(2008) notes that, while rhetorical agency remains “key to rhe-
torical inquiry,” its definition looks, all of a sudden, to be inor-
dinately “slippery and fluid” (227). Christine J. Gardner (2011) 
concurs. She adds that, even if rhetorical agency does involve 
“the capacity to act,” recent scholars have defined “this slip-
pery term,” rhetorical agency, in a “variety of ways” (203). The 
variety reflects a hydra-headed effort at rehabilitating rheto-
ric in the face of “a postmodern critique” that, decentering the 
subject as traditionally conceived, all but “reduces rhetors” to 
“points of articulation” (Gardner 203). So, although rhetorical 
agency can’t nowadays be treated as the province of a sovereign 
subject, it can at least be studied as ideology, or as power, or 
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as responsibility, or — perhaps a bit disingenuously — as human 
potential, or as resource, or as performance, or as illusion, all of 
these emerging as equally acceptable definitions (Gardner 203).
No wonder Amanda Young would take such care to empha-
size that, when it comes to talk of rhetorical agency, “the chal-
lenge is not simply” to define it, but “to recognize it in context,” 
the implication being that each definition, in stipulating its 
own preferred context, will dictate which sorts of evidentiary 
claims may be admitted in the first place (228). But this must 
be why rhetorical agency is so slippery and fluid: it’s everything 
from the quintessentially ideological and the authentically 
responsible to the inherently performative and the merely illu-
sory. Remarkably, though — as Young further explains, draw-
ing on pieces by Turnbull, by Young and Flower, by Flower, by 
Koerber, by O’Hair et al., and by Campbell — rhetorical agency 
has also managed to acquire certain “fundamental properties,” 
and these include questioning, negotiation, choice, and evalua-
tion (228).
The conundrum, then, is that rhetorical agency is currently 
being conceptualized in a manner that precludes any reestab-
lishment of its primacy, since this is an agency whose own con-
tents, ranging from “choice” to “ideology” — opposites as these 
are — must forever be undertaking a sort of mutual effacement. 
To pursue the point a little further, if only for the sake of clarity, 
let’s consider what happens to rhetorical agency when it’s con-
ceptualized in terms not only of “ideology” but also of “choice.” 
For this amounts to theory’s giving with one hand while taking 
away with the other, as by devising a view in which rhetorical 
agency is nebulously deterministic, but, then again, nebulously 
voluntaristic, too.
Rhetoricity Bound, Unbounded, and Both
If we could try to keep “ideology” and “choice” apart for just 
a heuristic moment, then “ideology,” pure and simple, would 
refer to a framework (for our thought and action) which is 
quintessentially directive, justificatory, comprehensive or total-
istic in tendency, and unconscious. By contrast, “choice,” pure 
and simple, would imply our ability willfully to opt out of any 
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framework whatever, no matter how directive and totalis-
tic that framework might be. But the definition of “ideology” 
contradicts the definition of “choice,” just as the definition of 
“choice” contradicts the definition of “ideology.” And even if 
choice really is a “fundamental property” of rhetorical agency, 
there’s no self-evident method for distinguishing between, on 
the one side, a determined, ideological modality of choice and, 
on the other side, an untrammeled, voluntaristic modality of 
choice (Young 228). Therefore, a rhetorical agency in which 
“ideology” is theoretically sutured to “choice” must be next to 
useless, for the reason that it is too voluntaristic to be tenable, 
and yet too deterministic to make any difference.
To be sure, many of us would hew to the position that even 
ideology can’t be seamless, that it necessarily betrays internal 
fissures. As Christian O. Lundberg (2009) asks, in rejoinder to 
Ronald Walter Greene, what about “failed interpellations,” and 
what about “impotence in the governing apparatus?” (183). 
But the question as to interpellative failure and/or managerial 
incompetence is still separate from the question as to choice. 
For choice, pure and simple, would be sometimes to choose 
against competent and even successful interpellations. There-
fore “choice” remains tied to voluntarism, whereas “ideology” 
(successful, incompetent, or whatever) remains tied to deter-
minism instead. At the same time, so long as rhetoricity is pro-
miscuously distributed between an improbable determinism 
and an unworkable voluntarism, then to say that its agency 
equates to “human potential” is to say nothing about it at all 
(Gardner 203).
If we were in a position to recognize whether it’s the deter-
ministically ideological that trumps the voluntaristically cho-
sen, or whether it’s the other way around, then we would be 
able to decide whether rhetorical transaction can make things 
otherwise than they are. But not only are we not in any such 
position, we are not even in a position to rule, other than 
by resorting to theoretical fiat, on so much as the difference 
between the ideological and the chosen. For, on the one side, 
there’s the never-ending regress of the ideological, to which 
theorists can retreat against the threat of voluntarism, and, on 
the other side, there’s the never-ending regress of the chosen, 
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to which theorists can retreat against the threat of determin-
ism. The only way out of either regress would be to make a 
flat-out assertion, as by saying “Yes, determinism trumps vol-
untarism, or “Yes, voluntarism flouts determinism,” or, alterna-
tively, “Yes, both determinism and voluntarism are just as irre-
ducible as can be.”
As for the question of consensus, well, according to Chris-
tine J. Gardner and others (see, for example, Lundberg and 
Gunn 102), the best that contemporary rhetorical theory has 
to offer in the way of a leading indication, in the way of a state-
ment that evokes “the essence of the plurality of views,” must 
be Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s celebrated argument of 2005, 
an argument in which rhetorical agency is disclosed as pro-
miscuous, protean, perverse, and even paradoxical (Gardner 
203). Indeed, if research into agency is travel, then Campbell’s 
“Agency: Promiscuous and Protean” has become a must-see 
attraction, highlighted as such in a substantive, even sump-
tuous brochure titled The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Stud-
ies (2009), edited by Lunsford, Wilson, and Eberly. That refer-
ence work begins with a series of “road-maps” for the student 
of rhetoric, one of them explaining exactly where to look for 
“Rhetorical Agents and Agency” (xxi–xxiv). Many individual 
studies are cited there, though in a manner not so much eco-
nomical as abstemious. It’s only in the case of Campbell’s text 
that the editors include entire paragraphs, one after the other. 
And this must be to leave no doubt that, no matter how many 
miscellaneous treatments there may be to choose from, Camp-
bell’s “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean” is, for the foreseeable 
future, pretty much the last word on this slippery and fluid 
topic.
But if rhetorical agency can really be as miscellaneous as 
Campbell indicates, then it will have to be not only slippery 
and fluid but homogeneous as well. It will have to populate the 
black box of rhetorical transaction with, for example, “power” 
as indistinguishable from “illusion,” and with “ideology” as 
coextensive with “choice,” all of these inhering, precisely as the-
orized in contemporary rhetorical studies, in one and the same 
rhetorical agency. Meanwhile, any rhetorical agency conceptu-
alized in this way will forever be canceling itself out. For, under 
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a description of rhetorical agency as so interminably miscella-
neous, whatever is (for example) authentically and voluntaris-
tically progressive about rhetorical agency can, in theory, also 
prove to be whatever is treacherous, deterministic, and retro-
gressive about rhetorical agency. The problem becomes that, so 
long as rhetorical agency is all things to all rhetorical theorists, 
it’s just too plain fluid and promiscuous to help us establish any 
intelligible connection between rhetorical functionality and 
genuine social change.
Variegation (Not Conglomeration)
We do seem presented with a conception of rhetorical agency 
as, on the one side, surprisingly complicated (for this is an 
agency that can collocate everything from hard-core power 
to solipsistic illusion) and yet, on the other side, astonish-
ingly simple (for this very same agency is not just sometimes 
but always elusive). Still, to the extent that the line of reason-
ing pursued by Campbell does remain helpful, then we should 
embrace the possibilities it discloses. Indeed, the internal struc-
ture of Campbell’s own argument suggests an expedient for 
simplifying the busyness, and yet for complicating the single-
mindedness, that attends the present-day theorization of rhe-
torical agency. For, even as “Agency: Protean and Promiscuous” 
implies that rhetorical agency must always be undoing itself, it 
also implies that rhetorical agency must always be proceeding 
from somewhere — and not just from anywhere, but from four 
sites in particular. These are the sites of rhetorical subjectivity, 
rhetorical conventionality, rhetorical transcendence, and rhe-
torical materiality.
In Campbell’s essay, to be explored later, we’ll notice four 
main collectors into which it seems possible to distribute all 
the otherwise miscellaneous features of rhetorical agency. 
Subjectivity, for example, might be a collector for what writ-
ers such as Gaonkar would call the ideological, and what writ-
ers such as Condit or Gunn would call the illusory (Gardner 
203; Young 227). And materiality (whether referring to a pre-
formed sort of materiality, or to a “performance” of materiality, 
or to some other condition of materiality) might be a collec-
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tor for whatever aspects of rhetorical transaction do involve an 
object-like exteriority (Gardner 203).
Meanwhile, convention, or conventionality, might be a 
collector for significations, discourses, social norms, mores, 
shared values or anything else functioning as a “resource” 
(Gardner 203) to facilitate “negotiation” (Young 228). Finally, 
transcendence might be a collector for “human potential” 
(Gardner 203), understood in terms of “choice,” “questioning,” 
“evaluation,” and “responsibility” (Young 228). If so, these lat-
ter references, to human potential and the rest, would then be 
allusions to the role that rhetoric can arguably play in creating 
a better shared world for all the participants.
But to complicate rhetorical agency by folding it into four 
is not to suggest that any particular feature, dimension, and/
or property of rhetorical agency — such as “power” — would 
belong, without question, inside this, that, the other, or the 
next of the four collectors (Gardner 203). To the contrary, it 
might very well remain nomadic, capable of migrating among 
the sites of subjectivity, conventionality, materiality, and tran-
scendence. The point, however, is that to fold rhetorical agency 
into four would be to highlight the potential for an interactive, 
rather than internecine, collaboration among its constituents. 
In other words, while it’s merely self-defeating to decide that 
rhetorical agency can be the stapling of “ideology” to “choice,” 
it’s at least workable to shift to a view of rhetorical agency as 
roomy enough for both subjectivity and transcendence — so 
long as it’s understood that these, in remaining distinct and 
separable, would remain other to one another. Under such cir-
cumstances, rhetorical agency might prove internally hetero-
geneous and yet parliamentary, as in Kenneth Burke’s usage, 
where all the participatory “sub-certainties,” none of them 
“precisely right” or “precisely wrong,” are equally “contribu-
tory” (512–13).
For now, though, we are left with a rhetorical agency so 
uniformly fluid, so universally promiscuous, so unanimously 
perverse as to constitute not a conversation but a collective 
misapprehension. It’s a misprision such that the theorists of a 
voluntaristic rhetorical agency and the theorists of a determin-
istic rhetorical agency are always talking past one another, and 
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always in a slaloming “monologue” that, leaving all the “sub-
certainties” precisely wrong, effectively reproduces “everything 
in its image” (Burke 512). Thus some hypothetical eavesdrop-
per, curious to know whether rhetorical transaction can con-
duce to genuine social change, would nowadays hear (out of 
the left side of her headset) that it can’t, and also (out of the 
right side) that it can, and she would be left nonplussed as to 
how rhetoricity could ever live up to its rationale, its task of 
helping make things otherwise than they are.
But even if we do have to concede that rhetorical agency 
is both deterministic and voluntaristic, we ought to treat the 
concession itself, with the internal heterogeneity it actually 
bespeaks, as warrant for the claim that rhetorical agency is 
irreducible to any unitary substance, no matter how protean 
and promiscuous. After all, the risk we face (namely, that those 
aspects of rhetorical agency which we’d prefer to align with 
choice, free will, and the like, might yet be explained away as 
epiphenomenal to some overarching social logic) is not to be 
overcome by just any approach yielding a more complicated 
account of rhetorical agency. It can only be overcome by an 
approach which clearly divulges its philosophical commit-
ments. Although these would probably not be commitments to 
an unabashed determinism (the latter obliterating any prospect 
of human agency), they might still be commitments to some 
conflicted truce between voluntarism and its counterpart.
Unfortunately, writers on rhetorical functionality are not, 
in fact, tending to disclose their philosophical commitments. 
Instead, they are avoiding the subject altogether. That’s what it 
means for them continually to elaborate on rhetoric’s means 
or mechanisms, while continually pleading ignorance as to 
rhetoric’s ends or purposes — even at a time when the “funda-
mental properties” of rhetorical agency (questioning, negotia-
tion, choice, evaluation) appear, in theory, to be dissolving into 
determinism by another name (Young 228).
To illustrate, we’ll consider a couple of projects aiming to 
highlight rhetoric’s temporality (very much as requested by 
Trapani in 2009), yet managing to chug along without betray-
ing the least hint as to whether we should read this rhetorical 
fluidity as confirming either that (a) people can often exceed 
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the confines of social structure, or else that (b) people are per-
petually shuffled between social-theoretical concentration 
camps.
In “Un/Framing Models of Public Distribution” (2005), 
Jenny Edbauer does help us see that the so-called “elements” 
of the rhetorical situation, with “exigence” as a case in point, 
are neither particularly discrete nor impossibly indeterminate. 
Better to say that all aspects of rhetoric “bleed” beyond their 
heuristically constructed borders (Edbauer 9). So rhetorical 
utterance betokens an ecology, a “viral economy,” where com-
munication occurs not as instrumentalist transmission but as 
affective spreading — indeed, as “shared contagion” (Edbauer 
13, 18). On the minus side, though, the author manages to 
avoid taking any stand as to whether rhetoric’s contagiousness 
means that interlocutors remain free to exercise an inalien-
able capacity for choice, or whether it instead means that they 
are forced, through communicative processes, into just those 
“affective channels” prescribed for them (21). In short, we still 
cannot tell, not even after the author’s so successfully compli-
cating the means of communication, what it would actually 
be (choice? interpellation? having being born that way?) that 
finally animates rhetorical transaction.
It’s the same story, and not by coincidence, with The Avail-
able Means of Persuasion: Mapping a Theory and Pedagogy of 
Multimodal Public Rhetoric (2012). There, Sheridan, Ridolfo, 
and Michel declare that they “find it essential to preserve some 
understanding of rhetorical agency,” before adding, as if for the 
sake of balance, that “we do not increase our agency by pre-
tending that it exists apart from a complex network of human 
and nonhuman agents” (107). Unfortunately, the authors grad-
ually translate the term “agency” into the term “velocity” — and 
that’s to beg the question. For, even if “velocity” does describe 
the career of agency, we’re still in the dark as to what would 
go, as it were, into the agency whose career is being described. 
While they do offer valuable insights into rhetoric’s multi-
modal turn, these writers neglect to divulge any fundamental 
philosophical commitment either way, whether to a view of 
rhetorical agency as bespeaking (even to the teeniest, tiniest 
extent) an absolutely irreducible human capacity, or else to a 
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view of rhetorical agency as betokening a totalistic social force 
that’s puppeteering everybody from behind the scenes.
So there’s a deficiency in such works, each of them toil-
ing (head-down) in its own vineyard, but each in its own way 
pleading ignorance, rather than taking any stand on rhetorical 
voluntarism, or on rhetorical determinism, or on both. These 
treatments don’t, of course, tell us what to think; they tell us 
only what to think about. Nevertheless, in their single-minded 
focus on the means of communication, they siphon away atten-
tion from the ends of communication, from the question as to 
whatever it is that communication might be good for in the 
first place.
Meanwhile, there cannot, in the absence of any defensi-
ble rationale for studying rhetorical transaction, be any justi-
fication for researchers’ gesturing to the virus-like spreading 
of rhetorical utterances, or for their adducing the acceleration 
or deceleration of such utterances within multimodal ecolo-
gies. That’s because the problem with comparing utterances 
to viruses is the same as with comparing the contents of com-
munication to genes (and the contexts for communication to 
organisms). It’s that the biologistic analogy is fictive, anyway.
Let’s recall that when contemporary researchers in the so-
called hard sciences do hypothesize about the constitution 
and behavior of genes, organisms, viruses, and the rest, they’re 
expected to ground their claims, or their speculations, not in 
just nothing, but, rather, in a set of assumptions as to the avail-
ability of a “code script” (Schrödinger, cited in Benítez Bribi-
esca 30). A hermeneutic key of this kind places boundaries on 
what can reasonably be said about the problem in question. An 
oncologist, for example, will assume that the “genetic informa-
tion” necessary for understanding a particular virus must, in 
the first place, be “stored in a relatively stable molecule such as 
DNA,” such that any knowledge about the molecule can, hence-
forth, inform any knowledge about the virus (Benítez Bribiesca 
30). What’s more, such an assumption will itself be grounded 
theoretically, just as the theory in turn will be grounded philo-
sophically. Thus, in the instance of the oncologist who appeals 
to DNA, or to relatively stable molecules, or to code scripts, 
the underlying philosophical commitment might be followed 
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all the way back to Immanuel Kant, who laid the conceptual 
groundwork for any subsequent confidence as to the correla-
tion between thought, or representation, and reality.
By contrast, contemporary rhetorical scholars typically 
remain silent as to precisely which code script, if any, could 
serve as their interpretive template — and also as to precisely 
which philosophical commitment(s), if any, could justify their 
investigation to begin with. So it’s no wonder when this or that 
study, its scope so circumspectly limited to the moment of cir-
culation, contributes no findings to help us decide whether 
rhetorical agency belongs to voluntarism, or to determinism, or 
to both of these at the same time. The only alternative (i.e., to 
turning this blind eye of circumspection) would be for the the-
orists, the ones tasked with shaping the direction of research 
into rhetorical functionality, to decide whether they’re commit-
ted to voluntarism, or to determinism, or to both. And, for that 
to happen, these same theorists would have to confront, rather 
than gloss over, the difference at stake among the options.
Alas, rhetorical studies presently risks vitiation by virtue of 
its own magnanimity, its agnosticism on the question of what 
could finally keep the options apart, preventing them from dis-
solving into one another. We find this toxic generosity at play 
in even the most rigorous attempts to differentiate among 
stances, for example, in the editorial paraphernalia for the col-
lection Rhetoric and Philosophy (1990).
There, Richard Cherwitz manages a remarkable feat of 
translation, carefully surveying a number of rhetorical-theoret-
ical universes in such a manner as to render them interchange-
able. For, on the one side, he maintains that we should cer-
tainly inspect the philosophical assumptions that underlie the 
various “conceptions of rhetoric,” given that those assumptions 
and conceptions already map out the “different ways in which 
the legitimacy of the rhetorical enterprise can be secured” (3, 
9). But, on the other side, he maintains that any specific choice 
we might make as to “philosophical perspective,” i.e., as to our 
rationale for pursuing Option A rather than Option B, will 
remain “a matter of preference” (10). So, according to Cher-
witz, writing twenty-five years ago, the “significance of there 
being a plurality of possible groundings of the rhetorical enter-
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prise” — groundings such as realism, relativism, critical ratio-
nalism, idealism, materialism, existentialism, deconstruction, 
and pragmatism — “resides in just the tensions among them,” 
with the implication that all of the tensions are already getting 
along famously (xviii).
By now, it does seem that many researchers are con-
tent with just that sort of assessment. If all the philosophical 
assumptions do fall to our preferential disposal, then let’s be 
charitable and uplift the lot of them in one fell swoop. Let’s 
even prefer to suture them together, so long as we’re not too 
individualistic about it. Since there’s just the one “rhetorical 
world” (a continuous “landscape,” a Mobius strip) for all the 
different approaches to address, each of the viewpoints can 
presumably contribute a certain something of its own (Cher-
witz 4). To be sure, such permissiveness will mean that rheto-
ric becomes not just pluralistic, but promiscuous and protean, 
too. Any stretch of rhetoricity will prove as amenable, say, to 
existentialist analysis as to relativist analysis. But now that all 
the viewpoints have been globalized, we can domesticate, i.e., 
dismiss as merely local, any tension between the deterministic 
and its other.
At a moment like this, the objection might arise that it’s 
ill-mannered to cast such aspersions upon the state of the rhe-
torical art. Why shouldn’t everyone’s theoretical perspective be 
a matter of preference — and why shouldn’t a thousand flow-
ers bloom, here in the one rhetorical world? Well, the answer 
is, in part, that “preference” isn’t applicable, as we’ll see when 
we visit Nathan Stormer’s conception of the will to matter. But 
the rest of the answer, calling for explanation now, is that there 
isn’t the one rhetorical world, anyway.
To accept the line of reasoning above, that which we’ve 
associated with Richard Cherwitz (but which is by now ubiqui-
tous) would be to accept that rhetorical theory already consti-
tutes a tableau — a self-evident body of developments for just 
anyone to study, and if not exactly from nowhere, then still 
from a standpoint that makes no difference. That’s a notion of 
the kind which Annemarie Mol (1999) has critiqued as per-
spectivalism. It’s the belief, ostensibly pluralistic, that view-
points cannot really matter, that the “object” of our “gazes and 
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glances” remains pristine, safely concealed from our particular 
ways of seeing (Mol, “Ontological Politics,” 76.)
True, there’s always the conundrum as to what might hap-
pen to an object that’s inaccessible, that’s withdrawn from us. 
But that’s separate from the question of what might happen to 
an object that’s disclosed to us. In the latter case, Mol would 
contend that any perspective we adopt must be, to some greater 
or lesser extent, an ontological intervention, a productive, co-
constitutive interaction with that which is being observed. So, 
to adopt this or that viewpoint (even on something as multi-
ple as contemporary rhetorical theory) isn’t merely to adopt a 
stance consistent with the object. It’s also to adopt an object 
consistent with the stance.
The claim might sound preposterous. Surely it’s the other 
way around; surely the stance, the perspective, the viewpoint 
must be accountable to the object — and unilaterally so. Don’t 
we already know as much because of those paradigm shifts, 
those unilateral sorts of development which operate every-
where, even, as Thomas Kuhn has reported, in “normal” sci-
ence? For, if it’s true that paradigms, or interpretive frame-
works, are overthrown by reason of their inconsistency with 
the data, then just any scientific revolution can show that, 
whereas viewpoints have always been ephemeral, the objects 
of the viewpoints have always been fixed, waiting around for 
the benefit of whichever would be the next, more nearly per-
fect perspective.
But that isn’t, after all, the best way to read a paradigm 
shift. It isn’t that Object X prevails, surviving the shift, per-
sisting undaunted as Paradigm A concedes to Paradigm B. 
Instead, as Kuhn (2000) himself explains, it’s that the old object 
vanishes from the scene contemporaneously with its support 
system, and always in favor of its rival, the Object Y which Par-
adigm B has managed to promote instead. A quite charismatic 
example concerns the element formerly known as phlogiston, 
once a prime candidate for explaining the processes of com-
bustion, but eventually driven out of the picture, hand in hand 
with its own paradigm, by the element currently known as oxy-
gen. And if we do grant the interdependence of the object (say, 
phlogiston as guest) and the paradigm (say, phlogiston chemis-
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try as host), then we’re ready to concede that perspectives, too, 
can be ontological interventions.
Returning now to the rhetorical-theoretical object, the tab-
leau with which we’ve begun, we should be able to see that, 
because perspectives are indeed ontological interventions, it’s 
most improbable that the perspectives aligned with volun-
tarism could be engaged in building just the same reality, or 
world, or landscape as the perspectives aligned with determin-
ism. The voluntaristic perspectives would be inculcating a real-
ity where agency persisted as irreducible beyond free will. But 
the deterministic perspectives, by contrast, would be inculcat-
ing a reality where rhetorical agency reduced to the workings 
of collective force, of social logic. So the better conclusion is 
that rhetorical voluntarism and rhetorical determinism must 
belong to incommensurable ontologies, each of which entails a 
radically divergent set of possibilities for rhetorical transaction.
Now, with respect to normal-scientific research, Kuhn’s 
later work shows that, while it’s an error to conflate progress 
with unproblematic linearity, and while we “cannot get from 
the old to the new simply by an addition to what was already 
known,” there is always some non-trivial change between the 
before and the after (15). To be sure, since any paradigm shift 
will involve the displacement of one language by another, each 
phase of development requires its own, carefully hermeneutic 
explication:
Consider the compound sentence, “In the Ptolemaic 
system planets revolve about the earth; in the Coper-
nican they revolve about the sun.” Strictly construed, 
that sentence is incoherent. The first occurrence of 
the term ‘planet’ is Ptolemaic, the second Coperni-
can, and the two attach to nature differently. For no 
univocal reading of the term ‘planet’ is the compound 
sentence true.  (Kuhn 15)
Yet it’s not as if the normal-scientific researcher is permitted, 
every now and again, to start appealing to the Ptolemaic par-
adigm, or to Aristotelian physics, or to phlogiston chemistry. 
In each of these cases, which are among Kuhn’s main illustra-
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tions, a formerly available cross-section of reality — let’s call it 
a reality as such — has long since gone away. And, now that the 
ontological checkbox for an entire assemblage (terms, refer-
ents, and all) has been de-selected, the language in question is 
no longer vital, no longer viable to speak.
By contrast, in contemporary rhetorical studies, volun-
tarism and determinism are practically coeval, equally per-
missible for researchers to invoke. Just ask Richard Cherwitz, 
with his insistence that, while there are, of course, alternative 
perspectives — such as relativism and existentialism — for the 
rhetorical scholar to adopt, all of these are still compatible. It’s 
as if they’re only alternative lenses upon the self-same world 
(where, or so one imagines, phlogiston and oxygen might be 
able collaboratively to explain combustion).
But this difficult contemporaneity means that we are con-
fronted with a hermeneutic task of our own. Over there, in 
Kuhnian normal science, researchers can resort to concepts 
such as punctuated equilibrium to capture the logical form 
underlying “development.” For while it’s true that normal-sci-
entific paradigms are separated by chronology, what’s more 
important is that they are separated by difference, by the 
incompatibility that makes their juxtaposition worthwhile.
Over here, though, in contemporary rhetorical studies, it’s 
all equilibrium and no punctuation, or at least seemingly so. 
Our own interpretive problem, therefore, includes recovering 
the missing separations, reclaiming the forgotten boundaries 
between rhetorical-theoretical perspectives. And since mere 
chronology is even less relevant for rhetorical studies than for 
normal science, the starting point is to acknowledge that differ-
ent rhetorical paradigms do, after all, bespeak different ontolo-
gies. These alternative realities are so very much separated, so 
clearly punctuated by their radical incommensurability, that it 
would be quite the distortion to speak of them as belonging to 
one and the same world, or landscape, or rhetorical-theoretical 
tableau.
Now, one might assume that the rhetorical scholars of 
today, with their recourse to approaches like actor-network 
theory, object-oriented ontology, and so on, must already have 
begun contemplating the incommensurability among para-
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digms. They must already have started noticing the distinc-
tions that would re-punctuate, re-differentiate, re-heterogenize 
the rhetorical-theoretical tableau. But exactly the opposite has 
been happening, with even the most forward-looking of proj-
ects tending to contribute yet more elisions through which to 
characterize the singularly unworkable world. That’s apparently 
the case for Thomas Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric (2013), which, 
in addition to arguing that there’s just the one reality for rheto-
ric to be grounded in, also lapses into what would seem to be a 
misreading, a misprision of what we’ve earlier, borrowing from 
Annemarie Mol, learned to call “perspectivalism.”
To illustrate, we’ll read just enough from Rickert to show 
that the author must have forgotten that alternative paradigms 
are not, in fact, reducible to alternative lenses on a single real-
ity. They are not, in other words, dismissible as the “many gazes 
and glances,” all directed at a state of affairs that’s everywhere 
the same (Mol, “Ontological Politics,” 76). To the contrary, they 
are ontological (not purely epistemological) interventions, each 
of them capable of unleashing its own objects, its own inter-
ferences, and its own possibilities for development. The disap-
pointment, then, is that Rickert contends with perspectivalism 
by trivializing it:
There is no “my” way and “your” way of seeing the 
world, no epistemological windows on a (stable, 
objective) world “out there” that in turn substantiates 
cultural relativisms. Rather, world is already impli-
cated, and hence it both generates and participates 
in who we are. Worldviews, then, as ways of seeing 
an already preexistent world, are not originary but 
derive from this more fundamental weddedness to 
world. (xvi)
So, yes, it’s hearteningly monogamous of Rickert to be over 
here, deploying his perspectival (existentialist, phenomenol-
ogist, and object-oriented) resources in just such a manner 
as to consolidate the one rhetorical world. At the same time, 
it’s equally monogamous for other sorts of researchers to be 
over there, someplace else, deploying their own perspectival 
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resources, consolidating a different rhetorical world to which 
we’re fundamentally wedded, anyway.
To be sure, we might still be enamored with the prospect 
of arriving at an ambient rhetoric. If so, then all we really 
need to reject is the notion that it’s desirable for there to be 
this singular environment for rhetoric’s perambulations, this 
cohesive ecology with a nice big auditorium in the middle —
a mead hall where the many heralds may gather to be heard, 
as in Michel Callon’s (1986) turn of phrase, speaking in uni-
son. Rickert (with his presumption that weddedness-to-world 
comes first, that situated viewpoint comes second) might not 
hear himself in that famous character from the short story, that 
curiously utopian figure who claims to be “not even from a 
place, just from near a place” (O’Connor 188). But rhetorical 
theorists do have to be from somewhere, and (to judge from 
those Graeco-Germanic intonations) Rickert must be from the 
paradigm that we’ll later identify as the existential-transversal 
landscape of rhetorical agency. It’s not, come to think of it, so 
bad a perspective to be from, not if you’d like to keep company 
with the specifically human actor. But it isn’t the only environ-
ment accessible from within contemporary rhetorical scholar-
ship — nor is it, not by a long chalk, the only auditorium where 
the many theoretical voices might gather as one.
Still, we should notice that, when it comes to Rickert’s own 
stance on rhetorical functionality, the operative word is “prepa-
ratory” (269). It’s to propose that, while there might not really 
be any ambient rhetoric just yet, we can still do our best to 
help bring it into being. In that case, if we’re at all interested 
in trailing just such an ambient rhetoric, we should probably 
say the whole enterprise seems prematurely prospective, con-
tingent for now upon the taxing (not even preparatory, but, as 
it were, pre-preparatory) work necessary to clear the way.
So how, under such circumstances, might rhetorical theory 
(writing an internally heterogeneous sentence about rhetorical 
agency) begin to establish not even a preparatory, but simply 
a pre-preparatory clearing for the consideration of (a) volun-
tarism, and (b) determinism, and (c) both of these together? 
The answer isn’t that we should look around for a bigger-
and-better code script, a template anticipatory enough for 
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everything. Instead, it’s that we should visit, and learn to take 
equally seriously, the four conceptual landscapes where rhetor-
ical agency is already being manufactured, regardless that the 
(Kuhnian) hermeneutic key in force over here might differ rad-
ically from the one in force over there.
If we concentrate on dominant terms (rather than on pro-
prietary critical constructs or arbitrary philosophical prefer-
ences) we can start to see that, of the four main rhetorical-
theoretical realities we’re to visit, each will involve a different 
orientation to the problem of voluntarism-and-determinism. 
The social-structural landscape, grounded in the subjective, 
will be clearly deterministic, whereas the material-semiotic 
landscape, grounded in the material-and-relational, will be 
confusedly so. By contrast, the existential-transversal land-
scape, grounded in the transcendent, will be strikingly volun-
taristic, even in comparison to the rhetorical-humanistic land-
scape, which is grounded in the conventional. In this case, it’ll 
be the former that knows where it stands, the latter, not so 
much.
But our project becomes that of traveling and document-
ing, of reporting on what each of the four ontologies can tell 
us about the inconsistent constitution of rhetoric’s agency. Our 
discoveries might, in time, pre-prepare subsequent research-
ers to see that rhetoricity does involve not only the subjectiv-
ity, conventionality, and materiality that continually constitute 
things as they are, but also the transcendence that continu-
ally makes things otherwise. And, in that case, our hypothet-
ical eavesdropper might begin to hear, out of both sides of 
her headset, that the productivity of rhetorical transaction is 
indeed such as to conduce to genuine social change, regardless 
that there’s rhetorical determinism, and regardless that there’s 
rhetorical voluntarism as well.
Since there’s no time like the present for packing, we’ll shift 
to a chapter on selecting some theoretical-and-practical equip-
ment to keep our travailing light. In subsequent chapters, the 
third through the sixth (and toting our knapsack’s worth of 
tackle), we’ll journey to this, that, the other, and the next of the 
four landscapes of rhetorical agency. At the end, in Chapter 7, 
we’ll reflect on the prospects, the options for conceptualizing 
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A Four-Folded Rhetorical Agency
Let’s stock up at one theoretical storehouse in partic-
ular, a statement which may yet turn out to offer the last word 
on the slippery and fluid topic of rhetorical agency. Admittedly, 
“Agency: Promiscuous and Protean,” Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s 
now-canonical essay of 2005, runs through so many consider-
ations as to imply countless features, or aspects, or dimensions 
of rhetorical agency. Yet the multiplicity resolves into just a few 
thematic clusters, and these, upon closer examination, turn out 
to involve only four central considerations.
Rhetorical agency involves a certain interiority, and this is 
the theme that Campbell addresses in her references to subjec-
tivity, i.e., to the private, though socially-framed “condition” of 
the agent construed as a thinker and perceiver, and not only 
as a producer and/or recipient of communication (3). But rhe-
torical agency also involves a certain exteriority, and this must 
have to do with the materiality of the actually existing world —
including, of course, the human corporeality which acquires 
“identities related to gender, race, class, and the like.” That’s not 
all there is to the sense in which rhetorical agency is enmeshed 
in a reality external to subjectivity. Someplace beyond the rhe-
torical agent is a system of public resources, referring, on the 
one side, to structures of “institutional power” and, on the 
other side, to structures of symbolicity, linguisticality, inven-
tion, artistry, and so on (Campbell 1). These collective assets 
point to the externality of convention. Still, not even the sub-
jective, the material, and the conventional put together are 
enough to account for rhetorical agency proper. There must 
also be a place or moment for that slippage through which 
rhetoric, as abstract, symbolic action, comes to participate in 
concrete, historical action. The label which Campbell adopts 
for this slippage is transcendence — a term implying rhetoric’s 
role in creating change, and emancipatory change, at that (8).
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So we’re discovering the notions of rhetorical subjectivity, 
rhetorical conventionality, rhetorical transcendence, and rhe-
torical materiality to be adumbrated in Karlyn Kohrs Camp-
bell’s own “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean” (2005). Yet it’s 
not as if Campbell is the only theorist to have engaged these 
terms, or to have highlighted their interplay. It’s just that 
she’s the only theorist to have so noticeably gathered all four 
of them into the one place, at least implicitly acknowledg-
ing their mutual imbrication in the constitution of rhetorical 
agency. While each of the four terms might cover an array of 
more technical meanings, we should at least address their base-
line usages. That’d be in the interest of keeping the denotations 
apart, of protecting them from dissolution into one another. 
For if we inspect the concepts at stake in “subjectivity,” “con-
ventionality,” “transcendence,” and “materiality,” we find that 
these are not, in fact, synonymous, but clearly distinct.
The term “subjectivity” does gather up the conditions, 
properties, and qualities, the constructs and perceptions, 
belonging to the mind, rather than to whatever might lie 
beyond the mind. Certainly, there are disagreements as to the 
constitution of this interiority, which might today be under-
stood either as that sovereign subjectivity held to have prolif-
erated during modernism, starting circa 1650, or else as that 
subjected subjectivity held to have entered the scene with post-
modernism and poststructuralism, or even as that ambiguous 
subjectivity (held to be socially-constrained in some ways but 
left free in others) posited in existentialist, phenomenological, 
and hermeneutic visions of the self. Still, those disagreements 
don’t impinge upon the basic distinction between interiority 
and everything else.
It’s conceivable that there might be nothing but mind. Yet 
there does remain a counter-conception, and this is to argue for 
the existence, in addition to mind, of something at least exter-
nal enough to matter. The counter-conception invokes an outer 
dispensation, one whose spatiotemporal features (including 
those of our own resistant-and-malleable corporeality) often 
require us to engage them in a manner other than by merely 
thinking about them. The term materiality then refers to those 
conditions pertaining to the Great Outdoors (Meillassoux 7). 
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For, even if materiality itself were a projection from interior-
ity, it might just as well be way over yonder in the “worldwide 
world” (Lee and Stenner 108, but also see Scarry 3).
At the same time, it’s evident that the spatiotemporal fea-
tures of the non-interior world include the other people, just 
as it’s evident that we ourselves, regardless of how much interi-
ority, how much subjectivity we may have to our credit, do not 
interact with those spatiotemporal features on an exclusively 
ad hoc, let alone arbitrary basis. To the contrary, we routinely 
collaborate, in a regularized rather than chaotic manner, with 
the disparate components of that outer dispensation. But the 
available means for collaboration (ranging all the way from the 
grammatical resources upholding our capacity for predication, 
to the guidelines we adopt for interchanges with others — and 
not only with human others) are not, in fact, synonymous with 
our subjectivity, nor are they synonymous with any features of 
the external world. Instead, they highlight the always-revisable 
relationships, the bridges, between the interior and its coun-
terpart.
This latter consideration is worth elaborating, given that, 
with the entrance of a Nietszchean hermeneutics of suspicion 
(see Ricoeur, 1970, or, more wickedly, Greene, 1998), every 
conventionalized “truth,” and about anything from commu-
nicative reference to sociality as such, seems unmasked as a 
collective imposture, a deception “binding for all” (Nietszche 
146). Sure, as Nietzsche does emphasize, to be caught in a lie 
would leave a speaker vulnerable to the same risk as just any-
one bypassing the “established conventions,” this being the risk 
of embarrassment upon exposure (143). But to concede the 
point about transgression is not to concede that all of conven-
tionality is imposture.
We don’t view conventional medicine, or conventional 
mortgages, or conventional welding techniques, or conven-
tional religion, or conventional warfare as if these belong 
merely to the conventional wisdom. Instead, we classify them 
with practices, which, rather than reducing to any “estab-
lished” proprieties, frequently remain among the efficacious, 
if not necessarily optimal expedients for (as we say) getting 
things done. So convention, as in the conventionality of prac-
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tice, remains halfway between the negotiated and the inelucta-
ble. To the extent that it’s revisable, such convention may seem 
arbitrary. But to the extent that it’s practicable, then it can’t be 
so arbitrary, after all. To the contrary, it’s an interface between 
people and a world not built entirely to their specifications.
It does seem that collaboration can take place only with the 
aid of a shareable repertory for making connections, for medi-
ating between interiority and exteriority. So, at least in the con-
text of rhetorical transaction, “convention” refers neither to a 
unidirectional constraint that’s imposed, as by an autonomous 
subject, upon the merely hapless world, nor, of course, to a 
unidirectional constraint that’s imposed, as by an autonomous 
world, upon the merely hapless subject. Insofar as it describes 
the adoptable means for interaction, convention is a term for 
those variable but non-arbitrary styles of linkage between sub-
jectivity and materiality.
Already, we can see that subjectivity, materiality, and con-
ventionality are three entirely unassimilable considerations. 
If there were only subjectivity, then we wouldn’t ever inter-
act with anything other than our own minds, in which case 
we wouldn’t be so very much preoccupied with the concept of 
materiality. On the other hand, if there were only materiality, 
then we wouldn’t be preoccupied with any concepts at all. So, 
just as the concept of subjectivity argues that there’s materiality, 
the concept of materiality, in turn, argues that there’s subjec-
tivity, and then neither of the concepts is optional. Meanwhile, 
if there’s subjectivity on the one side, materiality on the other, 
and if the two sides have to be linked in a regularized, non-ar-
bitrary manner, then the concept of convention isn’t optional, 
either. Instead, “subjectivity,” “materiality,” and “conventional-
ity” are equally mandatory, and this is for the reason that each 
of the three terms has to remain separable from its others in 
order to connect them.
But when it comes to the concept of “transcendence,” we 
discover that the latter cannot be contained by or subsumed 
under the three, equally mandatory terms we’ve considered so 
far. The transcendent is that which exceeds any ordinary limits, 
whether of subjectivity, or of materiality, or of conventional-
ity, or of all three put together. In a quite common usage, tran-
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scendence might refer simply to excellence — to a certain going 
beyond all expectations. But transcendence might also describe 
the shift from contradiction or opposition to dialectical reso-
lution; or the shift from aggregation to mereology (such that 
parts are then related to wholes, and vice versa); or the shift 
from quantity to quality. So the most important consideration 
is that “transcendence” always signifies a radical departure, and 
a desirable departure at that, from whatever there already is. 
Therefore, that we do have this concept, this term for exceed-
ing ordinary limitations, argues that transcendence cannot be 
coterminous with subjectivity, or with materiality, or with con-
ventionality, or even with their collocation, but must instead 
be different from all three, as well as different from their inter-
section. In that case, “transcendence” is as mandatory as “sub-
jectivity,” “materiality,” and “conventionality,” regardless that it’s 
other to them, too.
Of course the four terms are related. Subjectivity, material-
ity, and conventionality are related in the manner of co-requi-
sites, and transcendence is related to them by exceeding their 
limitations. Still, all four terms are related through their differ-
ence. It’s a difference marking, over here, the otherness inter-
vening among subjectivity, materiality, and conventionality, 
and, over there, the alterity of change itself. For if alteration 
can be transformative, and not only recuperative, then change 
is what exceeds the constitution of everything.
Tetradic Due Diligence
At this stage, we can say (along the lines developed by Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell) that rhetorical agency always involves some 
subjectivity, some conventionality, some materiality, and some 
transcendence, and we can add (along the lines developed by 
us) that these four terms — which now become the four con-
stituents of rhetorical agency — are distinct, mandatory, irre-
ducible, and folded together. In fact, we can say that these are 
so disparate and concomitant as to be axiomatic. But, in that 
case, rhetorical transaction must be bound up simultaneously 
with (a) the interiority of speakers and listeners, (b) the exteri-
ority of the world they share, (c) the means of linkage available 
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for connecting the interiority with the interiority, and (d) rhet-
oric’s capacity to make things otherwise. We can use this axio-
maticity, or simultaneity, to protect the constituents of rhetor-
ical agency from dissolution into one another. For if rhetorical 
agency is the folding-together of four quite separable constit-
uents, each conceptually different from the rest, then all four 
of them do have to participate in the rhetorical agency being 
theorized.
Even so, to say that the four co-constituents of rhetorical 
agency are irreducible (and distinct, and mandatory) isn’t to 
say that they’re given. For example, while rhetorical subjec-
tivity would refer to the interiority of the rhetorical agent, it 
hardly seems likely that the interiority attributable to speakers 
and listeners at the time of, say, Aristotle, or of the mid-six-
teenth century logician Peter Ramus, or of the baroque-era 
Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, or of the enlightenment rhetorician 
Richard Whately could be identical with the interiority attrib-
utable to listeners and speakers today. What goes for rhetori-
cal subjectivity must also go for the other three terms: neither 
rhetorical conventionality, nor rhetorical transcendence, nor 
yet rhetorical materiality can have stood still during those long 
stretches between the ancients, the earlier moderns, and us. 
Instead, each must continuously have become other than itself, 
while remaining itself anyway.
In short, if the four constituents of rhetorical agency do 
remain irreducible, then their irreducibility, so far as concerns 
their manifestation in rhetorical transaction, ought to be a pro-
leptic, rather than a backward-glancing sort of irreducibility. 
They ought to be irreducible in the sense that they’re proces-
sual, or emergent, or produced. For that reason, it does seem 
that a “productive” rhetoric, whether conceived as epistemic, 
constitutive, articulatory, or something else, must actually be 
producing the co-constituents of rhetorical agency as such.
So it’s by way of rhetoric’s productive irreducibility that we 
arrive at the epithet “four-folded.” Certainly, this terminology 
(this network) borrows from Heidegger. He’s the philosopher 
who holds that every thing, including any mode of communi-
cation, is entangled in four realms simultaneously, bespeak-
ing earth, sky, mortals, and gods (see, for example, Poetry, 
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Language, Thought 175-175). In consequence, the label itself 
(that cyborg, that alliance) is also beholden to Graham Har-
man (2007), whose unpacking and reworking of the Heidegge-
rian concept has proven so illuminating. It’s further indebted 
to none other than Thomas Rickert (2013), who, in putting the 
fourfold to extensive rhetorical-theoretical use, does survey, 
and critique, and redeploy (see especially his Chapter 7) such 
understandings of that construct as are available from Heide-
gger, Harman, Bruno Latour, and others. So, already, it’s pos-
sible to envision some implications for an articulation between 
(on the one side) earth, sky, mortals, and gods, and (on the 
other side) the rhetorical forms of subjectivity, conventional-
ity, transcendence, and materiality, just as it’s possible to envi-
sion some implications for rhetoricity as a “thing” whose work 
is to stay — in other words, to preserve, protect, promote — the 
fourfold.
However, those are not the implications to keep upper-
most in mind, not during the present investigation into rhe-
torical agency. That’s because, according to Heidegger himself, 
the fourfold can always be approached as a “simple onefold,” in 
which case its disparate constituents might yet be read in terms 
of the “self-unified” (Poetry, Language, Thought 176). Sure, it’d 
be one thing to explore so simple a onefoldedness in the con-
text of Heideggerian philosophy. But it’d be quite another to 
do so in the context of contemporary rhetorical studies, where 
theory, if the work of Ronald Walter Greene (2009) be any 
indication, seems already to have arrived at a onefold much 
more than simple enough.
At any rate, although Heidegger does devote “The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology” (1954) to a critique (a warning 
against the modernistic perspective which would view every-
thing as “standing-reserve,” as exploitable), he also empha-
sizes that even “Enframing” — or, let’s say, the very most ten-
dentious style of perspective-adopting — should be understood 
as a mode of revealing (23 ff.). What’s of interest here is the 
suggestion that any unconcealing along those lines would be 
an aesthetic:  a paradigm for teaching us how reality (at least, 
how a certain reality) works, how all of it fits together, and how 
we ought to behave while we’re in it. To be sure, it would also 
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be ontotheological — in a nutshell, self-referentially circular —
quite as Heidegger holds to be characteristic for all of western 
metaphysics (see Thomson’s essay unpacking that indictment). 
But the point is that any such aesthetic would further become 
the establishment not only of an environment (disclosing the 
properly ontological existence of everything) but also of an 
imperative (disclosing the properly ontic response to every-
thing). In that case, once we see that it’s possible to begin with 
aesthetics and then move to ontology, rather than necessarily 
the other way around, we arrive at some choices as to which 
environment-and-imperative, which tendentious perspective, 
within which to be located.
In Heidegger’s essay on technology, the options are binary: 
Either let everything be unforthcoming (such that it’s to be 
excavated scientistically), or else let everything be fruitful 
(such that it’s to be dwelt with poetically). But, instead of mak-
ing for the sunnier side of the opposition, let’s pursue the sense 
in which to adopt any tendentious perspective — scientistic, 
poetic, agnostic, or whatever — is to adopt both an environ-
ment and an imperative, in other words, to adopt a medium.
Now, when Marshall McLuhan (1964) says that the medium 
is the message, he means at the very least that the materi-
al-and-conceptual infrastructure for communication (spoken, 
written, digitized, grammatical, neurophysiological, and so on) 
supplies the initial condition of possibility for the message. So 
it’s hardly surprising that the consensus among media ecolo-
gists today is that the medium is not only the message but also 
the environment (the context, the setting, the Burkean scene, 
the Heideggerian enframing) within which the message must 
grow (see Strate 128). Still, that’s not to say the medium is only 
the environment — and obviously not, for it’s also the mes-
sage. It’s, in short, a contribution, an intervention, for better 
or worse, into whatever’s already there. That’s why McLuhan 
refers to every technology, and to every mediatization, as an 
“outering” — an utterance (99).
So we’re finding, if not an equivalence, then an exceedingly 
strong family resemblance between the Heideggerian account 
of tendentious perspective-adopting and the media-ecological 
account of mediation. On the one hand, the environment is the 
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outering of an imperative, and, on the other hand, the imper-
ative is the uttering of an environment. True, Heidegger, in 
the essay on technology, discusses only two imperatives, each 
attaching quite faithfully to its own environment. But the later 
McLuhan (1992), with his son Eric, attends to no fewer than 
four imperatives, all of them attaching, almost polytheistically 
so, to any built environment that there could possibly be. These 
are the tetradic laws, the quadruply heterogeneous command-
ments, which every enframing, every technologization, every 
mediatization keeps uttering simultaneously:  Enhance (this)! 
Reverse (that)! Retrieve (the next thing)! Obsolesce (the other)!
By putting together these ideas from Heidegger, from 
McLuhan, and, not to forget, from Kuhn, we can arrive at a 
version of four-foldedness suitable for theorizing rhetorical 
agency. For, when we do come to look around at the four quar-
ters of contemporary rhetorical studies, we’ll see that each of 
them is a paradigm that mediates, enframes, aestheticizes rhe-
torical agency in its own way. Each of them constitutes (glob-
ally) its own world, its own tendentious perspective. Yet each 
discloses (locally) its own possibilities for reversing, for retriev-
ing, for enhancing, and for obsolescing.
But, in that case, shouldn’t we be looking for something 
rather more complicated than a fourfold — at the very least, 
for a sixteenfold — with all the attendant ratios and relations 
that such a grid would bring into view? Well, maybe so, but 
not until rhetorical agency has stopped looking so promiscu-
ous and protean. For now, it’s first things first, and all we need 
at present is to fold rhetorical agency into four. That’s because 
rhetorical agency inheres in its terms, the most important of 
which are found together anyway.
Wherever we go, there will always be subjectivity, conven-
tionality, transcendence, and materiality. It’s just that they will 
be configured differently in the four different quarters within 
contemporary rhetorical studies. In each of those four assem-
blages, we will find this, that, the other, or the next of the terms 
being pulled into the center, where it becomes the planet, even 
as the three remaining terms are pushed to the periphery, 
where they become the satellites. So, in the interest of theoriz-
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ing rhetorical agency anew, we’ll reflect upon the four terms 
that structure every present-day version of rhetorical agency.
Disaggregating a Constitution
For simplicity’s sake, let’s agree that numerous treatments from 
within rhetorical studies, not only that from Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell, do recognize there to be something subjective, and 
something conventional, and something transcendent, and 
something material about rhetorical agency. And, if the four 
terms are conceptually distinct, then they ought to be theoret-
ically separable as well: Nietzsche does say, after all, that indi-
vidual “concepts” can be “as bony and eight-cornered as a dice” 
(147). Unfortunately, our present discussions seem to leave us 
conceptualizing rhetorical agency as too fluid, gelatinous, and 
non-cornered for us to understand how rhetorical transaction 
would actually articulate with genuine social change.
What, then, ought we to expect from theoretical discus-
sions addressing the concepts of rhetorical subjectivity, rhe-
torical conventionality, rhetorical transcendence, and rhetor-
ical materiality? Why, we should expect each of the terms to 
be treated as contributing something which is not, in the final 
analysis, the same as the contribution of the others. In other 
words, whenever rhetorical agency is speaking, its co-constit-
uents must be speaking, too, each of them adding its own het-
erogeneity to the conversation. That’s how the rhetorical forms 
of subjectivity, conventionality, transcendence, and materiality 
could remain distinct, mandatory, and irreducible, each play-
ing its own role in the four-folded constitution of rhetorical 
agency. It’s also why we should think of their irreducibility 
as an ongoing emergence into difference, and not at all as the 
return of the given.
If we were to start viewing its four constituents as both 
irreducible and emergent, rhetorical agency would stop seem-
ing so protean, slippery, fluid, and homogeneous. To the con-
trary, it would start looking four-folded, internally heteroge-
neous, participatory, and dynamic. Furthermore, rhetorical 
agency would begin traveling in more than just the one sense. 
While it would prove mobile in crossing all sorts of social loca-
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tions (remaining accessible to agents regardless of their posi-
tioning), it would also prove mobile in continually becoming 
other than itself. But, then again, to see it that way, we’d first 
need a suitably rhetorical view of rhetorical agency, and of its 
four co-constituents, as simultaneously irreducible and emer-
gent.
A Willfully Productive Rhetorical Agency
Such a perspective is available in an essay treating all of action, 
including rhetorical action, in terms of an ongoing will to 
matter. The essay is Nathan Stormer’s “Encomium on Helen’s 
Body” (2009), and among its most important “provocations” is 
that which concerns the purposive quality — the rhetoricity —
of action in general (220). For, as the author observes,
The media that connect one to another, the material-
ity of objects that signify, the embodiment of percep-
tion, the messages interpreted from the rest of nature 
(from genetic codes to animal behavior) — all…con-
found the issue of “what is rhetorical action” and beg 
us subtly but significantly to alter the question to 
“what is rhetorical about action?” (224)
In this passage, Stormer is referring to the tendency of every-
thing to participate in a world (as in the proclivity of media to 
forge connections, the inclination of objects not only to signify 
but also to remain material, the predisposition of bodies to 
perceive, and the propensity of even the rest of nature to gen-
erate messages), and this is the very tendency that he’s opting 
to call the “will to matter” (220). So, if rhetoric also tends to 
participate in a world, then rhetoric can be said to express the 
will to matter, too.
Yet the vector that Stormer is describing isn’t limited to the 
will to power, to knowledge, to truth. Rather, it’s broader, more 
promising and capacious than these, for it includes such wills 
among its internal differentiations. Indeed, the will to mat-
ter, which Stormer derives by reworking concepts from writ-
ers ranging from Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche to 
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Judith Butler, might also be known as the general, even univer-
sal “desire to persist” (220). And, as Stormer does explain, this 
is an imperative to flourish, not independently from others, or 
in spite of them, but with their interactive, mutually transfor-
mative aid. Thus the will to matter includes a will to “recog-
nition,” and a will to change as well. It’s the impulse to make 
a difference, even an intensive or self-reflexive difference, just 
so long as the difference matters. So, if the tendency to make a 
difference is rhetorical, and if this is, furthermore, a tendency 
to change in the process of making a difference, then all of 
action, and not only rhetorical action, is, indeed, rhetorical.
Stormer’s reading of all action as rhetorical (pushy but 
responsive) offers us a new way to think about the vaunted 
productivity of rhetoric itself. While rhetoric can still remain 
productive in that it’s epistemic, constitutive, articulatory, and 
so on, rhetoric can now become additionally productive in 
that it’s continually producing itself anew, continually endur-
ing even as it adapts to changing circumstances. And if we do 
make the conceptual transition from the willful persistence of 
rhetorical action to the willful persistence of rhetorical agency, 
we can say that such agency is productive not only in its ten-
dency to make things otherwise, but also in its tendency to 
adapt in response to the very changes it produces.
By now, we are better positioned to think of rhetorical 
agency as made up out of four axiomatically distinct, man-
datory, and irreducible constituents. All of these constituents 
seem capable of furnishing us with some formerly-occluded 
evidence of rhetoric’s productivity — of rhetoric’s quadruple 
will to matter — since each of them (persistently) does remain 
itself even while (adaptively, interactively) becoming otherwise. 
And the four constituents of rhetorical agency can no longer 
be taken for granted, for they look to be under production, too. 
Their axiomaticity becomes a question, on the one side, of the 
more general will to matter, and then, on the other side, of the 
theoretical and practical work required to keep each of the four 
constituents durable enough to persist, but interactive enough 
to adapt.
By the same token, once we take Stormer’s insight seriously, 
it’s no longer “a matter of preference” as to which philosoph-
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ical assumptions are to play which part in keeping rhetorical 
agency four-folded (Cherwitz 10). To the contrary, in a rhe-
torical-theoretical world where the will-to-matter is the will 
to make subjectivity matter, the most important philosophical 
assumptions in town are those which protect the axiomaticity 
of the subjective. The same logic applies to the other three rhe-
torical-theoretical worlds. There, the will-to-matter becomes, 
respectively, the will to make conventionality matter, or else 
the will to make transcendence matter, or else the will to make 
materiality matter.
So, while the broader challenge is for us to conceptual-
ize the mechanisms through which rhetorical transaction 
might conduce to social change, there’s also a more immedi-
ate task. It’s not merely to reframe the co-constituents of rhe-
torical agency as both persistent (or irreducible) and mutable 
(or emergent), but, beyond that, to explain how they are pro-
duced with the aid of rhetorical agents as such. On the theoret-
ical side, therefore, we’ll adopt an investigative method under-
girded by a philosophical commitment. It’ll be a commitment, 
in this case, to explaining the ongoing production of an irre-
ducibly four-folded rhetorical agency. And then, on the practi-
cal side, we’ll look for evidence showing that rhetorical agents 
can participate in the production, too.
Our method will be consistent with the assemblage theory 
utilized in a number of social-scientific and other fields (Wise, 
2005; Phillips, 2006; Marcus and Saka, 2006; DeLanda, 2006; 
Venn, 2006, Srnicek, 2007; Livesey, 2010). Thus the investiga-
tive framework for the project as a whole will derive primar-
ily from the ideas of Gilles Deleuze, a thinker often invoked 
in contemporary rhetorical studies (see, for example, Barnett, 
2005; Edbauer, 2005; Stormer, 2009; Greene, 2009; or Kephart 
and Rafferty, 2009).
Assemblage–Theoretical Resources
As Graham Livesey explains, the concept of assemblage derives 
from the English translation of agencement, referring, in the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari, not to any finished product, but 
rather to the very “processes of arranging, organizing, and fit-
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ting together” (18; see also Dosse 43). So “assemblage” (which, 
if rendered as agencement, would resonate all the more ambi-
ently with “agency”) retains a participial force, signaling that 
disparate elements are becoming related, forming a collectivity 
with emergent functionalities of its own.
However, as deserves underlining, the assembled bits and 
pieces are never symbolistic alone. Deleuze and Guattari do 
say that even “desire” is an assemblage, clarifying that assem-
blages don’t have to be objects in a purely physicalist sense 
(Kafka, 56). Yet a Deleuzian transcendental empiricism posits 
that assemblages aren’t made up exclusively of signs (or ideas), 
but include “sub-representative” (or “extra-propositional”) 
experiences, these latter remaining excessive, irrecuperable (see 
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition).
It’s important, therefore, that rhetorical scholars understand 
“assemblage” as referring to “inter-relationships” between “ele-
ments” which are emphatically “heterogeneous” (Venn 107). 
For were we to view rhetorical agency’s four constituents as, at 
base, homogeneous — in the way of mere ascriptions, notions, 
representations — then we’d be unable to conceptualize them as 
separate from and irreducible to one another. They would seem 
to dissolve into the very significations that rendered them 
accessible. If so, we’d be left thinking that none of these co- 
constituents could actually be itself, but could only be the sim-
ulacrum of itself, and we’d remain mystified as to how rhetori-
cal transaction could ever contribute to any social change. We 
should therefore view any assemblage not as a homogeneous 
stretch of ideation, but, instead, as a collective facility within 
which disparate participants, not all of them tied to human 
subjectivity, happen to be collaborating to produce something.
Rhetorical agency is a coalition of just that kind, its most 
salient functionality (though not always by design) being to 
produce some genuine social change. Yet rhetorical agency is 
a quadruple assemblage. It’s made out of four other alliances, 
networks, or cyborgs, every one of them extant within a differ-
ent quarter of contemporary rhetorical studies. And the four 
assemblages, the four “landscapes,” are populated by an array 
of theorists, critics, and practitioners, all gathering and deploy-
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ing resources for the willful production of this, that, the other, 
or the next of rhetorical agency’s four constituents.
That’s how we can account for both the persistence and 
adaptability of rhetorical agency, the qualities that Nathan 
Stormer associates with the will to matter, and with all of 
action. We can explain these in terms of the work that the 
various theorists, critics, and practitioners must be doing to 
ensure that each of the co-constituents of rhetorical agency 
does, in fact, remain persistent and adaptable. Still, in fram-
ing rhetorical agency as assembled, we should keep in mind 
that any assemblage (together with, let’s add, any sub-assem-
blage it might be surrounding) is characterized simultaneously 
by “territorial sides,” which “stabilize it,” and by “cutting edges” 
of “deterritorialization,” which “carry it away,” such that it’s 
able to endure even as it’s able to grow (Deleuze and Guattari, 
ATP, 88). These “processes that stabilize/consolidate and desta-
bilize/dissolve (respectively), the identity of the assemblage,” 
do explain how the co-constituents of rhetorical agency, each 
associated with a different quarter within rhetorical studies, 
can persist while also changing (Palmås 3).
For assemblages are made up out of terms (or parts, or 
components) which, though they may be linked under a “dom-
inant relation,” do not reduce to such a relation (Baugh 36). 
Instead, the terms can migrate between assemblages, between 
alternative dominant relations, always retaining some of their 
own functionality. Indeed, with respect to any assemblage, the 
relations holding the terms together are “external” to the terms, 
these latter evading containment by any structure, configura-
tion, or relation within which they’re implicated (Colebrook 5). 
On the one side, a “whole” persists as an ostensible totality (as 
molar) for so long as its “parts” are held together in a particu-
lar relation. On the other, the constituent terms do retain their 
own transportable powers.
In short, even such seeming totalities as rhetorical subjec-
tivity, rhetorical conventionality, rhetorical transcendence, and 
rhetorical materiality can be viewed as made up of (molecu-
lar) bits and pieces. Their components may, in principle, bring 
their own character along with them, migrating beyond their 
familiar borders, and interacting with yet other bits and pieces 
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under an altered, perhaps unprecedented “dominant relation” 
(Baugh 36).
We’ll therefore read each of the four constituents of rhetor-
ical agency as belonging to a different theoretical-and-practical 
landscape, a terrain whose “dominant relation” is sometimes 
being reinforced, but sometimes becoming unsettled. We’ll 
posit, and attempt to demonstrate, that the local theorists, 
critics, and practitioners are sometimes reterritorializing, but 
sometimes deterritorializing the rhetorical forms of subjectiv-
ity, of conventionality, of materiality, of transcendence (Baugh 
36). So there’s our hypothesis as to the reason for which the 
constituents of rhetorical agency would stay axiomatic, dis-
tinct, mandatory, and emergent. It’s also our reminder that 
rhetorical agency might remain just as quadruple as the pre-
ceding extrapolations from Heidegger, McLuhan, and Kuhn 
would suggest.
Yet there is one more assemblage-theoretical precept to 
adduce, and it’s that the assemblage, network, or cyborg (or 
else alliance, mesh, association: the near-synonyms abound) 
isn’t identical with what we study. Instead, it includes our inter-
ference with what we study (see especially Mol, 1999). Michel 
Callon, for instance, has emphasized that an agencement is the 
object of the investigation as interwoven with the report on the 
investigation (see Palmås 2). The assemblage, drawing together 
some kinds of agency while giving rise to others, is therefore 
what emerges “in connection with” what we say about it —
from our statements together with the contributions, affor-
dances, resistances supplied by all the other constituents folded 
into a provisional, mutable unity (Phillips 109). Thus the act of 
accounting for any of these networks, cyborgs, alliances is an 
intervention into the very processes that bring the collectivity 
into being.
Triangulation
We’ll need some examples to show how rhetorical transaction 
really could involve the ongoing persistence-and-transforma-
tion of the four co-constituents of rhetorical agency. And since 
we can’t expect, say, “self-organization” to explain everything, 
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we should drop to a level concrete enough to register the work 
performed by local actors. Let’s continue drawing on Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell’s essay of 2005, which already attends to some 
particularly germane evidence, that is, in the form of a speech 
attributed to the African-American rhetor Sojourner Truth. 
For, if we gather up all of this work of Campbell’s, folding it 
together with the explanation provided by one of Campbell’s 
own sources, the historian Nell Irvin Painter, we discover a 
way to verify that rhetorical agency resides not just in the pro-
nouncements of rhetorical theorists, but out there in the world 
as well.
Here, to start with, are some facts. As Painter, a scholar 
of African-American history, points out, it’s the consensus 
that, in her speech of 1851, Sojourner Truth has actually —
by means of speaking — “inserted black women into women’s 
reform” and, in the process, “reclaimed physical and emotional 
strength for all women” (“Difference” 140–141). So, before 
the speech, black women are not, for all intents and purposes, 
really part of the women’s reform movement of the mid-nine-
teenth century. After the speech, they are. Yet the speech of 
1851 doesn’t merely reflect a social change already occurring at 
the time. To the contrary, it helps enact, realize, or materialize 
the social change, creating some non-trivial infrastructure for 
the social change as such. The speech itself is an insertion of 
black women into women’s reform, as well as a reclamation of 
physical and emotional strength for all women.
So, since the facts can confirm that rhetorical agency exists, 
the really worthwhile endeavor from now on is to explain 
where it comes from and how it operates. In the following 
chapters, therefore, we’ll situate the Sojourner Truth speech of 
1851 in four different theoretical-and-practical frameworks. 
That way, it will become caught up within such movements of 
reterritorialization and deterritorialization as can produce a 
variegated, mobile rhetorical agency.
However, we’re confronted with an important methodolog-
ical difficulty. For there isn’t a Sojourner Truth speech of 1851. 
There are only alternative paraphrases, performances, produc-
tions of this conjectural artifact, some less substantive than 
others. Nevertheless, if we’re to understand how our exem-
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plary rhetorical practitioner could, in 1851, have inserted black 
women into women’s reform, we’ll obviously need access to her 
speech.
Our solution to the methodological difficulty is to under-
take some triangulation, as by looking to the intersection where 
the most substantive traces of the speech agree. It’s to juxta-
pose alternative accounts of what Sojourner Truth must have 
said (attending to their correspondences, side-stepping their 
divergences), thereby arriving at an equivalent for the other-
wise hypothetical speech. In short, we’ll be constructing an evi-
dentiary text much like a bibliographical or literary recension, 
since that does seem a good way for us to document, i.e., from 
a rhetorical perspective, the concrete activity of a practitioner 
whose work would clarify the nature of rhetorical agency itself.
What we’re given to think of as the Sojourner Truth speech 
is actually the choice we make when we privilege one out of 
two renditions. The better known rendition, and to this very 
day, is “a fiction created some twelve years after the event” 
by “an ambitious white woman,” Frances Dana Gage, a jour-
nalist-activist who had served as president for the women’s 
rights convention where Sojourner Truth spoke (Campbell 9, 
13). Campbell relies extensively on the version from Gage to 
support her own propositions about the perverse and protean 
nature of rhetorical agency. Her rationale for nurturing this 
simulation (so replete with fabricated details as to add up to 
a “characterization…not supported by other accounts”) is that 
it’s “longer and more frequently cited” than its counterpart (12, 
17). 
Now, it’s not as if we ought to defenestrate the Frances 
Dana Gage version of the speech, the version which Camp-
bell is turning into a case study of rhetorical agency as such. To 
the contrary, it’s that, since the Gage rendition is already there, 
what with its being so frequently cited and so on, we ought 
to be triangulating as much of it as we can. Indeed, so far as 
concerns the central claims which Gage reports, and which 
Campbell repeats for our benefit, it’s at least conceivable that 
Sojourner Truth could have made them all.
So, yes, let’s concede that the Gage version is the one in 
which Sojourner Truth’s persona is the more memorably “dra-
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matized,” such that it does at least help us grasp that image of 
herself which the historical speaker is known to have deployed 
during her public appearances of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury (Painter, “Difference,” 151, 154). But if so very many of 
the details as reported (including, evidently, most of the fire-
works) are Gage’s fabrications, then we should not be allowing 
her rendition to serve as our sole source on the speaker’s rhe-
torical agency, or — by extension — on everybody else’s. For we 
wouldn’t want rhetorical agency itself to be a fiction promul-
gated by a certain mid-nineteenth century journalist, no mat-
ter how much of an activist the latter must have been.
Fortunately, another eyewitness, Marius Robinson, did 
publish (just a month after the event, and not, as in the case of 
Frances Dana Gage, twelve years later) a version of the speech 
that’s almost as lengthy, just as interesting, and, according to 
the experts on Sojourner Truth, much more trustworthy than 
the version which Karlyn Kohrs Campbell portrays as epito-
mizing rhetorical agency. So, rather than settle for tracing all of 
Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical agency to Gage’s imagination, we 
can trace at least some of it to an evidentiary text to be built in 
collaboration with Marius Robinson himself.
Of course, according to the Robinson account, reprinted in 
Nell Irvin Painter’s book, the closest analogue for the world-fa-
mous “A’n’t I a woman?” (which we’ve inherited directly from 
Gage) takes the form not of a rhetorical question, but of a flat-
out declaration: “I am a woman’s rights.” Yet it’s Campbell’s 
own use of “I am a woman’s rights,” the line which scholars 
now take to encapsulate the speech as a whole, that contextu-
alizes our project of triangulating for rhetorical agency in the 
first place. For the theorist herself is the one citing that supple-
mentary line, that flat-out declaration, as verifying that, even 
if Sojourner Truth never did ask whether she was a woman, 
she must still, in her speech of 1851, have said something to 
that effect. That’s precisely as documented by this parallel state-
ment, this “I am a woman’s rights,” from an eyewitness whom 
Campbell chooses to leave anonymous.
So we should treat Marius Robinson as an informant not 
only with respect to what Sojourner Truth would have said in 
1851, but also to what she wouldn’t have said. In this way, even 
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Marius Robinson can participate in the processes by which 
rhetorical agency is assembled. But, to triangulate properly, we 
should take some care to discount any attributions appearing 
only in the Gage version of the speech, and emphatically not in 
the version that’s by far the more “reliable,” the one from Mar-
ius Robinson (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 174; see also Lerner 59; 
King 137–139; Fitch and Mandziuk 18, 74). Those would be 
the attributions which, precisely because they belong to the fic-
tionalized Gage rendition, we should hesitate to accept at face 
value, even if they do include all the makings of a quite chime-
rical rhetorical agent.
According to Gage (an anti-slavery feminist), but not 
according to Robinson (an anti-slavery clergyman), Sojourner 
Truth, at the woman’s rights convention of 1851, speaks in a 
dialect most obtrusively marking her as African-American. She 
integrates a paradoxically and perversely authentic use of the 
“n-word” (Campbell 13). She notes that she’s never in her life 
been helped into carriages or pampered in any similar respect 
(with the implication that, whatever she’s accomplished, she’s 
accomplished entirely on her own). She refers to her experience 
as a mother who has seen most of her thirteen children sold off 
into slavery, not to mention as a woman who, in her own per-
son, has been forced to “bear de lash” (10). She uncovers her 
right arm all the way up to the shoulder, specifically in order to 
show her tremendous muscular power. And she directs certain 
witheringly pointed asides, one after another, at these hecklers, 
these “traditional male religious authorities” who, infiltrating 
and even overrunning her immediate audience, have estab-
lished “a scene of great tension and hostility,” right here at the 
1851 women’s rights convention in Akron, Ohio (9). Yet Mar-
ius Robinson (who, having once been tarred and feathered at 
the hands of an angry, anti-abolitionist mob, ought to remem-
ber at least the part about bearing the lash) doesn’t corroborate 
any of these details at all (see Baker).
Yes, such details would obviously be speaking to realities 
faced, on the one side, by nineteenth century abolitionists and 
women’s rights activists and, on the other side, by the historical 
Sojourner Truth, together with, in Campbell’s turn of phrase, 
her “slave sisters” (14). Even so, our methodological difficulty 
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can’t be surmounted by any rehearsal of the preceding. The 
problem is that the very most memorable details from Gage’s 
account — the obtrusive dialect, the close-to-thirteen children 
sold away, the bearing of the lash in person, the uncovering of 
a laborer’s arm to the shoulder, even the patriarchal-and-rac-
ist hecklers are all missing from the Marius Robinson version 
of the speech, appearing only in the fictionalized version from 
Frances Dana Gage. So those must be the features that add up 
to the “characterization…not supported by other accounts” 
(Campbell 12). And this remains the case even if Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell is bent on treating those same memorable details as 
if they can help us theorize the way in which rhetorical agency 
would actually work.
Yet we are not left with the fabricated Gage version alone, 
for we also have at our disposal the considerably more reli-
able version from Marius Robinson. Let’s proceed by reflect-
ing on the overlap between the two accounts, including the 
manner in which each of them helps disclose the very thesis 
of the hypothetical speech. In Gage, as we know, it’s “A’n’t I a 
woman?” and, in Robinson, it’s “I am a woman’s rights.” Now, 
the “I am a woman’s rights” (from Robinson) does seem func-
tionally interchangeable with the “A’n’t I a woman?” (from 
Gage). This means that we can with some justification look to 
“I am a woman’s rights” as an alternative formulation of “A’n’t I 
a woman?” (in other words, of whatever it was that Sojourner 
Truth must have been claiming). We can then ask which par-
ticular features, dimensions, or realities of rhetorical agency 
the various parts of this flat-out declaration might be engaging.
After all, Gage and Robinson — both of them eyewitnesses, 
evidentiary sources — do agree in some noteworthy ways. 
Among the points of agreement is that the Sojourner Truth 
speech is about gender, a theme clearly accessible through both 
“A’n’t I a woman?” and “I am a woman’s rights.” In addition, the 
reality of race functions inarguably as a condition of possibility 
for the statement as a whole. The speech also addresses “work, 
mind, and biblical precept” (three central “aspects” of nine-
teenth-century “women’s identity”), in this way refuting “all 
of the major arguments (biological, theological, and sociologi-
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cal)” then available “against woman’s rights” (Painter, Sojourner 
Truth, 126; Campbell 12).
What’s more, in connection with the argument as to “mind” 
(belonging to a nineteenth century debate over whether women 
and African-Americans were intelligent enough to deserve full 
membership in the social), there’s also a kind of second-order 
agreement. For Robinson and Gage do, together, corroborate 
the role in the speech of a curious analogy, this latter again 
concerning the intellect of the marginalized. It’s the celebrated 
analogy of the pint and the quart, which must therefore be 
playing an important part in the communicative transaction.
Finally, there’s something else, separate from anything stip-
ulated in the catalog above. Its presence is palpable in both the 
Gage and Robinson versions (that is, in both “A’n’t I a woman?” 
and “I am a woman’s rights”), each of which refers, though 
each in a different way, to the corporeality, indeed, the sheer 
physicality at stake in the delivery of this famous if hypotheti-
cal speech. Let’s provisionally refer to the unknown quantity as 
embodiment, employing that term as a placeholder for one or 
another conception of materiality.
These several elements go together in a thematic bundle, 
and the “I am a woman’s rights” from Robinson clearly serves 
as a more useful guide to the contents than does the “A’n’t I 
a woman?” from Gage. It’s a bundle, a package establishing 
rather precisely (Mikhail Bakhtin might say, “chronotopically”) 
which utterances, which details really do have to be included 
in Sojourner Truth’s hypothetical speech. Although we can 
describe the package as the core of the speech, there is a sense 
in which it’s a lamellation as well. For the speech is assem-
bled out of layers — of “race,” “gender,” “work,” “mind,” “bibli-
cal precept,” the pint-and-quart analogy, and something quite 
like “embodiment.” All of these lamellae must lie at the core 
of Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical agency, since they do lie at the 
core of her speech. And, as we’ve seen, they’re also articulated 
with “I am a woman’s rights,” which is the capsulation, the the-
sis, the handle for the speech itself. So we’ll posit that “I am 
a woman’s rights” (which, again, expresses Sojourner Truth’s 
message at least as concretely as does “A’n’t I a woman?”) collo-
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cates all the points of departure required for investigating the 
constitution of rhetorical agency as such.
By now, we have at our disposal not only an assem-
blage-theoretical approach, but also some evidentiary materials 
to which to apply the approach. So what we should do next is 
firm up the agenda. We’ll wish to undertake a systematic inves-
tigation of the Sojourner Truth speech in keeping with the 
activities of reterritorialization and deterritorialization that are 
taking place within the four landscapes of rhetorical agency.
An Investigative Itinerary
Let’s agree, for heuristic purposes, that the “I” of “I am a wom-
an’s rights” must refer to the rhetorical agent in its aspect as the 
subject. Still, if the remaining string of terms — “am a wom-
an’s rights” — were there in the manner of a glorified apposi-
tive, and all in the interest of self-expression, then nothing 
much could happen as a result of the speech. For this would be 
an utterance from someone who, in 1851, is attending a con-
vention the very purpose of which is to generate the women’s 
rights that don’t, at this moment, exist.
In that case, noting that the speaker’s subjectivity, identity, 
essence, or status can’t, not automatically, help her insert black 
women into women’s reform, let’s try to put that fact to use 
within the methodology for the study. Let’s structure the inves-
tigation in such a manner as to take seriously each of the four 
terms in “I am a woman’s rights,” discovering what they can 
contribute to Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical agency. (Or, to put 
it another way, let’s frame each of them as an agent, an infor-
mant, speaking on behalf of one or another assemblage of its 
own.)
Treating the “I” as pointing to the social-structural land-
scape of agency, we’ll accompany Sojourner Truth to a place 
where an axiomatic rhetorical subjectivity will look to be coex-
tensive with rhetorical agency itself. Unfortunately, and in 
direct consequence, we’ll soon find that just about everything 
she highlights in her speech will, under rhetoric’s constitu-
tive turn, seem to disappear into a sort of social-and-linguistic 
loop.
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But we will still have to address an “am,” a “woman’s,” and 
a “rights,” and, as suggested above, these are not to be written 
off as elaborating the condition, no matter how “unavoidable,” 
of an “I” who is only a subject (Campbell 3). So we’ll treat the 
“rights” as pointing to the axiomatic role in agency of the con-
ventional, and therefore as directing our steps to the rhetor-
ical-humanistic landscape. We’ll then become better placed 
to account for rhetorical transaction as conducing to genuine 
social change, for rhetoric will come into view as a mechanism 
for leveraging shared values in the interest of making things 
otherwise than they are.
Yet we’ll be left wondering why someone’s agency should 
be so dependent on a conventionality which, in privileging the 
shared values holding the group together, would tend continu-
ally to override, even to efface, the alterity of the group mem-
bers themselves. And we’ll have to consider that rhetorical con-
ventionality, even in the form of shared values, would still need 
supplementation by something else, something as irreducible 
to rhetorical conventionality as to rhetorical subjectivity.
So we’ll treat the “am” of the statement not as registering 
some sort of consensus, but rather as registering the diachronic 
and emergent character of human existence, i.e., as invoking 
the axiomatic role of rhetorical transcendence. The “am” will 
thus lead us all the way into the existential-transversal land-
scape of agency, where it’s an authentic claim to life, quite 
untrammeled by any shared values, that counts for everything. 
And then we’ll see that our exemplary practitioner, in deploy-
ing the life-affirming resources folded into her speech, is act-
ing to operationalize rhetorical transcendence, as by producing 
some genuine social change.
Yet, as we’ll notice, the existential-transversal landscape 
will, ironically enough, be populated by many local residents 
who themselves keep overlooking the full force of anybody’s 
“am.” These will be those theorists who, in tacitly assuming 
that rhetoric is purely epistemic, cannot help but view tran-
scendence as ordinarily immanent to consciousness. So they 
will remain bedeviled by the difficulty of conceptualizing tran-
scendence as separate from a socially-determined subjectivity. 
For that reason, we will have to go so far as (gratuitously) to 
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participate in some assemblage-theoretical intervention, guid-
ing certain of the local agents to additional resources avail-
able within their own landscape of agency. With the aid of yet 
another local theorist, the material phenomenologist Michel 
Henry, we will undertake to show that the inhabitants of the 
existential-transversal landscape needn’t locate transcendence 
within human interiority, but, to the contrary, can locate it 
within human exteriority instead.
Even so, we will be left with another of these nagging ques-
tions, this time, as to the improbability of thinking that rhetor-
ical transcendence (in animating genuine social change) could 
really involve so little as some authentically human subjectivity, 
some authentically human conventionality, and some authen-
tically human corporeality, all of these sutured to an authen-
tically human claim to exist. For an answer, we’ll move on to 
treat the “woman’s” as pointing to the axiomatic role in agency 
of the material, and, for that reason, as pointing to the mate-
rial-semiotic landscape of agency. There, it will turn out that 
nothing is merely authentic. Instead, whatever exists — what-
ever seems “given” — will prove to be produced, and always 
from somewhere in the midst of things.
But material-semiotic production will not be symbolis-
tic production alone, regardless that so many rhetorical theo-
rists might prefer to treat it that way. So, when we do reach 
the material-semiotic paradigm, we’ll have to undertake yet 
another intervention. We’ll attempt to show how Sojourner 
Truth, our exemplary rhetorical practitioner, is enabled — with 
the aid of her radically heterogeneous allies — to produce a 
new reality, not out of nothing, but as the material-and-rela-
tional output of a quite unprecedented assemblage.
This latter will remain compatible with the most import-
ant themes bundled into Sojourner Truth’s speech of 1851. For 
we’ll see that “race,” “gender,” and “biblical precept” are strata 
(social territories) whose bits and pieces our exemplary practi-
tioner is gathering and connecting as she speaks. The speaker 
and her auditors will then start collaborating, constructing an 
alliance with unwonted functionalities, these latter conducive 
to genuine social change. Thus even the exemplary rhetorical 
agent will participate in building a meshwork, a cyborg capable 
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of enacting, or realizing, or materializing rhetorical transcen-
dence itself.
3.
 Subjectivity in the Social-Structural 
Landscape
What would happen to an exemplary rhetorical artifact were 
it situated within a theoretical context that defines every mode 
of perception, affect, thought, and ideation as socially con-
structed to begin with? For some insight, we’ll read the famous 
Sojourner Truth speech of 1851 from the social-structural per-
spective, though we’ll also turn our assemblage-theoretical 
attention to the manner in which rhetorical subjectivity itself 
is being produced, here in a landscape (an enframing, an envi-
ronmentalized imperative) where rhetoric’s general will to mat-
ter is localized as the will to make interiority matter. But, in 
addition to inquiring into the processes through which rhetor-
ical subjectivity is produced, we will also ask whether the out-
put could help even an exemplary rhetorical agent to effect any 
genuine social change.
Co-Constructing Constraint
With respect to the ideational formation of the social-struc-
tural landscape, we should reflect on the overview provided 
by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (2005). As both a participant in 
and a representative on behalf of this social-structural frame, 
she’s conceptualizing rhetorical agency from inside a “linguis-
tic” turn nestled into a “social” turn (Crowley, “Response,” 1; 
Lunsford, Wilson, and Eberly xxi). In other words, she’s among 
those contemporary writers on rhetoric who are left struggling 
with the problem of “how to theorize the existence of an agent 
within the constitutive rhetorics of omnipresent ideologies” 
(Barnett 13).
The “constitutive rhetorics” part of Scot Barnett’s formu-
lation evokes the linguisticality, and the “omnipresent ideolo-
gies” part the structured sociality of the theoretical perspective 
at issue. We might notice, for example, that in the social-struc-
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tural landscape of rhetorical agency, “interpellations” don’t 
merely invite us, on occasion, to assume this or that subject 
position; instead, as Judith Butler asserts in “Performativity’s 
Social Magic,” they constitute the foundation of all founda-
tionalisms, manufacturing “effects” which are “neither linguis-
tic nor social, but indistinguishably — and forcefully — both” 
(126). And then the very most salient of these social-and-lin-
guistic effects must be the production of no less than our sub-
jectivity.
Now, one should concede that this model, according to 
which rhetorical agency reduces to a subjected interiority, has 
elicited some spirited critique. Nevertheless any critique would 
(by social-structural definition) miss the point, which is that 
critiques themselves can emanate only from suspect subjectivi-
ties. The more pragmatic option for us, then, is simply to inves-
tigate the concrete functionality of the social-structural per-
spective, in this way uncovering the attendant implications for 
the study of rhetorical transaction. After all, so long as subjec-
tivity can be said to play a part in the constitution of rhetorical 
agency, and so long as there’s an entire assemblage devoted to 
translating rhetoric’s (general) will to matter into a (specific) 
will to make subjectivity matter, the social-structural model 
is destined to remain invulnerable, deflecting every external 
assault as wishful thinking.
Even so, let’s at least acknowledge the influential response 
of Herndl and Licona (2007), who have suggested that the 
subject-agent might be able, kairotically, to exploit certain 
moments of slippage in collective structure — certain gaps at 
the intersections among social positions. Yet that’s no refuta-
tion. It’s only to affirm that, while nobody can say whether the 
ginormous egg precedes the itty-bitty chicken, there’s still no 
reason not to celebrate the latter’s ability to peck.
Then again, there have also been some attempts to turn the 
tables, to redirect the social-structural argument in just such 
a manner as to confound its proponents. The attempts most 
worth mentioning are from Marilyn Cooper (2011) and from 
Thomas Rickert (2013), though neither is capable of so much 
as impinging upon the social-structural sphere of influence, 
other than, perhaps, by way of theoretical fiat.
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Cooper’s position, as in the preamble to her “neurophenom-
enological” account of agency, is that, because social-and-lin-
guistic arguments about subjectivity do tend to leave us in 
despair, we should start ignoring them. Certainly, any
theory of agency that depends upon a notion of the 
subject is…hamstrung at the start, struggling with 
how to account for any action that is not either deter-
mined by or resistant to semiotic, social, political, 
and material others or orders. (423)
And that, as Cooper emphasizes, is why every theory con-
flating agency with subjectivity remains inherently defeatist, 
incapable of helping us see why rhetorical transaction should 
ever make any non-trivial difference. It’s why Carolyn Miller 
has to explain agency as a merely subjectivist “attribution 
made by another agent,” and it’s “why Herndl and Licona can 
offer only an agent function” (i.e., a socially-determined role 
for a socially-determined subject), and it’s why Thomas Rick-
ert, at least in 2007, cannot envision any but “fleeting and pro-
visional” means for “achieving resistance through subjective 
transformations,” and, finally, it’s why “Judith Butler’s perfor-
mative notion of agency as repetition with a difference is in 
the end so unsatisfying,” considering that “the subject’s actions 
are inevitably structured by the very norms that it attempts to 
resist” (423–424).
Cooper really is onto something: all of these social-struc-
tural, or social-and-linguistic theorizations are to guaran-
tee that the agent-as-subject remain a hapless creature of the 
collectivity. Yet Cooper errs in maintaining that “a workable 
theory of agency requires the death not only of the modern-
ist subject but of the whole notion of the subject” — even in 
its “poststructural, postmodern, and posthumanist” variations 
(423). She’s mistaken precisely because there’s nothing work-
able about wishing the subject away, certainly not so long as 
the entire social-structural assemblage keeps producing a 
socially-determined subjectivity that’s, in turn, bent on con-
tinuing to matter.
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As for Rickert (2013), who must have taken Cooper’s criti-
cism to heart, his position has become that deterministic the-
ories, such as those about the social construction of subjectiv-
ity, are only world views, and that mere vagaries of opinion 
cannot, in the long run, make any difference, and that even 
the most socially-constituted of subjectivities are dwarfed by 
everybody’s “fundamental weddedness to world” (xvi). But, 
again, it’s Rickert who’s missing the point. The inhabitants of 
the social-structural landscape of rhetorical agency (this fac-
tory for generating rhetorical subjectivity) have already placed 
the subject under the thumb of the social, and, by now, there’s 
just no contradicting them.
That’s why it’s still worth our while to scrutinize the work 
continually taking place in the social-structural landscape. 
For some data, we’ll return to that theoretical statement from 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (2005), to that essay which has so 
influentially demonstrated rhetorical agency to be coextensive 
with a certain collectively-determined interiority.
In surveying the relevant (not only, as it were, the “consti-
tutive,” but also the “critical-constitutive”) literature, Campbell 
discovers that rhetorical agency in principle reduces to exactly 
the subjectivity proper to a creature of the status quo. Thus she 
prefaces her entire discussion with a somewhat disconcert-
ing manifesto, assembled on the basis of works from Michelle 
Baliff, Judith Butler, Louis Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu. It’s 
to frame rhetorical agency as coextensive with the interiority of 
what we’ll call, repurposing a usage from Anton and Peterson 
(2003), the structural subject.
For, while theorists such as Campbell do proceed from 
within rhetoric’s constitutive turn, they don’t consider dis-
course to be constitutive from scratch. To the contrary, on 
their account, it’s actually “the community” which establishes 
all the “externals” governing rhetorical transaction in the first 
place (Campbell 9). For example, it’s the group that “con-
fers identities related to gender, race, class, and the like on its 
members and by so doing determines not only what is consid-
ered to be ‘true,’ but also who can speak and with what force.” 
And, yes, Campbell’s labor on behalf of the (incontrovertible) 
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social-structural perspective is indeed supported by, and, in 
turn, supportive of, quite the rhetorical-theoretical crowd.
From Michelle Baliff, Campbell hears that the speech act
is the sacrificial ritual which maintains the polis and 
secures the community…[B]y being subjected to gen-
der, the self is sacrificed upon the altar of the polis, 
offered in the name of solidarity, order, harmony, 
peace…In this way, the political subject and the 
speaking subject…gain identity — recognition by the 
polis as legitimate.” (3)
So, on the social-structural account, the rhetorical agent is 
the authorized (if thoroughly subjected) agent, dispensing 
occluded social forces with her every word. Besides, she’s not 
just a political subject, but a speaking subject as well, and then 
her speech, if it’s to be so much as registered, must be con-
sistent with the discourse, signification, or rhetoric already 
approved for circulation within the collectivity.
From Judith Butler, Campbell learns that agency itself must 
be co-extensive with (pre-structured) subjectivity:
“[T]he agency of the subject appears to be an effect of 
its subordination” or, referring to…Althusser’s doc-
trine of interpellation, “existence as a subject can be 
purchased only through guilty embrace of the law.” 
(3)
What’s more, “agency is always and only a political prerog-
ative,” for “if the subject is constituted by power, that power 
does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted”; to the 
contrary, the “subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected 
and produced time and time again” (Butler, qtd. in Campbell 
15). In that case, the perspective which Campbell is helping 
to construct must be one in which subjectivity is not so much 
“produced” as re-produced. For example, while the interiority 
of the rhetorical agent is said to reflect the latter’s ongoing sub-
jection (time and time again), there’s not the slightest sugges-
tion that such interiority might ever be formed other than in 
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keeping with the dictates of the immediately given dispensa-
tion.
Next, from Pierre Bourdieu, Campbell discovers that all of 
communicative agency is locked irremediably into place within 
the status quo:
“competence” in linguistic performance…includes 
“the right to speech”…the right to speak “the autho-
rized language which is also the language of author-
ity. Competence implies the power to impose recep-
tion.” (15)
Clearly, such official control over expression then becomes an 
insurmountable constraint upon the very rationality which 
subject-agents share as members of the collective.
It’s from this perspective that Campbell finally calls 
upon none other than Aristotle to testify on behalf of the 
social-structural paradigm. Citing various passages from the 
Poetics and the Nichomachean Ethics, and tacitly linking these 
to ideas in the Rhetoric, Campbell indicates that Aristotle’s 
conception of “art” or techne (which involves a “reasoned habit 
of mind”), and also his conception of “thought” or dianoia 
(which refers to “the faculty of saying what is possible and per-
tinent in given circumstances”), not to mention his conception 
of practical judgment or phronesis, must already be consistent 
with the work of “Foucault and Bourdieu,” where subjectivity, 
certainly subsuming Aristotle’s conceptions of art, reason, and 
tact, emerges as the output of one or another governing appa-
ratus (Campbell 6-7).
Consequently, in Campbell’s social-structural assemblage, 
all of the (let’s say) constitutive mechanisms — the common-
places and communicative techniques at work in rhetorical 
transaction — turn out to be much the same as those through 
which the Bourdieu-styled habitus would generate (what else 
but) habits of mind. Such commonplaces, techniques, and hab-
its of mind are now byproducts of just those “recurrent prac-
tices” which, once “internalized,” provide sociality not only 
with “powerful engines” for “affecting and constraining future 
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behaviors” but also with the means for controlling conscious-
ness, rationality, and rhetorical transaction itself (5-7).
And what, so far, can we surmise of the processes through 
which the social-structural machine fabricates a rhetorical sub-
jectivity that could, in turn, serve as proxy for all the rest of 
rhetorical agency? Well, first of all, we’ve seen that rhetorical 
subjectivity is being constructed as the interiority necessary for 
filling out all of the structural roles (whether dominant or mar-
ginalized) that are integral to the status quo. In other words, 
rhetorical subjectivity turns out to be an effect of the overarch-
ing social logic which organizes the totality. Second, we’ve seen 
that rhetorical subjectivity is also being constructed as isoto-
pic with rhetorical conventionality, for it’s now the constitutive 
output of just those discursive practices already authorized for 
use within the group. Third, we’ve seen that rhetorical subjec-
tivity is being constructed as coextensive with rhetorical mate-
riality, for it’s henceforth the re-production of just those “exter-
nals” — those “identities related to gender, race, class, and the 
like” — which the group continually “confers on its members” 
(Campbell 9).
We can therefore surmise that these are processes through 
which rhetorical subjectivity is being assembled on the model 
of the state. For it does appear that the so-called community is 
a nation (with the smaller locales tucked, homologously, into a 
more global totality), and that collectively-determined identi-
ties are social or structural roles, and that any privileges accru-
ing to those identities are political capital, and that constitutive 
discourse is the law, and, finally, that the rhetorical agent is the 
subjugated citizen.
Of course, there might be some more or less impassioned 
rejoinders, such as those implied in the work of Schrag (1997), 
or of Latour (2007), or of Grimson (2010). But those rejoin-
ders wouldn’t sink in, not among the inhabitants of a landscape 
whose will to matter is actually the will to make interiority 
matter, and in its most socially-determined form, at that.
Clearly, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell is correct to emphasize the 
communal dimension of agency, which — as she explains —
has featured in discussions of rhetorical functionality since the 
time of the ancient Greeks. And, yes, interiorities, identities, 
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and social roles are shaped by collective ways of speaking, just 
as these latter, in turn, are processed and deployed in a manner 
more or less consistent with prior interiorities, identities, and 
social roles. So it does seem that Campbell, like so many other 
contemporary scholars, must have every justification in the 
world for treating a socially-constituted subjectivity as founda-
tional for rhetorical transaction.
After all, some rhetorical theorists have been able to show 
that “change” itself is indistinguishable from the impres-
sion of change. In “Liminal Spaces in Popular Culture: Social 
Change through Rhetorical Agency” (2005), Roxanne Kirk-
wood affirms that rhetorical agency accrues to identity, and 
that, even if “identity is merely a form of interpretation,” it’s 
still “real if it means something to the person claiming it” (32). 
As a result, since it’s this sort of personalized interpretation 
that presumably accounts for everything, rhetorical subjec-
tivity, all by itself, becomes the explanation for social change. 
Similarly, Foss, Waters, and Armada (2007) maintain that rhe-
torical agency is a function of the agent’s “interpretation” (a 
“source of power” in its own right), for which reason agents 
always “have choices about how to perceive their conditions 
and their agency” (219, 223). Meanwhile, as Christine J. Gard-
ner (2011) reports, theorists such as Joshua Gunn and Michelle 
Condit have entered into a debate not over whether rhetori-
cal agency is a fantasy, but, rather, over whether it’s good that 
rhetorical agency is a fantasy. Thus, after Condit proclaims that 
agency is a “necessary illusion,” Carolyn Miller (2007) agrees 
with Condit, adding that agency is illusory in two senses at 
once (Miller 151-152). It’s illusory in that it is a “constructed 
(or pre-constructed)” attribution, and in that it is “an ideolog-
ical construct.”
In all these cases, and many more besides, the inhabitants 
of the social-structural landscape have so successfully reduced 
rhetorical agency to rhetorical subjectivity, and have so suc-
cessfully placed the latter under the thumb of the social, that 
it’s simply irrelevant for writers like Herndl and Licona, or 
Cooper, or Rickert to come along and complain that the para-
digm itself happens to be demoralizing.
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For present purposes, though, what’s important to note is 
that Karlyn Kohrs Campbell is not manufacturing rhetorical 
subjectivity by herself, nor is she lacking for allies to help her 
frame this subjugated interiority as governing all of rhetorical 
agency. As we know, “the term agency” has commonly been 
theorized in keeping with a “long list of terms,” including “self-
hood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, 
initiative, freedom, and creativity” (Emirbayer and Mische 
962). All such terms, filtered through just the right concepts 
from Althusser, from Bourdieu, from Butler, can readily be 
viewed as outputs of an ineluctable social logic. And that’s how 
rhetorical subjectivity can emerge as quite perfectly cotermi-
nous with rhetorical agency itself (Campbell 9).
Can the Speaker Speak?
Drawing on all sorts of resources available in this first theo-
retical-and-practical landscape, Campbell infers that the “con-
dition” of the agent, i.e., as a mere byproduct of social force, 
is by definition “unavoidable” (3). Then, to verify that rhetori-
cal agency is the same as subjugation, she presents a dramatic 
illustration, a striking case, to exemplify the subjection of rhe-
torical agents categorically.
For, when introducing the nineteenth-century activ-
ist Sojourner Truth as the very embodiment of the rhetorical 
agent, Campbell emphasizes the odds against any such subject’s 
ever managing to speak. Perhaps, of course, Campbell means 
to deliver a bit of a pep talk: where there’s a will, there’s a way! 
Even so, in rehearsing Frances Dana Gage’s characterization 
of Sojourner Truth as “an old, illiterate, former slave woman,” 
Campbell affirms that, when such a person is “able to speak 
at all” (i.e., not only to her contemporaries but also, a longue, 
to us), then that, here in quite an intriguing turn of phrase, is 
nothing short of “a miracle” (8-9). It’s as if Campbell, in consul-
tation with her social-structural cohorts, has happened upon 
an irrefragable answer to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s ques-
tion. Yes, everybody knows the subaltern can speak, regardless 
that, on all the non-trivial accounts, it’s impossible for her to 
do so.
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Again, the theoretical frame which Campbell has assembled 
(with, again, the aid of her allies) is a perspective according 
to which any speaker, any nominal rhetorical agent, must be 
totally subjected to the state. So of course it’s mystifying when-
ever the subaltern manages to speak anyway. At the same time, 
though, we should notice that Campbell, as a social-structural 
commentator on rhetorical agency, is committed to shoring up 
the theory of the theorist by undermining the practice of the 
practitioner. For she’s demonstrating that not even an exem-
plary rhetorical agent ought, in principle, to be capable of say-
ing anything that matters.
In this case, Campbell chooses to dwell on Sojourner 
Truth’s dialect, which would surely betray something about the 
subject-agent’s social status. The dialect then becomes import-
ant, i.e. in this representative social-structural reckoning, 
because it verifies that any utterance whatever would automat-
ically become an expression of the speaker’s social identity, her 
structural role within the collectivity.
Let’s agree, without reservation, that dialect can indeed 
be tied, first, to one’s ascribed identity (“race, class, and the 
like”) and then to one’s subjectivity, in this way lending cre-
dence to the argument that it’s never really the rhetorical agent 
who speaks, but always a pre-established sociality that speaks 
through her (Campbell 3). To be sure, it’s only in a certain fic-
tionalized version of the Sojourner Truth speech that any of 
the non-standard dialect exists to begin with. Nevertheless, 
since we ourselves are concerned with the work that the social- 
structural investigator is having to perform, namely, the work 
of undermining the practice of the practitioner, we should 
take a moment to examine Campbell’s preferred uses for the 
(bogus) dialect which Frances Dana Gage, our theorist’s priv-
ileged source in this regard, has sutured to Sojourner Truth’s 
statement.
The difficulty is that — by Campbell’s recurrent admis-
sion — the non-standard dialect isn’t authentic in the first place 
(12–13, 18). Therefore, to derive Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical 
agency, as Campbell does, from a spurious dialect, and to place 
so much emphasis on this same non-evidentiary dialect (as, 
on the one side, “degrading” and “deformed” and, on the other 
  3 :: subjectivity in the social-structural landscape | 59
side, authentically evocative of the speaker’s identity) does look 
to be quite the social-structural sub-routine. If it’s defensible, 
that’s not on the basis of any historical evidence, but, rather, 
on the basis of a theoretical perspective which reads rhetorical 
agency as manifesting just that interiority proper to a minion 
of the state.
Thus we arrive at some corroboration for the assem-
blage-theoretical premise that the investigator, too, is always 
among those who are producing the assemblage under inves-
tigation. For Campbell divulges that, once upon a time, she’d 
been confronted with a problem of editorial craftwork that 
must have been a problem of theoretical production as well. 
She’d had to decide whether to retain or else to excise Gage’s 
interpolated (degrading, deformed, inauthentic) dialect:
When the text of Gage’s version of Truth’s speech was 
published in Man Cannot Speak For Her, I removed 
the dialect that smothers the speech with racist ste-
reotypes…I now believe that it was wrong to do so, 
although it could not and should not have been pub-
lished as originally written without the kind of analy-
sis done here. (14)
With respect to Campbell in that former role as editor, we 
should indeed recognize the challenge she faced. Yet, with 
respect to Campbell’s present role as theorist, we cannot very 
well say that she’s merely attending to the evidence as given, 
that she’s simply inspecting something inherited from else-
where. To the contrary, she is demonstrating, and before our 
very eyes, that she is still engaged in generating the materi-
als that she’s supposed to be uncovering. After all, she’s draw-
ing her data from, and basing her analysis on, a speech which 
sometimes includes the bogus dialect but sometimes excludes 
it, all depending on the theorist’s own interest in making the 
bogus dialect matter.
What the demonstration itself demonstrates is that 
Sojourner Truth is not the only rhetorical agent in town —
that a theorist like Karlyn Kohrs Campbell can be a rhetori-
cal agent, too, right along with the “old, illiterate, former slave 
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woman” whose activity she’s studying (9). It’s just that the 
theorist in this case happens to be working to advance the 
social-structural perspective on rhetorical agency. Under an 
environmentalized imperative like that, subjectivity is so thor-
oughly constrained, so utterly determined, that it’s a miracle 
when anybody speaks at all, let alone when she’s heard over the 
noise of her identity.
An Ineffectual Agency
The social-structural perspective, ostensibly “constitutive,” 
illustrates the workings of a social-and-linguistic loop. In this 
view, rhetorical agency is a circuit, with some socially-enforced 
structure at one end, some socially-constrained subjectiv-
ity at the other, and some socially-determined signification in 
the middle (connecting the two ends by filling up the concep-
tual space between). Rhetorical agents can then be theorized 
as merely operationalizing the constitutive forces that create 
the rhetorical agents to begin with. Indeed, that must be what 
Campbell has in mind when she writes that “agency is consti-
tutive of collectivities…just as collectivities are constitutive of 
agency, however paradoxical that may seem” (5).
Even so, in our present investigation, it’s not social-struc-
tural theory in isolation, but, rather, in conjunction with a cer-
tain case study (involving Sojourner Truth’s famous speech) 
that’s to illustrate the workings of a subjected rhetorical agency. 
Of course, it would also be manageable for us to dispense with 
the case study altogether. We might settle for quoting one or 
another of the assertions rehearsed above — say, the complaint 
that, in theories like that of Judith Butler, “the subject’s actions 
are inevitably structured by the very norms that it attempts 
to resist” (Cooper, “Rhetorical Agency,” 424). Yet, insofar as 
we are acting as assemblage-theoretical researchers, our task 
is not, in fact, to rehearse complaints; it’s to disclose connec-
tions and consequences. Thus we should simply ponder the 
destiny of our selected artifact, were the latter to be read in 
keeping with the social-structural paradigm. What would hap-
pen, more than likely, is that the speech would prove not to 
manifest very much rhetorical agency at all, whether for (a) the 
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audience to whom Sojourner Truth would be speaking, or (b) 
the constituency she’d appear to be opposing, or (c) the listen-
ers who hadn’t yet made up their minds.
To begin with, the speech, according to social-structural 
logic, ought to do next to nothing for just that audience with 
which the speaker would seem the most closely identified. 
In this case, Campbell assumes that the audience in question 
would comprise all the disempowered African-Americans and 
women of the mid-nineteenth century, in other words, all the 
sorts of disenfranchised persons with whom Sojourner Truth 
could be affiliated, as if automatically so, by virtue of her race 
and gender. Yet our own observation should be that, were she 
really speaking for a constituency unified by its own discourse, 
our exemplary rhetorical agent would not be able to say any-
thing that could matter. The unified community of disenfran-
chised African-Americans and women would already prefer 
that they be granted their missing rights, and then nothing 
Sojourner Truth might say in support of that preference could 
make any difference.
Certainly, as one might extrapolate from any public speak-
ing textbook, Sojourner Truth may have in mind purposes 
other than to convince. She may be seeking merely to rein-
force the predilections already in place. She may even be hop-
ing to motivate some outright action. But, then again, those 
outcomes couldn’t matter either, not in a world where social-
ly-constituted subjectivities would already determine which 
socially-constituted trajectories may prevail.
On the other hand, if the speech were to be read in rigorous 
keeping with the social-structural paradigm, then it ought to 
do even less for the speaker’s opponents than for her support-
ers. In a social-and-linguistic view such as Campbell’s, speech 
itself ought to be the automatic reinstitution of the “unavoid-
able” condition of the subject (Campbell 3, 12). So, under a 
model where rhetorical agency attaches to membership within 
the status quo, somebody speaking for the minoritarian posi-
tion oughtn’t, in principle, be able to out-shout the majoritar-
ians. To do that, the exemplary rhetorical agent would have to 
speak in so miraculous a manner as to convert her own, mar-
ginalized identity into a source of empowerment, and against 
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the very forces precluding such empowerment in the first 
place. But is that really what we should expect from a theoret-
ical perspective where the more powerful subjectivities and/or 
discourses would forever be keeping their weaker counterparts 
at bay (constituting them, again and again, as insignificant)?
So, if it’s the case, as on the social-structural reckoning, that 
neither the position of those already constituted as the speak-
er’s supporters, nor the position of those already constituted as 
her opponents could be altered by anything the speaker might 
say, then, by process of elimination, we should conclude that all 
of the claims, themes, and images bundled up into Sojourner 
Truth’s speech must be there for the benefit of quite another set 
of listeners. They ought to be there for the benefit of the unde-
cided auditors, those who hadn’t (in connection with this par-
ticular debate) been constituted either way.
Subtracting from Rhetorical Practice
At the risk of lapsing into some instrumentalism, let’s agree 
that the speaker must be thinking to create a coalition between 
her supporters and the as-yet undecided auditors, i.e., as a 
practicable way of swelling the pool of subjectivities in favor of 
extending equal rights under the law.
Therefore, from now on (in the remainder of the study, and 
not just while we’re here in the social-structural landscape of 
agency), we’ll assume that Sojourner Truth is speaking mainly 
to the undecided, the auditors in the middle, and that not only 
“I am a woman’s rights” but also the rest of her speech (com-
prising gender, race, mind, and so on) is primarily, though not 
exclusively, for them.
Unfortunately, so far as would concern any undecided audi-
tors, every term in “I am a woman’s rights” would start disap-
pearing if read from the social-structural perspective. The “I” 
would refer to a black person, and therefore to someone who 
(at a time when most of the African-Americans are enslaved, 
and the rest politically invisible) is practically a non-entity, 
hardly a figure for the undecided auditor to identify with. By 
the same token, the “woman’s” would refer to a merely subal-
tern contingent, just as the “rights” would refer to a freight-
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less counter-factual. For, in the historical setting for the speech, 
it’s the very reality of women’s rights (to say nothing of Afri-
can Americans’ rights) that is still the unknown quantity. And 
then, should the majoritarian contingent prove anywhere near 
as hostile as Gage reports, and as Campbell continually insin-
uates, so much the worse for Sojourner Truth’s (tainted) iden-
tification with all the other women’s rights activists, outliers as 
they are to begin with. Thus the various social-structural tenets 
already invite us to conclude that much of what goes into the 
speech (all of it there to develop “I am a woman’s rights” as its 
kernel, its thesis) must be squandered on behalf of a project 
lacking in agency for the undecided auditors.
By now, in noting the likely effacement of every term in “I 
am a woman’s rights,” we have simultaneously encountered the 
likely effacement of at least two of the most important themes 
folded into the speech. The elements in question are race and 
gender. After all, from the perspective of the undecided audi-
tors, the speaker’s very dependence upon the two marginalized 
identities, one that of an African-American, the other that of a 
woman, must be subtracting from, rather than adding to, her 
rhetorical agency. But we’ll continue regardless, folding some 
of the remaining features of the speech into the social-struc-
tural paradigm as well.
As we glean from reading Campbell between the lines, 
there is available, in contemporary theory, a quite reputa-
ble explanation as to how even an “old, illiterate, former slave 
woman” might exercise agency in the face of a racist, sexist, 
and generally oppressive form of sociality (Campbell 9). It’s 
that the exemplary rhetorical agent can harness the constitutive 
power of the discourses circulating within her collectivity.
For, as Campbell indicates, the Sojourner Truth speech is 
situated within a set of nineteenth-century “principles” or com-
monplaces (14). These betoken (on the one side) the then-pro-
gressive discourses of natural rights, abolitionism, and women’s 
rights, and (on the other side) the then-conservative discourses 
of traditional religious authority, of legalized and monetized 
racism, and of patriarchal, “elitist conceptions” of “true wom-
anhood” (10, 14). So, according to Campbell’s social-structural 
reasoning, what must be happening in 1851 is that the speaker 
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is seeing to it that the progressive discourses come to exert all 
the more authority than do the conservative discourses. And it 
is marvelous indeed to think that the speaker could exercise 
rhetorical agency by invoking precisely those commonplaces 
held at bay in the operations of a backward-looking dispensa-
tion. After all, in its departure from the ideologies then hege-
monic within the status quo, a minoritarian discourse of nat-
ural rights would appear replete with liabilities, not assets, for 
anybody deploying it.
To support her argument about the collective basis of 
agency, Campbell avers that “without the communities repre-
sented by abolitionism and woman’s rights, the natural rights 
principles underlying the arguments as reported in the news-
paper accounts and incorporated into Gage’s versions of the 
speech would not have been available to Truth” (14). The point, 
let’s recognize, is not that the speaker becomes an agent by 
appealing to natural rights; it’s that she becomes an agent by 
appealing to just any previously-approved discourse, for exam-
ple, that of natural rights. For, according to Campbell, it’s by 
parroting the principles already acceptable to her target audi-
ence that our exemplary rhetorical agent refutes “all of the 
major arguments (biological, theological, and sociological) 
against woman’s rights” (12).
On this view, the speaker would be invoking natural rights 
to argue that the rights of women and African-Americans 
ought certainly to be added into the set of civil, legal, or stat-
utory rights from which they are missing. So, to discover how 
dubious is this (nominally “constitutive”) picture, this sce-
nario in which discourses are sources of agency simply because 
they’re collectively authorized, let’s investigate the claim that 
for someone to invoke a minoritarian discourse could convert 
her into a rhetorical agent just like that.
If we reflect that the social-structural perspective would 
require the discourses in question to be hierarchically disposed 
(i.e., within a sociality modeled on the state), we’ll see that a 
discourse which is locally influential really ought not to be any 
match for a discourse which is globally normative. As a result, 
and on the social-structural reckoning itself, we should expect 
any hypothetically undecided audience to become increasingly 
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inclined toward the status quo, rather than toward a speaker 
who is limited to deploying arguments which, though per-
haps inspirational for her own disempowered “community,” are 
immediately recuperable into the logic organizing the society 
at large.
Now, the doctrine of natural rights most obviously at issue 
in the Sojourner Truth archive would be that reflecting the Jef-
fersonian division of rights into those which are alienable and 
those which are not, the latter including the rights to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. One wouldn’t, however, have 
to be a constitutional scholar to know that these inalienable 
rights of the mid-nineteenth century do co-exist with their 
legalized effacement, both in the practice of slavery, and in the 
disenfranchisement of women.
Simply on the face of it, we have an inequality between the 
discourse of natural rights and the discourse of civil or legal 
or statutory rights. And, probably like the historical audience, 
we notice this to be an outright imbalance, rather than some 
sort of stalemate. For just anyone can look around and see that 
reality, circa 1851, is weighing in overwhelmingly on the side 
of the state, whose actions have long since verified that even 
natural rights are subsumed under legal or statutory rights.
Even so, according to Campbell — whom we’re consulting 
as a representative for the social-structural perspective more 
generally — the speaker in the case study is further warranting 
her claim (for the expansion of legal rights such that they also 
accommodate natural rights) with the aid of examples drawn 
from personal experience, and scriptural precedent, and just 
plain common sense. All of these are said to be showing that 
women like Sojourner Truth do remain ontologically or “nat-
urally” equal to men, for which reason they should be granted 
their missing legal rights as well. Yet these are precisely the 
sorts of examples that ought to be neutralized under a per-
spective where somebody becomes a rhetorical agent, first, by 
virtue of her “unavoidable” subjection under the social dispen-
sation, and, second, by virtue of her fluency in precisely such 
commonplaces as those to which only a local, pre-constituted, 
and grievously out-flanked audience could respond (Campbell 
3).
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Campbell reports that the reason for which Sojourner 
Truth so carefully “details the heavy fieldwork she has done” 
is that she’s thereby showing that women can be as physically 
strong — and hard-working — as men (Campbell 10). So, in 
order to establish that she, exemplifying all the rest of the dis-
enfranchised, is certainly entitled to the legal rights that are 
currently missing, the speaker insists that she has long since 
proven herself qualified to fill out the social role of just any 
manual laborer. Yet it’s difficult to see why this, from the per-
spective of an undecided audience, should be an argument 
constituting the disenfranchised as entitled to the full range 
of legal rights. It could as easily constitute them as entitled to 
continue performing the heavy fieldwork.
But then, as Campbell would have it, Sojourner Truth 
also cites some scripture to prove that, because the equality of 
women with men is woven into the universe, it should certainly 
be protected by the state as well. For this must be the point not 
only of the speaker’s referring to “the Virgin birth, which pre-
sumably is a religious belief accepted by her opponents,” but 
also of her referring to the “power” of Eve — a power quite 
undeniable even by the speaker’s racist-and-patriarchal heck-
lers, considering that these latter would be none other than the 
“traditional male religious authorities” to begin with (Campbell 
9, 11). Regrettably, it’s still unclear that Eve and Mary would, in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, have had their own legal 
rights, in which case it’s not self-evident that to invoke those 
figures would immediately constitute all the rest of the women 
as entitled to legal rights by association. On this count, too, the 
hypothetically undecided audience wouldn’t have any compel-
ling reason to side with the speaker, rather than with the status 
quo.
Finally, or so Campbell argues, Sojourner Truth clinches 
the deal by emphasizing her own intelligence. The idea would 
be that women like Sojourner Truth are certainly entitled to 
legal rights because of their wit, their all-around cleverness. 
And it is indeed in connection with the problem of mind that 
the analogy of the pint and the quart comes into play.
One hardly need argue for the importance of tropes — viva-
cious imagery, enargeia, figures of speech, comparisons of all 
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sorts, conceptual metaphors, frames, and the rest. Such features 
of technique have always been associated with rhetoric’s storied 
power, now commonly labeled “constitutive,” to help interlocu-
tors see themselves (their situations, their problems) differently 
than before. Yet Campbell, for all her social-and-linguistic pre-
suppositions, runs into inordinate difficulty explaining how the 
pint-and-quart figure would work. Indeed, she comes close to 
suggesting that the analogy might, after all, have a little less to 
do with highlighting women’s intelligence than with showing 
how skillfully a woman can elicit charitable donations.
But here, in any case, is how we find the analogy presented 
in Gage, that is, in Campbell’s preferred, if often dubious, 
source on our exemplary rhetorical agent:
“Den dey talks ‘bout dis ting in de head; what dis dey 
call it?” (“Intellect,” whispered some one near.) “Dat’s 
it, honey. What’s dat got to do wid womin’s rights or 
nigger’s rights? If my cup won’t hold but a pint, and 
yourn holds a quart, wouldn’t ye be mean not to let 
me have my little half-measure full?” (qtd. in Camp-
bell 10)
And it’s noteworthy that the following is all that Campbell can 
find to say about the pint and the quart as a constitutive, met-
aphorically-validated way of elevating the discourse of natural 
rights so that it may henceforth compete with, and even over-
come, the discourse of legal rights:
The implied argument against women’s rights [has 
been] that women lack the mental capacity for polit-
ical and economic rights. [The speaker] rejects the 
relevance of this issue to civil rights for women or 
African Americans. Note that her words presuppose 
natural rights principles, that rights are not conferred 
but inhere in persons. The case of equality of oppor-
tunity is made with a vivid figurative analogy — even 
if my cup holds less than yours, are you so mean you 
won’t give me my little half measure? (10)
68 | belikian // rhetorical agency 
Consequently, with respect to “mind,” Campbell’s social-struc-
tural perspective does lead her to conclude that the speaker 
must be deploying the resources of language in order to frame 
natural rights as trumping legal rights, even if that also requires 
shaming the audience in the process.
Yes, but let’s think about what would be happening here —
at least, on an appropriately rigorous social-structural account. 
The metaphor of the pint and the quart, that clever analogy, 
would be separating the discourse of natural rights from the 
discourse of civil rights, leaving the two discourses talking past 
each other. Exactly as Campbell concedes, the intelligence of 
women and/or of black people would prove irrelevant to the 
question of social, legal, or civil emancipation. As a result, the 
hypothetically undecided audience would be left with even 
less reason to side with the speaker than ever before, since the 
speaker herself would be arguing that natural rights had noth-
ing to do with legal rights, anyway.
Thus it turns out that, from a social-structural perspec-
tive, the metaphor of the pint and the quart couldn’t be so very 
much “constitutive,” after all. Instead of creating a new way 
of seeing (such that those auditors subscribing to legal rights 
could perhaps find themselves connected with those subscrib-
ing to natural rights), the “vivid figurative analogy” would, 
more than likely, invite everyone to return to the shelter of the 
old discourses, the old rationales for remaining undecided, to 
which they’d been adhering all along (Campbell 10).
Yet the question remains, especially for those who are not 
social-structural theorists, as to how the exemplary rhetori-
cal agent, were she limited to recycling a weakly minoritarian 
discourse, could effect any social change whatever, i.e., in the 
face of a robustly hegemonic discourse. Again, just anybody 
circa 1851 might look around and see that, while metaphysi-
cal rights can’t be withheld, legal rights obviously can, in which 
case there’s no, as it were, structural reason to link the one kind 
of right with the other.
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What Else Is Wrong with This Paradigm?
In opting for an assemblage-theoretical approach, we’re hav-
ing to ponder the processes through which the four different 
versions of rhetorical agency are being manufactured, even 
if one of the versions might prove only to be reinforcing the 
social conditions already in place. So let’s consider that the 
social-structural perspective, where rhetorical agency becomes 
indistinguishable from rhetorical subjectivity, is actually a way 
of flouting the assemblage-theoretical approach that we our-
selves have begun to implement.
As we know, assemblage theory (in the variant adopted for 
this investigation) holds that collectivities are built out of com-
ponents — resources, agents, participants in general — that are 
irreducible to any of the relations in which they’re implicated. 
So an assemblage-theoretical perspective leaves open the pos-
sibility that a term like “subjectivity,” though it might, in some 
respects be shaped by those communal structures into which 
it’s folded, might also, in other respects, exceed the constraints 
that are imposed by the structures themselves.
In the social-structural perspective, by contrast, all terms 
are claustrated, for they are synonymous or isotopic with 
a socially-determined interiority. In this case, subjectivity 
becomes the planet, and then conventionality, transcendence, 
and materiality become the satellites. Yet all of the terms exist 
as fully internal to their relations, as ineluctably bound by 
them. That’s what it means to argue (as Campbell does, albeit 
with the help of an entire social-structural support system) for 
speakers as miniaturized chunks of sociality, as creatures of 
a collectivity that subjectifies them, determining, on the one 
side, what’s considered to be “true,” and, on the other side, 
“who can speak and with what force” (Campbell 3). Thus, in a 
landscape where rhetorical subjectivity arises within a closed, 
self-contained system (a social-and-linguistic loop), it neces-
sarily remains the only conceivable source of rhetorical agency.
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A Chimerical Agency for a Colossal Agent
That this is not just a theoretical but also a practical setback 
becomes clear when we consider that any social-structural 
researcher will finally have to justify all of rhetorical trans-
action by theoretical fiat. Let’s again reflect on the plight of 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, who is obviously cognizant of the 
(defeatist) ramifications of the perspective she espouses. To 
assure subsequent researchers that rhetoric does, somehow, 
retain its own role, its own task, even where theory leads to 
the opposite inference, Campbell invites them to trust in the 
constitutive powers of “alchemy” (13). Regardless that Fran-
ces Dana Gage’s version of the Sojourner Truth speech is in so 
many ways bogus, we can pretend that it isn’t. Instead, we can 
turn to what we “imagine” to be the “originary moment,” with 
its “play of ideas,” its “metaphors,” its “interaction between 
Truth and her opponents” (Campbell 14). That’s how we can 
wish the rhetorical agent into being. After all, rhetorical agency 
can inhere — if only we’d like it to — in any signs whatever, even 
those belonging to a “fictive recreation” (13). For example, we 
can derive, from the famous fabrication by Francis Dana Gage, 
a made-up Sojourner Truth to serve “as an icon and symbol for 
her slave sisters.” Thus we can attribute some rhetorical agency 
to this impossible speaker’s “words as we imagine her to have 
spoken them,” even when we have every reason to believe that 
the “words” belong not to Sojourner Truth, but to a simula-
crum constructed, twelve years after the fact, by — as Campbell 
herself explains — an “ambitious white woman.”
It’s as if we can now have the best of both expedients, jux-
taposing the basket of critical-constitutive rhetoric with the 
basket of just plain constitutive rhetoric, and proclaiming rhe-
torical agency to be hidden inside whichever of the baskets we 
prefer. If we’d like to privilege the critical-constitutive rhetoric, 
then we can affirm that the rhetorical agent must be the sub-
jected minion of the community (i.e., the seamlessly totalitar-
ian state, producing all the marginalized interiorities, ruling on 
whatever is to be considered true, stipulating exactly who may 
speak, and with exactly what force). But if we’d like to privi-
lege the constitutive rhetoric proper, then we can affirm that 
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the rhetorical agent is only on occasion a disempowered struc-
tural subject, and, at other times, a colossal individual, inher-
ently capable of bending the social to her will, and all of it just 
like that. In this case, she can come into view the very minute 
that the marginalized subaltern spins around, turning suddenly 
into “a very tall, strong woman of great presence with a com-
manding voice in speech and song,” someone with great “wit…
skill at repartee…command of metaphor, and…courage in fac-
ing hostile audiences” (Campbell 9).
The problem for Campbell, though, is that to deploy all 
these social-structural tenets (and to invoke a simulated 
Sojourner Truth) requires that she undermine the mountain of 
concrete evidence presented by the historians whom she her-
self is citing, historians such as Nell Irvin Painter. All of this 
historical evidence is to suggest that rhetorical agents might 
be produced in some way other than through absolute subju-
gation and/or theoretical fiat. But Campbell, regardless of all 
that Painter in particular has done to demystify the colossally 
authentic speaker, wants us to preserve that canard so we can 
(“constitutively”) exploit it.
So here’s an illustration of the manner in which the 
social-structural perspective would (to repurpose a term from 
Paul Virilio), endo-colonize just any source materials it hap-
pened to fall upon: “What Painter fails to understand is that 
Gage’s fiction has a dramatic agency as a performative text 
that is greater than historians’ facts” (Campbell 14). Clearly, if 
Campbell is choosing to trivialize the argument from “facts,” 
then that’s because she’s attempting to protect the argument 
from performativity. Trapped inside a linguistic turn, the lat-
ter embedded within a social turn, a social-structural theo-
rist like Campbell has no access to anything more substantial 
than wishfulness, or desire, or theoretical fiat when it comes to 
explaining how rhetorical transaction could ever make any dif-
ference under the present dispensation.
In short, our main discovery (on this first leg of the trip) 
has been that the social-structural perspective is a machine for 
debilitating the practitioner, for weakening rather than empow-
ering the exemplary rhetorical agent. Yet the local theorists, 
here exemplified by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, keep overlooking 
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their own role in perpetuating this framework within which 
communities are totalitarian states, discourses are constitu-
tive in the manner of the law, and subjectivities are homolo-
gous with the structural relations into which they’re embed-
ded. Sadly, in their determination to construct a constrained, 
victimized rhetorical subjectivity, the latter coterminous with 
all the rest of rhetorical agency, such researchers have begun 
jeopardizing rhetorical transcendence as well. They are already 
reporting that, were any rhetorical agent ever to speak in a 
manner conducive to social change, it would necessarily be by 
miracle.
4. 
Conventionality in the  
Rhetorical-Humanistic Landscape
Back there in the social-structural perspective on rhe-
torical agency, every standardized practice associated with rhe-
torical transaction would resemble an artifact of subjectivity, 
thus risking quite merciless interrogation under the light bulb 
of “normativity.” Therefore, to understand how rhetorical con-
ventionality might somehow tamper with, rather than merely 
reinforce, the present dispensation requires that we shift to 
a world in which this second aspect of rhetorical agency can 
indeed make things otherwise than they are. Having addressed 
the “I” of “I am a woman’s rights, of that thesis-like claim which 
features so prominently in our case study, we’ll now treat the 
“rights” as leading to a place where rhetorical conventionality 
is central, and where the local theorists are among those pro-
tecting its centrality (Campbell 3).
De-Leviathanizing the Normative
Here, in the rhetorical-humanistic landscape of agency, rhe-
torical transaction is animated not by nothing, but by ideals, 
visions of the good, and so on, all of which, because they func-
tion as “terms” irreducible to their “relations,” remain separa-
ble from social structures and the like (Baugh 36; Colebrook 
5). Part of our responsibility, then, is to inquire as to where 
such collective guidelines could be coming from. After all, 
from the vantage point of our own (assemblage-theoretical) 
approach, even shared values have to be seen as produced —
maybe not created from scratch, but, in any case, continually 
raised to salience.
We should therefore consider the work of at least some of 
the actors who have been producing all of these commonly 
accepted measures to begin with. Although the label “rhetor-
ical-humanistic” derives, somewhat indirectly, from the work 
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of Michael Leff (2003), we’ll treat the activity of such theorists 
as Bryant (1953), Wallace (1963), and Weaver (1970) as exem-
plifying the rhetorical-humanistic drive to shore up rhetori-
cal conventionality precisely by assembling it on the basis of 
values held in common. According to these writers, rhetorical 
agency isn’t just any stream of transparent norms, but, rather, a 
bridge between embodied subjectivity (or experience) and col-
lectivized subjectivity (or shared guidelines).
Donald Bryant emphasizes rhetoric’s concern, on the one 
side, with our “thoughts, feelings, motives, and behavior” and, 
on the other side, with our “ideas” and “values” — with what 
we as members of a collective know about and consider “worth 
doing” (412-13, 415).
Rhetorical agency, then, is an emergent property of, as Bry-
ant explains, the “whole” person, in whom are hybridized the 
materiality of, say, behaviors, and the sociality of, say, ideas 
(Bryant 414). Karl Wallace, too, highlights the role of “ethical 
and moral values,” and he affirms that rhetoricity draws not 
only on functions belonging to “social rewards and sanctions” 
(from which we learn “right” and “wrong”), but also on func-
tions belonging to “the individual organism” (240, 244). Thus 
rhetorical agents are linked through “commonalities of mean-
ing and partial identities of experience,” and these, again, are 
the links between the materiality of an organism and the soci-
ality of a collective (239). Similarly, Richard Weaver insists that 
rhetoric seeks to engage (what else but) the “whole” person —
much of whose wholeness is sustained through “this subjec-
tively born, intimate, and value-laden vehicle which we call 
language” (Weaver, “Language,” 316). All of these writers are 
building rhetorical agency out of an articulation between, on 
the one side, the evaluative criteria shared within the commu-
nity and, on the other side, the sort of embodiment that’s uni-
versal among all of the group members.
To size up this notion of shared values, we’ll turn to the 
account Weaver offers in “Language Is Sermonic” — a state-
ment quite canonical for the rhetorical-humanistic perspec-
tive. Weaver acknowledges rhetoric’s amphiboly: on the one 
side, it refers to an “independent order of goods,” involving “a 
“vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically”; on the 
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other side, it proceeds from “an order of desire,” involving the 
“particular situation,” the “special circumstances of the audi-
tors” (309). Here, we have a distinction between the aspect of 
rhetoricity that goes with communal guidelines, operating ide-
ally and ethically, and the aspect that goes with embodiment —
operating specially, particularly, situationally.
Even so, the presumption is that there are commonplaces 
for mediating between the timeless, “independent” order of 
goods and the dependent special circumstances, for such are 
the commonplaces, the reconciliatory ways and means, that 
we’re now calling shared values.
They’re like ribbons, streamers, fixed at the one end (where 
they’re nailed into the independent order of goods), but free 
at the other (where they can be manipulated over to just any 
situation, within the dependent order of desire, where they’re 
applicable). We can therefore say that rhetorical-humanistic 
agency is a hybrid between the cultural-anthropological and 
the biological-anthropological, for it’s as much anchored in 
some unspecified range of deeply entrenched, yet redirectable 
social guidelines as it is in the Standard Human Complement.
The term “Standard Human Complement” refers in this 
study (though it originates in certain slightly ironic usages 
from elsewhere) to whatever array of traits and faculties may 
be held to define human beings as (a) members of a single, 
notably embodied, fallible species, and (b) capable of think-
ing and communicating so as to reshape the objects, problems, 
and situations that they’re faced with (Lodge 299; Thomas and 
Turner 95). Such an array, such a Latourian “black box,” work-
ing well enough that almost nobody worries about its “inter-
nal complexity,” could certainly collect a number of those items 
appearing in the “long list of terms associated with agency”: 
“self-hood, motivation, will, purposiveness, intentionality, 
choice, initiative, freedom, and creativity” (Latour, Reassem-
bling, 304; Emirbayer and Mische 962).
However, according to the rhetorical-humanistic model, 
while people do possess a general sort of agency just by vir-
tue of being people, this inherent agency isn’t, in isolation, 
enough to make them rhetorical agents. For that, there needs 
to be a connection between, over here, the inalienable proper-
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ties of the human actor and, over there, the collective proper-
ties (most of all, the locally-shared values) characterizing the 
group to which both the speaker and the listener belong. With 
the linkage in place, then — yes — everyone is now a rhetori-
cal agent, and also, for that matter, a cyborg. The name for this 
rhetorical agent (this network) is, as we’ve seen, the whole per-
son. And what makes the actor “whole” is that she is the com-
plete reconciliation between, on the one side, those ideational 
and affective guidelines characteristic for her group and, on the 
other side, the Standard Human Complement which every-
body possesses simply by belonging to the same species.
So, while our rhetorical-humanistic competencies belong 
to us as members of the worldwide, anthropological commu-
nity, our rhetorical-humanistic shared values belong to us as 
members of the local, historical community. But rhetorical 
agency is still not some special power, accruing to an elite. It’s 
the ordinary ability to link values and object(ive)s within a col-
lectivity where differences are shallow, constituting an overlay 
easily rubbed off to disclose the continuity beneath. After all, 
just anyone possessed of the Standard Human Complement 
can help her neighbors come to see themselves, their prob-
lems, their situations in terms of the shared values which have 
always kept the community together.
For language is, on this view, constitutive only in the sense 
that it’s a humble “system of imputation, by which values and 
percepts are first framed in the mind and are then imputed 
to things” (Weaver, “Language,” 316). The percepts, as mani-
festations of the Standard Human Complement, can take care 
of themselves. Therefore we, as investigators, may concentrate 
on asking what could possibly authorize the ongoing rhetori-
cal-humanistic imputation of values to things. This is not, for 
the locals, a trivial question, given that rhetorical transaction, 
far from automatically placing a seal of approval on whatever 
exists, typically thrives upon our righteous indignation, our 
“sense of the ought,” our “vision of how matters should go” 
(Weaver, “Language,” 309, 315).
Particularly in the case of Weaver, the “ought” might per-
haps be emanating from some Platonic realm of ideality. Yet it’s 
in Weaver’s own reference to what is “intimate” about language 
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that we find the more likely rhetorical-humanistic answer, 
involving a proximate rather than ultimate origin (Weaver, 
“Language,” 316). The intimacy is of a kind obtaining among 
family and friends, much as in the ancient notion of oikono-
mia (see Eden 1997). It’s intrinsic to just the sort of ecumen-
ical economy that makes a household of the entire, expansible 
flock. But this derivation of agency from the hearthside implies 
that the rhetorical-humanistic “ought” must be arising from 
within none other than those intimate, value-laden, conven-
tionally-articulated guidelines which are always already inher-
ited by any bona fide rhetorical agents.
From Normativity to Shared Values
The fact is that rhetorical theorists who appeal to shared val-
ues do not often interrogate the genesis of the very guidelines 
they’re invoking. We know this to be the case because, as Cal-
vin O. Schrag (1997) points out, it is an innovation for Ramsey 
and Di Mare, with their “politics of critical rhetoric,” to have 
shown that even “ideals” are mutable, both in themselves and 
in the effects they promote (74). So the rhetorical-humanis-
tic appeal to collective guidelines, the latter coming from who 
knows where, does look to be another instance of theoretical 
fiat, with writers assuring themselves that shared values are 
necessarily sources of agency simply because they’re shared. 
Yet, in fields quite other than rhetorical studies, as in social 
theory and cultural theory, commentators have begun arguing, 
cogently enough, that it may be less important to scrutinize 
the origin of shared values than to grasp that the shared val-
ues, once they’re present, can serve as resources helping actors 
evade normative, indeed oppressive constraints.
We can consider, for the sake of an outside example, the 
introductory notes which Pisters and Staat provide in Shoot-
ing the Family: Transnational Media and Intercultural Values 
(2005). Taking issue with the view of family as a kind of bun-
ker for hegemony (a “backlash resource”), the authors explain 
that “the intercultural values of migrant families are as partic-
ular and contrary to universalist (that is, modernistic) values 
as natural family values were in the counter-Enlightenment” 
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(13). For, in “transgressing the borders of the nation-state,” 
these “families make clear that the public realm of nation-state 
institutions cannot contain the contemporary significance of 
real families.” And so, as in this example concerning the politi-
cal normativity of the modern(ist) nation-state, commentators 
from even beyond the discipline of rhetoric are agreeing with 
the rhetorical-humanistic position, reinforcing its doctrine that 
the shared, valuated guidelines keeping the group together still 
don’t have to exist in any necessary homology with the hege-
monic.
Now, it’s conceivable that “norms” and “values” might still 
be ideological. However, in the rhetorical-humanistic land-
scape, shared values can only become ideological if they’re 
blended with other elements (objects, aims, ideas, purposes, 
practices, and the like) to form an ostensibly seamless fabric. 
Yet shared values, i.e., pure and simple, clearly remain detach-
able from their contexts. They’re not even unconscious, since 
rhetorical agents can effortlessly draw them to attention, as 
when arguing that only these, and certainly not those, are the 
right shared values for the situation.
A case in point is that “patriotism” can prove to be a 
shared value irreducible to (and de-linkable from) any par-
ticular ideology, including among present-day Americans. 
For there are, evidently, a number of persons who, adhering 
to “a moral framework that goes back to this nation’s found-
ing, and that is inherently progressive,” already live “by such 
principles as service, stewardship, tolerance, and equality of 
opportunity,” showing by example that “devotion to this nation 
means working to help America reach its exceptional poten-
tial and promise” (“Welcome to the True Patriot Network”). 
In that case, from a rhetorical-humanistic perspective, to say 
that shared values are ideological wouldn’t be accurate. They 
might be social, cultural, collective, conventional, and so forth, 
but still without being determinative. And that’s exactly as for 
those true patriots adhering to a moral framework which they 
declare to be inherently progressive, persons whose stated val-
ues it would be quite a stretch to label normative as well.
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A Tribe of Equals
When rhetorical transaction is constructed as depending 
simultaneously on shared human propensities and on shared 
societal values, it’s construed as re-affirming affinity. This pre-
occupation with like’s giving rise to like can explain why rhetor-
ical-humanistic agency is so readily figured as love. An exem-
plary statement is Richard M. Weaver’s “The Phaedrus and the 
Nature of Rhetoric” (1953), with Wayne Brockriede’s “Arguers 
as Lovers” (1972) adding some further nuance. Both take for 
granted, and both perpetuate, the conviction that rhetorical 
agency, whenever worthy of its name, necessarily involves the 
(re)affirmation of a bond between, on the one side, some set 
of auditors and, on the other side, a rhetor who, in caring for 
what they value, cares for them as well. For, while the shared 
values can certainly do the heavy lifting, they cannot lead any-
one astray, not here in the rhetorical-humanistic landscape of 
agency. Instead, any disastrous manipulation, ventriloquation, 
or zombification must be blamed upon the unworthiness of the 
interlocutors, especially of the rhetor, who’s more than likely 
mismanaged, if not abused, the freedom to articulate “values” 
with “things” (Weaver, “Language,” 316).
In any case, regardless that the local commentators might 
consider “bad rhetoric” to be a contradiction in terms, the 
point remains that, in this world, good rhetoric is efficacious 
when it is animated by shared values. Yet, eternal as these 
shared values may appear to be, they are, to the contrary, 
under constant production, and by agents including the local 
commentators themselves. That’s the explanation as to how 
such core beliefs, though periodically “forgotten,” can so rou-
tinely and immediately be remembered, i.e., whenever it’s time 
to close the gap between “existing and desired conditions” 
(Sheard, qtd. in Villadsen 42).
Let’s turn to a couple of contemporary illustrations, good 
for showing how rhetorical-humanistic theorists can reterri-
torialize rhetorical conventionality by deploying techniques 
of consolidation. Such expedients are designed to protect the 
agency that simply must accrue to shared values in order for 
rhetorical conventionality to make any difference to speak of.
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In his essay on Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, Han-
sen (2004) seeks to explain the “endurance” of that certain 
kind of rhetorical text which is not “exhausted by its situation” 
(224). He draws on a method of “re-creative criticism,” posit-
ing that producer and receiver can be linked transhistorically 
(227). True, “the agency of the producer of the text and its fit 
audience are mutually dependent, one calling out the other, the 
absence of one leading to the absence of the other” (230). Nev-
ertheless, any agency worth mentioning must certainly bespeak 
the continuity between rhetor and audience.
Such continuity would obtain not at the level of some hege-
monic subjectivity, but at the level of the more deeply-en-
trenched values which normativity can only contextualize. For, 
while “ideologies” may come and go (“coruscating and evolv-
ing”), collective values persist (252). Reactivated by features of 
textual language, style, and form, they establish, in this case, 
a bridge between Lincoln’s neck of the woods and ours. The 
present-day audience — at least, the part of it that’s “fit” — sees 
past its own provincial ideology, and then the message comes 
home, animated by the shared values that have been there all 
along (230).
Interestingly, Hansen speaks not of reconciliation but of 
revolution: Lincoln’s audience, “transformed by the radicalizing 
knowledge that the speaker has presented,” finally “gains new 
instruments to enact new abilities” (250). At the same time, 
though, the audience, whether past or present, will be agreeing 
to just exactly the “instruments” (charity, firmness, self-sup-
pression of malice), and just exactly the goals (unity, peace) 
which the speaker has been recommending, and these will be 
thoroughly familiar to the audience, anyway (251). So rhetoric 
is revolutionary, transformative, and radicalizing not in call-
ing for everything to change, but, instead, in framing “desired” 
conditions in terms of those familiar, shared values which are 
always already there, even if they have momentarily “been for-
gotten” (Sheard, qtd. in Villadsen 42).
Villadsen (2008) analyzes a ceremonial speech aimed at 
creating a “recommitment to values fit to inspire future collec-
tive action” (42). Yet some of the speaker’s choices prove to be 
blunders that “complicate” or undercut his rhetorical agency. 
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The speech starts functioning as “a site of rhetorical agency 
for its audiences,” who come to understand themselves not as 
neutral bystanders but as agents who can “partake in an eth-
ical re-evaluation” (40, 43). The most important implication, 
then, is that rhetorical transaction succeeds when the interloc-
utors are (in Weaver’s terms) imputing the same shared value 
to the same thing, just as rhetorical transaction falters when 
they impute that shared value to different things altogether.
For, in Villadsen’s case study, the Danish Prime Minister, 
while apologizing for a former government’s collaboration with 
the Nazis, is applauding the Danish resistance movement for 
having fought, anyway. By now everyone’s remembered the 
shared values, and no-one disagrees with the imputation of 
oppression (bad) to the Nazis, or of resistance (good) to the 
Danish freedom fighters. Then it transpires that the Prime 
Minister means also to impute “oppression” to an Iraqi regime, 
and “resistance” to the U.S.-led effort, recently supported by 
the Prime Minister’s own government, to overthrow that dis-
pensation.
Certainly, the same shared values are still in play. The prob-
lem is that different (indeed, contextually opposite) objects are 
now becoming articulated with the shared values, which lat-
ter haven’t changed at all. From the speaker’s perspective, the 
U.S.-led effort properly articulates with resistance. But, as it 
happens, “many Danes” at this time perceive the “war in Iraq” 
as “illegal” to begin with, so that, for them, the U.S.-led effort 
properly articulates with oppression (Villadsen 40). This is why 
they balk, why the rhetorical transaction falters, and why the 
speaker loses agency. Yet the shared values have simply stayed 
there, remaining capable of empowering or disempowering 
just anybody. In fact, the same shared value of resistance both 
empowers the speaker (when he articulates it with the Dan-
ish freedom fighters) and also, albeit by contrast, empowers 
the audience (when the speaker tries to articulate it with the 
American forces as well).
So, in the rhetorical-humanistic world, the shared values 
that are so central to rhetorical agency are not the same as 
hegemonic norms, for they refer to the desirable rather than 
the “expected,” coming into play especially when the expected 
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should not, in fact, prevail (see Barker, 1995). Further, the 
shared values are accessible to all, regardless of the agents’ 
collectively-determined identities, subject positions, or social 
roles. And these shared values, as deserves some emphasis, are 
heterogeneous, rather than homologous. To stipulate valuation 
X of an object would not, after all, be structurally or function-
ally equivalent to stipulating valuation Y of that same object. 
That’s why the “many Danes” of whom Villadsen has been writ-
ing are left annoyed, not apathetic or impressed, when their 
Prime Minister shows he can’t differentiate between an object 
properly to be linked with “resistance,” and an object properly 
to be linked with “oppression” (40).
Keeping Shared Values between the Ceiling and the 
Seat
An important difficulty, from the rhetorical-humanistic 
perspective, is that the participants in some given transaction 
might not, at any given moment, be sharing the same values. In 
that case, theory risks opening the door to a merely relativistic 
rhetorical agency, that is, of the sort that would exist for those 
who currently shared the values, but not for those who didn’t. 
Therefore, rhetorical-humanistic commentary (exercising its 
will to make conventionality matter) has developed a safeguard 
for ensuring the preponderance of shared values, and, in conse-
quence, for upscaling the reality of the agency that derives from 
them.
The safeguard, at least conceptually, is to minimize the 
number of auditors who don’t, in fact, share the same val-
ues, and to maximize the number of those who do. What this 
amounts to in practice (and here one means practice as adum-
brated by the theorist) is, in effect, the judicious elimination of 
just as many of the auditors as necessary, leaving in their seats 
only those who certainly share the same values. We’ve already 
witnessed this safeguard in operation. We’ve discovered that, 
according to Villadsen, rhetorical agency belongs not merely to 
those who value resistance over oppression, but to those who 
value the alignment of each with its proper objects. Similarly, 
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we’ve seen Hansen, in his essay on Lincoln’s Second Inaugu-
ral Address, insisting that the audience be “fit” for rhetori-
cal agency — qualified, that is, by its responsiveness to exactly 
those shared values which underwrite the worthy speaker’s 
message (230).
If we were proceeding as rhetorical-humanistic theorists, 
we might find it natural to rule out of consideration anyone 
theoretically unfit to serve as a rhetorical agent. But, since we 
are proceeding as assemblage-theoretical researchers, our obli-
gation is to scrutinize the collaborative processes by which 
rhetorical agency is manufactured for distribution. If we look 
into the support system for theorists like Hansen and Villad-
sen — technicians bent on spinning rhetoricity directly out 
of shared values — we’ll find the New Rhetoric of Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) to be foundational. In fact, that 
canonical work serves as an instruction manual for leaving in 
their seats only such auditors as are fit for rhetorical agency.
Here, the salient point of view might appear to be that 
adopted by the initiating agent. For it’s the rhetor who selects, 
from the options available within the bona fide collectivity, 
whichever configuration(s) and application(s) of shareable 
values are parametric for the transaction. On the other hand, 
everything still rises or falls in accordance with whatever the 
audience will stand for.
True, “the status of an audience varies with the concepts 
one has of it,” implying that it’s primarily the rhetor, the audi-
ence rather less so, who determines what the latter would find 
acceptable (Perelman and Tyteca 34). But if the rhetor could 
wish herself into speaking before the “universal,” or best-pos-
sible audience, then she could ignore the stance of any actual 
audience whatever (Perelman and Tyteca 33). She could dis-
miss the whole congregation as “recalcitrant,” and all on the 
basis that they didn’t actually share the values which the best- 
possible audience, as she envisioned it, would certainly share. 
It’s exceptional for the rhetor’s universal audience to coincide 
with her actual audience, and she must be careful not to charge 
too many with recalcitrance. Thus she ought to deploy values 
lowly enough for even the majority to share, which is again to 
say that everything turns on the audience’s approval.
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So the theoretical expedient for maximizing rhetorical 
agency is two-folded. The rhetor gains agency partly by lower-
ing the ceiling, and partly by raising the floor. For, as Perelman 
and Tyteca explain, “There can only be adherence to this idea 
of excluding individuals from the human community” if 
the number and intellectual value of those banned are 
not so high as to make such a procedure ridiculous. 
If this danger exists, recourse must be had to another 
line of argumentation, and the universal audience 
must be set against an elite audience, endowed with 
exceptional and infallible means of knowledge. (33)
As necessary, the speaker is to keep dropping her standards 
to the next-best level, constituting the audience as sharing val-
ues just about high or noble enough to make the recommended 
course of action seem substantive. In this way, she constitutes 
her audience as fit, as qualified to accede to her own rhetorical 
agency. And, again as necessary, she constitutes as recalcitrant 
those hypothetical auditors unlikely to meet even the lowered 
level of expectation.
That’s how the rhetorical-humanistic speaker so often man-
ages to make things otherwise than they are. Picking her bat-
tles wisely, she argues for the value of altering the present dis-
pensation by just enough, but never too much. She shores up 
her own agency by imputing recalcitrance, not to mention 
imbecility, to any hypothetical auditor who’d undervalue this 
indisputably moderate, though still desirable degree of change. 
Meanwhile, both the ground floor and the ceiling are projec-
tions from the value-set which the rhetor always already shares 
with the bona fide community, with the result that the transac-
tion only ever takes place among those who are welcome at the 
familial hearthside.
We now see that it’s theoretically possible for rhetorical 
conventionality to transform rhetorical subjectivity itself, as 
when shared values enable a speaker situationally to redraw 
the boundary between the “fit” and the “recalcitrant” (Han-
sen 230; Perelman and Tyteca 33). In the rhetorical-humanistic 
world, “terms” — here, with reference to shared values — can 
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exceed any “relations” in which they’re temporarily embed-
ded, which is to say that social structures, significations, sub-
ject positions are not internalized constraints, but “external” to 
the values traveling through them (Baugh 36; Colebrook 5). In 
addition, the rhetorical-humanistic paradigm not only illus-
trates but even operationalizes the synergy obtaining between 
“reterritorialization” and “deterritorialization” (Palmås 3). Rhe-
torical agents can reterritorialize rhetorical conventionality by 
conceptually banishing those who don’t share the same values. 
Consequently, they can deterritorialize rhetorical subjectivity, 
stretching it out with the aid of those standards that are indeed 
held in common by the remaining interlocutors.
Staying the Same by Doing Something Differently
Returning, even while we’re here in the rhetorical-humanis-
tic world, to the Sojourner Truth literature, we can start see-
ing how an exemplary practitioner could parley the topics of 
race, gender, work, mind, biblical precept, and embodiment, 
together with a certain metaphor about the pint and the quart, 
into a means of transforming the sorts of interiority prevalent 
within the status quo. In this case, the agents of change hap-
pen to include certain shared values. They facilitate the emer-
gence of an alternative way of knowing and acting, such that 
the interlocutors can agree on the justice of granting to the dis-
enfranchised, or at least to one or two sub-sets of them, the 
same legal rights as any other bona fide members of the collec-
tivity. But, in that case, the famous speech of 1851, rather than 
attempting to frame the natural rights as already formidable 
(i.e., in the social-structural manner considered earlier) must 
be attempting precisely the opposite. It must be portraying the 
natural rights as languishing in exile, such that its own func-
tion becomes to bring them back into the familial fold.
In nineteenth-century America, natural rights are as 
familiar as legal rights, though the two kinds of rights are, at 
this moment, in contradiction. To resolve the contradiction 
requires the adjustment of legal rights until they are consistent 
with natural rights. Yet this will be the alteration of the sta-
tus quo, taking place through the reconciliation of a presently 
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hegemonic discourse (that of legal rights) with a presently 
marginalized discourse (that of natural rights). Such a recon-
ciliation can take place if the two discourses are rendered com-
mensurable, as on the basis of any values shared by the adher-
ents to the discourses themselves.
Again, it’s the task of the whole person — at least, when 
she’s acting as rhetor — to speak in a manner that, manifesting 
love, shifts the collectivity back to the future. For, in helping us 
recollect the shared values that have always kept us together, 
the exemplary rhetorical practitioner helps us adapt. She helps 
us become otherwise than we are, and precisely so that we can 
stay lovable (albeit, from now on, a little more so than of late). 
To do that, she constitutes herself as a docent, someone who 
helps us revisit, remember, reinterpret our shared values, so 
that we come to see for ourselves the “disparity between exist-
ing and desired conditions,” the mismatch that, before our very 
eyes, becomes “the subject of critique” (Sheard, qtd. in Villad-
sen 42). This docent will indeed serve as a kind of lover, just 
as in Weaver (1953) or Brockriede (1972). Yet she may as well 
serve as a teacher, a guide, a parent.
In both the Gage and Robinson versions of the speech, 
this agency of the docent is manifested wherever the speaker 
frames her audience as children. The underlying appeal, osten-
sibly from maternal authority, isn’t to sassify the speaker: O, 
that authentic Sojourner Truth, so down-home and so coun-
try! Instead, it’s to reassure, and to comfort, and to inculcate 
trust. Let’s recognize, therefore, that “children” is a rhetorical- 
humanistic technique — not too different from, say, “Four 
score and seven years ago.” It’s a transition, much like a cin-
ematic wipe, but placing us within earshot of an interpreter, 
of someone who recovers and reminds us about our collective 
values. Of course, just about anybody in our community may 
need such reminding. But, then again, just about anybody can 
act as docent.
For the reminder doesn’t have to come from some creden-
tial-bearing specialist; it’s not a question of scholastic train-
ing or fancy paraphernalia. To the contrary, the reminder can 
come from just any speaker who’s remembered the familiar, 
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ecumenical guidelines, those that can help her decrease the 
space between ceiling and floor.
Now, it’s true that, in the rhetorical-humanistic landscape, 
an appeal to “common values, undisputed though not for-
mulated,” can only be made “by one who is qualified to do 
so” (Perelman and Tyteca 53). But this isn’t so exclusionary a 
requirement as it may sound. The docent gets to be qualified in 
the same, perfectly manageable way as does the docent’s bene-
ficiary: by clearly not being “recalcitrant” (Perelman and Tyteca 
33). This means that the rhetorical agent is anyone whose val-
ues are the same as ours. And if it happens that she’s just as 
comfortable in her impromptu role as in her own skin, i.e., in 
her possession of the Standard Human Complement, then so 
much the better for the recovery of our collective values.
In the rhetorical-humanistic world, the docent can always 
draw upon certain local conventions, for example, of genre. 
But even the genre-conventions will be perfectly accessible. 
Certainly, the nineteenth-century rhetor might invoke the 
time-binding powers of narrative. That’d be a way of univer-
salizing what’s all too easily mistaken for a regional contin-
gency — as with the famous opening for Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address. But, then again, she might as readily appropriate the 
genre conventions of the come-all-ye, that populist sort of 
utterance to reappear, so much later, in the songs of Woody 
Guthrie: “Well, gather ‘round me, children, a story I will tell / 
‘bout Pretty Boy Floyd the outlaw, Oklahoma knew him well.”
Always, though, the message rests between shared values, 
those which the docent has bolted into place, forming upper 
and lower brackets for the problem confronting the group:
As through this life you ramble  
As through this life you roam  
You’ll never see an outlaw  
Drive a family from their home.
So the shared values that the docent invokes will not have to 
do with any pre-determined social identity, essence, or station 
in life. They won’t even have to do with the currently privileged 
medium of communication, not so long as story exceeds the 
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provenance of alphanumeric text. This is precisely why nobody 
who inhabits a world like the rhetorical-humanistic would ever 
find it paradoxical for an “old, illiterate, former slave woman” 
to be acting as a docent, as a bona fide rhetorical agent (Camp-
bell 9).
Maximizing Assent by Minimizing Recalcitrance
The technical use of “children” tells us we’re in the presence of 
someone activating what is axiomatically conventional about 
rhetoricity — in this case, by bringing collective values into the 
transaction. But the docent won’t bring in just any collective 
values, only those which are suited to the situation. For we, the 
undecided auditors, do need to undertake some self-modifica-
tion, as by returning (from our idiosyncratic preoccupations) 
to our communal roots. Indeed, it’s in recalling just those few 
collective guidelines which we’d forgotten, and in reviewing 
them under the tutelage of the docent who loves us, that we’re 
to become otherwise than we are, though remaining lovable 
all the while. And that, the assemblage-theoretical investiga-
tor should conclude, must be why Sojourner Truth isn’t actu-
ally asserting the rightfulness of “natural rights,” pure and sim-
ple, let alone the wrongfulness of say, social, political, or legal 
rights as presently constituted. For to valorize natural rights 
over everything else would be to insinuate that the American 
republic must be unlovable by design.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, to hew too closely 
to a natural-rights position would be to shift the focus from 
what binds us to what divides us, the divisive reality, in this 
particular instance, being that of class. Admittedly, Sojourner 
Truth does hint, in both the Gage and the Robinson versions of 
her speech, at how often she (as the representative of an entire 
constituency) has been left hungry. She’ll “eat” as much as she 
can “get,” but that doesn’t mean she always gets enough to eat 
(Painter, Sojourner Truth, 125; Campbell 10). Still, it’s possi-
ble, even in the rhetorical-humanistic landscape of agency, that 
the unfortunate might be so for any number of reasons; and, 
in any case, the speaker isn’t betraying the least suggestion that 
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slavery and/or women’s subjugation, or even exploitation based 
on class, might be wrong in principle.
That would be precisely the kind of argument, the argu-
ment from ideality, that we should expect to hear from any 
purism of natural rights: some set of claims to the effect that 
slavery, women’s subjugation, and class exploitation are inher-
ently wrongful. But there’s nothing along those lines in the 
Robinson version of the speech, and this, as we’ve noted in an 
earlier connection, would appear to be a remarkable omission 
on the part of someone who’d been tarred and feathered for 
the ardency of his own natural-rights abolitionism. Meanwhile, 
there’s nothing like it in the Gage version, either, regardless 
that the latter does imply there to be some “rights” which “are 
not conferred but inhere in persons” (Campbell 10).
So what could be the rationale for the speaker’s outright 
avoidance of the least suggestion that slavery, sexual subju-
gation, exploitation of the subalterns by the elites, might be 
wrong in principle? Well, the answer is that, while everyone 
in the audience can accept that some of their practices may 
call for revision, not everyone can accept that some of their 
principles may need revision too. If the speaker is refraining 
from asserting the supremacy of natural rights, pure and sim-
ple, that’s because she knows better than to advocate a mor-
ally unimpeachable stance which would, for that very reason, 
be politically untenable.
Thus, if we do triangulate (looking to the intersection 
where Robinson and Gage agree), we’ll notice just how cau-
tious is Sojourner Truth, as she dwells on the topics of work, 
biblical precept and mind, to skirt the topics of property, dis-
possession, and class. Still, it’s precisely because shared val-
ues are heterogeneous, strategically separable, that they can be 
deployed, rather like the croupier’s rake, for finessing auditors 
into the familiar fold. Indeed, the speaker can gather up any 
number of auditors, just so long as these do not bring along 
with them the sharable value of ownership. That’s very much 
as we’ve seen above, where Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
do emphasize that any rhetor must be circumspect enough to 
lower her standards when necessary.
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As an exemplary rhetorical agent, Sojourner Truth would 
recognize that to associate ownership with recalcitrance would 
be to banish from the conversation the majority of her own 
(actual, and perhaps even potential) auditors, indeed, practi-
cally everyone but the slave and the pauper. For, according to 
the rhetorical-humanistic perspective, rhetoric does come into 
its own by offering something for everybody, that is, for every-
body who shares the same values. But there wouldn’t be some-
thing for everybody in a jeremiad on exploitation — whether 
on that of the factory worker by the industrialist, or on that of 
the wife by the master of the house, or on that of the domes-
tic servant by the wife herself. Ownership, property, class: these 
would only separate us, and, if the point is to keep us together, 
then why bring them up at all? So, the speaker can hardly be 
expected to pitch her appeals at the loftiest level imaginable, as 
by asking the auditors to indict themselves for their complicity 
in economic, sexual, and racial exploitation. Instead, she can 
be expected to invoke some lowlier criteria than that, leaving 
almost all the auditors in their seats, but giving them some-
thing to rise for, too.
Thus we come to see the docent as appealing not to the 
taintless, unimpeachable values of an ideal audience but to the 
relatively more humble values of an “elite” audience (Perelman 
and Tyteca 34). The elite audience in this case simply consists 
of those whose “knowledge” is at least “exceptional” and “infal-
lible” enough for them to know the value of work, and of bib-
lical precept, and of mind. If it happens that Sojourner Truth’s 
elite-enough audience additionally subscribes to values con-
ducing to class exploitation, dispossession, and the like, then 
that’s truly unfortunate. But it’s still no reason not to grab onto 
any handles available for aligning listeners with their better 
natures, if not absolutely their best. Besides, an audience that 
can be constituted as valuing work, biblical precept, and mind 
is also an audience ready to recall that all of these do lie at the 
very intersection between natural rights and legal rights.
Let’s therefore consider that, if the Sojourner Truth speech 
does emphasize the hard work that our docent, or persons like 
her, have already performed, then this is not a self-advertising 
of physical prowess but a verification that the presently-mar-
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ginalized do share the work ethic already valued by the speak-
er’s audience. For who but a social-structural theorist could 
think that the rhetorical agent, in arguing for equality of rights, 
must also be arguing that she is naturally built for all of this 
back-breaking labor, in other words, perfectly suited to her 
structural role?
Instead, the speaker is showing that she, like those for 
whom she speaks, understands very well that it’s only work, 
not something disturbing like ownership, which is at issue 
now. It’s this appreciation of the value of work, this cognizance 
of the obligation to help make the social world go round (as 
Nell Irvin Painter says, in the way of “production,” “transpor-
tation,” and “consumption”) that unifies the speaker — indeed, 
her rights-less constituency — with an undecided audience 
positioned to make a difference (Sojourner Truth 126–27). So 
the examples from personal experience are there to argue for 
“equality of opportunity” not by invoking natural rights, but 
by invoking the work ethic that just any auditor would share, 
other than, of course, in cases of recalcitrance (Campbell 10).
Even the integration of biblical precept becomes articulated 
with the shared value of work, though in a manner perhaps 
more pointed for the historical audience than for the present 
day social-structural theorist. To be sure, in both the Robin-
son and the Gage versions of the speech, the speaker does refer 
to all the agricultural labor — plowing, reaping, husking, chop-
ping, and mowing — that she’s done during her life. Neverthe-
less, it’s still the case, and in Robinson’s version of the speech as 
much as in Gage’s, that “work” is allied with “biblical precept” 
as well. So let’s examine the rhetorical process through which 
“work” starts traveling in the company of “biblical precept” —
with “class” coming along, albeit invisibly, for the ride.
As Nell Irvin Painter acknowledges, while the historical 
Sojourner Truth contributed lots of “household work” (laun-
dering, cooking, cleaning) in reciprocation to the various activ-
ist families with whom she “stayed for extended periods,” that’s 
simply not the kind of labor the rhetorical Sojourner Truth 
chooses to thematize (Sojourner Truth 126). Instead, our exem-
plary practitioner emphasizes “the work of the farm,” which 
she, “along with masses of other Americans, including other 
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rural women,” idealizes “as the embodiment of real work.” Yet 
we really shouldn’t stop there, i.e., with Painter’s historical-bi-
ographical suggestion that Sojourner Truth might be serving as 
yet another spokesperson for nineteenth-century pastoralism.
For what’s more rhetorically important is that the work of 
the farm (ontologically preceding any laundering, cooking, 
cleaning) is an activity from which all Americans benefit. It’s 
an activity in which many of them have first-hand experience, 
and, in any case, it’s an activity which most of them, not count-
ing the recalcitrant, are likely to value. That’s the explanation 
for a folk song like the following, from Sojourner Truth’s own 
era, though circulated more widely during the populist move-
ments of the 1890s:
You may talk of all the nobles of the earth 
Of the kings who hold the nations in their thrall  
Yet in this we all agree, if we only look and see  
That the farmer is the man that feeds us all.
It’s back-breaking labor, yes. But at least it’s a sunny kind of 
backbreaking labor — and you’d be the salt of the earth if you 
knew it. For farm work really does offer something for every-
one.
In short, there’s nothing more reconciliatory than to cele-
brate the sorts of “real work” through which we Americans do 
earn our keep, putting our rightfully-won bread on the fam-
ily table (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 126). And just any non-re-
calcitrant auditor can sense that this work ethic (bespeaking 
authentic labor — the effort, for example, of those who do reap 
and sow and gather into barns, as in that passage from Mat-
thew to which Sojourner Truth alludes in her speech) must be 
shared universally. That’s why so much of the speech would be 
about farming, in this way recalling the better part of the audi-
ence to its traditional family values.
What’s just as evident, though, is that Sojourner Truth is 
definitely citing scripture, since she’s doing so not only in Gage 
but also in Robinson. From this perspective, we can again see 
that Gage and Robinson are together drawing our attention to 
the rhetorical-humanistic agency that accrues to shared values. 
       4 :: conventionality in the rhetorical-humanistic landscape | 93
They’re doing so whenever they report on Sojourner Truth’s 
incorporation into the speech of any Judeo-Christian refer-
ences at all.
For the function of such references wouldn’t be to furnish 
the speaker with some theological or supernatural warrant in 
support of political enfranchisement. Instead, it would be to 
bring into the forum certain reminders of the shared, deep-
ly-entrenched values which are keeping speaker and audience 
connected. True, it’s only in Gage that we find a line like this:
I have borne thirteen chilern, and seen ’em mos’ all 
sold off to slavery, and when I cried out with [sic] my 
mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me! (Campbell 
10)
But if we only look and see, we’ll recognize that the point isn’t 
to perseverate on what the speaker “has done as a woman and 
suffered as a mother” (10). To the contrary, it’s to establish the 
speaker’s ethos as someone whose scriptural values saturate her 
to the core. She remains bound to Jesus, even when the rest 
of us have forgotten that she actually shares our faith. Indeed, 
it’s her own faith, authenticated with each of her citations of a 
Judeo-Christian commonplace, that constitutes her as consub-
stantial with us. And then there’s no longer any reason for the 
other family members, those who aren’t recalcitrant, to wonder 
about any fundamental disparity between the speaker’s values 
and their own.
At this stage, we should be fairly clear as to how it is that 
“work” and “biblical precept” can, by way of shared values, 
become sources of rhetorical agency — the sort that trans-
lates convention into a means of altering sociality. It’s worth 
noting in this connection that the shared values can also fold 
race and gender, maybe even “embodiment,” into all the rest 
of the American collectivity. For all we have to do is open our 
eyes and look at who’s expressing these shared values, here at 
this woman’s rights convention of 1851. But what remains to 
be addressed is the topic of “mind,” together with the complex 
metaphor of the pint and the quart, a figure which itself proves 
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consistent with the shared values of “work” and “biblical pre-
cept.”
Again, given that we have shifted to the rhetorical-human-
istic landscape, we will understand that what makes it possible 
for social realities to change, to emerge or come into being, is 
that the present dispensation can always be redeemed through 
the common language established by shared values. This lingua 
franca can even translate the discourse of natural rights into 
commensurability with the discourse of legal rights. Thus, if we 
do turn to the rhetorical-humanistic uses of “mind,” we’ll find 
that the Sojourner Truth speech must be invoking yet another 
shared value, that which accrues to none other than reasoned 
debate. This latter, of course, is “conventional” in that it’s just 
how we nineteenth-century Americans ordinarily go about 
negotiating our collective destiny.
Earlier, during the course of a social-structural reading of 
the pint-and-quart analogy, we’ve come to see that, in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, the discourse of natural rights 
cannot, in isolation, count for very much, what with its already 
being trumped by a discourse indisputably more normative 
than itself. Nevertheless, there is still a way to bridge the dis-
course of natural rights with the discourse of, say, legal rights. 
Let’s recall that the political rationale for the republic has 
always been to uphold an alternative to government by arbi-
trary power. This alternative is validated by the people’s right 
publicly to discuss, revise, and select from the options avail-
able in the marketplace of ideas. Thus, even in the United 
States of Sojourner Truth’s day, the shared value of delibera-
tion is hybridized, on the one side, with the discourse of nat-
ural rights and, on the other side, with the discourse of civil, 
or social, or statutory rights. The metaphor of the pint and 
the quart can capitalize upon both sorts of discourse simulta-
neously. It’s a reminder that reason isn’t, after all, a zero-sum 
game (everybody can have as much of it as they naturally do, 
without depleting anyone else’s), and it’s also a reminder that 
reason itself supplies an irrefragable justification for altering 
the present dispensation.
So here’s a rhetorical-humanistic gloss of the metaphor in 
question, a gloss which, rather than having primarily to do with 
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guilt, craniometry, physique, essence, or parody, has primar-
ily to do with the shared value of reasoned debate. Sojourner 
Truth is saying that even if she and the members of her constit-
uency were (naturally) endowed with a smaller-than-optimal 
amount of reason, their reason, whether it were measured by 
pint or by quart, would be reason nonetheless. Meanwhile, as 
everybody knows, this American experiment is such that supe-
rior, quart-sized reasons have incessantly to earn their keep by 
vanquishing inferior, pint-sized reasons. Since so many among 
the disenfranchised must possess at least some rationality, it’s 
no less than a political failure to discount their potential con-
tributions, in other words, to rule out these same untapped 
reservoirs of reason, some of which might yet turn out to be 
quart-sized, after all.
Certainly, it makes good practical sense for us, the unde-
cided auditors, to help expand the range of enfranchisement. 
As it is, we already appreciate the value of real work. So we just 
need to remember that intellectual labor is another of the prac-
tices that keep the nation humming along. In addition, there’s 
nothing for us to lose in emancipating at least one or two sub-
sets of the currently marginalized. Should any among them, 
making their way into the public forum, betray their half-mea-
sured inferiority, that will just give us something to argue all 
the way back to the farm, the domicile, the factory. It’s how 
American democracy operates: by pitting the better arguments 
against the worse. Meanwhile, if any among the newly-enfran-
chised turn out to be competent, there will still be no prob-
lem. For this, too, is what it means for the better arguments to 
win. Besides, since reason is the currency of the political mar-
ketplace, it’s clear that statutory (or legal, or civil) rights are to 
be earned, indeed purchased through reasoned debate. In that 
case, to persist in silencing certain intellects on the basis of 
race or gender is to persist in vitiating the political process. It’s 
as inimical to the spirit of the republic as price-fixing would be 
to the spirit of free enterprise.
By now, we’ve indeed come upon a way to frame rhetorical 
agency as “conventional,” though without necessitating its pol-
lution by normativity. In this extended example, the shared val-
ues accorded to work, biblical precept, and mind do return the 
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collectivity to a certain equilibrium, yet they do not function in 
a manner that can be called merely conservative. Rather, they 
effect what is simultaneously a reconciliation and a transfor-
mation. By linking alternative discourses, they promote inclu-
sion and enfranchisement. And, in broadening the range of 
the ecumenical family, they help the collectivity remain itself 
by becoming otherwise, as by welcoming into the fold cer-
tain constituencies which, up to now, have (irrationally) been 
excluded from the household.
Still Missing So Far
As we’ve seen, the rhetorical-humanistic perspective explains 
rhetorical agency in terms of the deployment of shared values. 
Thus theory supports (rather than undermines) practice, for it 
frames collectively held guidelines as resources for reconfigur-
ing rhetorical subjectivity. Yet the reterritorialization of rhetor-
ical conventionality does require the elevation of certain val-
ues at the expense of others. For instance, as we’ve seen above, 
democratization might carefully be sutured to the value of 
work, biblical precept, and mind, but just as carefully ampu-
tated from the value of ownership, property, and cash money. 
This implies that rhetoric’s (Heideggerian) saving power might 
very well be founded upon no less than its exploitative danger. 
And the only rhetorical-humanistic defense for such duplicity 
seems to be that it is actually the rhetor’s duty to promote the 
greater good by whatever means are available.
To bring the duplicity more clearly into view, we’ll give it 
a face, acknowledging its likely impact on any human actors 
caught up in rhetorical transaction. So let’s consider the opin-
ion of Emmanuel Lévinas, who, even as a philosopher of com-
munication, denies that there’s any justification for rhetoric at 
all. Citing Plato’s Phaedrus as an illustration, Lévinas maintains 
that the “specific nature of rhetoric” is to inculcate “propa-
ganda, flattery, diplomacy,” indeed, to effect “psychagogy, dem-
agogy, pedagogy” (70). In short, rhetorical transaction looks 
to be all “ruse, emprise, and exploitation” (72). Although Lévi-
nas provides only the most cursory analysis, his complaint still 
poses a problem quite devastating for the tradition, a tradition 
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in which Plato himself is continually tortured into admitting 
that, but of course, rhetoric’s true purpose is to uphold the 
(universally) greater good.
After all, while the Phaedrus does take the form of a dia-
logue, on the question of a true art of rhetoric, the true art 
uncovered there isn’t dialogic. According to Plato’s Socrates, 
the best of all possible rhetoricians will aspire to understanding 
things exactly as they are — aspire, that is, to grasping a “being 
that really is what it is” (Plato 33). So, once the requisite tele-
ology establishes the frame for everything else, the task degen-
erates into audience analysis, also known as homework. But, in 
that case, rhetorical utterance isn’t conversation, it’s indoctri-
nation. It’s to regroup the audience under the sign of the given, 
the unalterable, the “being that really is what it is.” There’s no 
provision in the true art of rhetoric for protecting, only for 
co-opting, the otherness of the interlocutor. And this, for Lévi-
nas, is what counts as psychagogy, demagogy, and pedagogy.
 It’s difficult to refute Lévinas by asserting that, no, regard-
less of what Plato or Socrates might say about the authoritar-
ian, top-down trajectory of, frankly, even the most truly rhe-
torical communication, rhetoric is still, by and large, quite 
open to radical alterity. The basic criticism obviously applies 
to any rhetoric addressing its auditors “in the name of their 
highest good” (Weaver, “Language,” 309). For the Lévinasian 
indictment is correct: the rhetorical-humanistic tendency is to 
submit, indeed, to betray the person to the group. Under these 
circumstances, while there’s a social rationale for speech, there 
isn’t a human justification at all.

5. 
Transcendence in the  
Existential-Transversal Landscape
Fortunately for contemporary rhetorical theory (given 
the implications of the Lévinasian critique) there’s still one kind 
of value that acts in tension with, rather than in subservience 
to, the greater good. It concerns the non-finessable, non-nego-
tiable, indeed non-rational claim of every human being upon 
a free, authentic, and responsible existence. To understand the 
sort of agency that could accrue to such a claim, we’ll visit a 
place where theorists are continually (re)territorializing rheto-
ric’s power to make things otherwise. According to the locals, 
rhetoric’s productivity, or efficacy, belongs to an agent whose 
very manner of being is emergent. That’s why, in this third 
landscape of agency, a claim like “I am a woman’s rights” will 
be heard as valorizing the “am.”
Existence, Transcendence, and Transversality
Some rhetorical-theoretical investigators have pursued the 
senses in which responsibility (Schrag, 1997), conscience 
(Hyde, 1994), and questioning (Turnbull, 2004) all become 
sites of rhetorical transcendence. For these writers, responsi-
bility, conscience, and questioning are among not the poten-
tial, but the actual and inalienable affordances available to 
what might be called — here to borrow again from Anton and 
Peterson (2003) — the existential self. This latter, as implied in 
the work of, say, Georges Gusdorf (1965), Hans Blumenberg 
(1987), or Ernesto Grassi (2001), is by now presupposed in 
projects like that of Thomas Rickert (2013).
Since “existentialism” is a constituent of the stance in ques-
tion, we’ll note that this is a philosophy according to which 
existence precedes essence, with existence understood not as 
a prior category but as a “self-making-in-a-situation” (Fack-
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enheim 37). However, existentialism additionally holds that 
“human beings came into existence through natural, evolu-
tionary processes, and then created myths and religious beliefs 
to explain their unique importance” (Hall 132). Of course, the 
term “natural” implies “contingent” rather than “inevitable,” 
since existentialist writers are likely to include biological deter-
minism among the “myths” to be rejected. Even so, if vital-
ism is the assertion that life exceeds reduction to the pre-de-
termined, to the mechanistic, then existentialism ought to be 
vitalism, too — and presumably occasionalism as well. What’s 
crucial, after all, is the contrast whereby existence proceeds 
from life, but essence from social determination. Therefore, 
existentialism, insofar as it does tie human existence to “evolu-
tionary processes,” should probably consider the sine qua non 
of this existence to be our living materiality as such.
However, in preparation for an upcoming local pitfall —
namely, the existential-transversal forgetfulness of material-
ity — let’s proceed by consulting some existentialism proper, 
that is, with reference to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre’s close 
ally, Simone de Beauvoir. In The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), 
Beauvoir argues that the only absolute value is that of exis-
tence, willed into being whenever we take a stand in favor of 
the life-affirming over against the life-denying. Thus Beau-
voir illustrates the way in which transcendence can be said to 
remain ontologically independent of everything else. For she 
presents “freedom” as a recurrent return “to the positive,” a 
return which gives existence “a content through action, escape, 
political struggle, revolution: Human transcendence then 
seeks, with the destruction of the given situation, the whole 
future which will flow from its victory” (31). Clearly, this tran-
scendence involves an endless breaking-up of whatever social 
conditions are currently in place.
From a generally existentialist viewpoint, it’s always that 
“man must…assume,” i.e., both posit and embrace, “his finite-
ness: not by treating his existence as transitory or relative but 
by reflecting the infinite within it, that is, by treating it as abso-
lute” (Beauvoir 130–31). Yet there are cases in which freedom 
takes on a negative or reactive complexion. For, while “liber-
ation” is “a movement” which “realizes itself by tending to 
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conquer,” action cannot “seek to fulfill itself by means which 
would destroy its very meaning” (131). Thus, in “certain situa-
tions there will be no other issue for man than rejection.” Such 
rejection might include militancy, “action,” “political struggle,” 
“revolution.” But it will always contrast with “political realism,” 
where everything is compromise — precisely as in that view-
point on rhetorical agency where shared values do, in manu-
facturing the greater good, keep trumping the freedom of any 
group member.
After all, there is genuine, transcendent “rejection only if 
man lays claim in the present to his existence as an absolute 
value,” in which case “he must absolutely reject what would 
deny this value” (Beauvoir 131). Nowadays, as the author 
explains, that is, “in the name of such an ethics,” we’d “con-
demn” all those Vichyites who were trying “to make the best of 
things,” for that ought to have been a matter not of “rationaliz-
ing the present such as it was imposed by the German occupa-
tion,” but of “rejecting it unconditionally”:
The resistance did not aspire to a positive effective-
ness; it was a negation, a revolt, a martyrdom; and in 
this negative movement freedom was positively and 
absolutely confirmed. (131)
So, regardless that political realism does look synonymous 
with existentialist suicide, transcendent agency must still, on 
this view, be conceptualized as ethical, though in the way of 
the authentic rather than the socially-determined.
For example, in the illustration provided by Beauvoir, we 
can be sure that, once upon a time, appeasement really did 
constitute the most rational if least authentic course of action. 
For, if such an expedient could ever have made sense, that 
would have been after reality itself had proven unreasonable, as 
when a certain Vichyite commonsensicality and a certain Nazi 
irrationality were co-constructing a “state of affairs” just as real 
as it could be (Schrag 91). As for us today, if we were to collect 
enough such cases of local (dis)ordering, we’d be confronted 
with the universal principle underlying them all — which is 
that, as one of our own contemporaries has observed, there’s 
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an “absence of reason inherent in everything” (Meillassoux 53). 
Under the circumstances, all that’s left, as an alternative to the 
abyss, is our incalculably human claim to life, to an authenti-
cally free and responsible, if also counter-rational existence. 
It’s no surprise that the rhetorical theorist Calvin Schrag 
(henceforth treated as an ambassador for the existential-trans-
versal position) would wish to draw so bright a distinction 
between, on the one side, responsitivity and, on the other 
side, responsibility. To the extent that we’re managing to get 
by, negotiating our pragmatic “being-with-others,” we’re best 
described as responsive (Schrag 91). But we shift into genuine 
responsibility by adopting an insistently “ethical stance” — that 
which is, more properly, “an ethos, a way of dwelling in a social 
world that gives rise to human goals and purposes, obligations, 
duties, and concerns for human rights.”
Yet, as investigators, we should further contextualize 
Schrag’s affirmation of responsibility by considering the man-
ner in which existentialism proper would explain the origins of 
transcendence. It would frame transcendence as arising not out 
of, say, the agent’s capacity for rational deliberation, much less 
out of any traditions the agent may have inherited, but, rather, 
out of nowhere: out of an inexplicable motivation for exceeding 
whatever there is.
After all, the claim to life, arising in what Beauvoir calls 
“the original helplessness from which man surges up,” must 
itself be what generates the existential imperatives other-
wise missing from the world — including the ethical stance to 
which Schrag refers as responsibility (Beauvoir 12). For, build-
ing on Sartre, Beauvoir notes that there’s “no external justifi-
cation” whatever for this self-warranting claim upon existence: 
“no outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being 
called useful. It has no reason to will itself. But this does not 
mean that it can not justify itself, that it can not give itself rea-
sons for being that it does not have.” This is a way of saying 
that the transcendent claim to a free, responsible existence is 
prior to everything, preceding any social overlay that could 
ever come to mask it.
So, in treating Schrag as exemplifying the existential-trans-
versal perspective, and in tracing his discussion of transcen-
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dence back to its support system, we can begin to see that rhe-
torical transcendence is being constructed, on the one side, as 
if it’s anchored in nothing (arising from nowhere), but then, on 
the other side, as if it’s anchored in Sartrean philosophy. And 
now that we have a stronger sense of what’s “existential” about 
Schrag’s position, we can turn to what’s “transversal” about it.
Transversality, at least in its Sartrean variety, is the con-
struct which rhetorical theorists like Schrag (and, more implic-
itly, Michael Hyde or Nick Turnbull) are invoking whenever 
they imply that transcendence must be operationalized exclu-
sively within consciousness, where it creates “unity” as “a coef-
ficient” of all “thought and communication” (Schrag 129). 
And Jean-Paul Sartre — as the author of The Transcendence of 
the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness (1937) — is 
indeed among the philosophers to whom such rhetorical the-
orists continue pledging fealty: “it was the genius of Sartre to 
recognize” that “consciousness achieves unification by dint” of 
a built-in “transversal function, an extending across and revis-
iting of past moments of consciousness without solidifying into 
an identification with any particular moment” (Schrag 128-
129). So, on this account, transversality becomes the royal road 
for rhetorical transcendence, the latter traveling epistemically.
Schrag, for his own part, seeks to validate this rather sub-
jectivist train of thought by also appealing to another sort of 
transversality, that to be found in Félix Guattari’s Molecular 
Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics (1984). Yet there is a pivotal 
distinction between the transversality theorized by Sartre and 
the transversality theorized by Guattari. Since Schrag overlooks 
the distinction, we should note that Guattari is actually talking 
about the interaction between subjective and non-subjective 
resources, so that his version of transversality bespeaks a link-
age between minds and non-minds — not only, as in Sartre, 
between minds and minds. Guattari’s conception of transver-
sality arises from his critique of “transference,” that psychoan-
alytic way of explaining how feelings and desires are redirected 
(3). But, in Guattari’s view, transference has become a tool of 
the status quo. It perpetuates normativity through impositions 
from above, as well as through institution-wide inertia, such 
that it forces “things and people” to “fit in as best they can with 
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the situation in which they find themselves” (17). By contrast, 
“transversality” denotes a “dimension” that may “overcome 
both the impasse of pure verticality and mere horizontality,” as 
by permitting “maximum communication among different lev-
els and, above all, in different meanings” (18).
Perhaps Guattari’s transversality does so closely resem-
ble Sartre’s as to explain how an existential-transversal insider 
could miss the distinction. Yet, from an outsider’s point of view, 
Guattari’s emphasis on the non-conscious, non-determined, 
and non-representational aspects of transversality sticks out 
like, well, a sore thumb. For Guattari argues that the “best safe-
guard” against the “danger” of normalization is “to bring to the 
surface” not, for example, the group’s brightest ideas, but, here 
in a phrase invoking Marx, Freud, and Darwin simultaneously, 
the group’s “instinctual demands” (21). These latter, in requir-
ing “everyone” to “consider the problem of their being and 
destiny,” can render any group (or institution) “ambiguous.” 
In some respects, the collectivity does remain “reassuring and 
protective, screening all access to transcendence, generating…a 
mode of alienation one cannot help finding comforting.” At the 
same time, though, “there appears behind this artificial reas-
surance the most detailed picture of human finitude, in which 
every undertaking of mine [becomes] caught up in the exis-
tence of the other, who alone guarantees what reaches me via 
human speech.”
A passage like that may sound life-affirming in precisely 
the style of Sartre, of Beauvoir, of Lévinas. Yet “instinctual 
demands” (which Guattari here associates with our transversal 
“access to transcendence”) turn out to evade social determina-
tion altogether. They inhere in that which is irreducible: our 
materiality, our corporeality, our embodiment. For Guattari, as 
a matter of fact, transcendence informs the transversal move-
ment from one presence, regardless how finite, to another. By 
contrast, Sartrean (and, by extension, existential-transversal) 
transcendence is so immaterial as to be making its way exclu-
sively among absences, that is, entirely within the “no-thing” 
which Sartre proclaims consciousness to be (Zahavi 136).
Actually, during our visit to the existential-transversal land-
scape, we have so far been examining the local production of 
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rhetorical transcendence in an ontological sense — the way in 
which it’s theorized as inherent to every existential self. Now 
we’ll consider the local manufacture of rhetorical transcen-
dence in a methodological sense — the way in which it’s theo-
rized as an intra-psychic sub-routine.
Thus we reach a fork in the road. Whereas the ontologi-
cal explanation derives from Sartrean existentialism (declaring 
that transcendence is prior to everything), the methodological 
explanation, by contrast, derives from Sartrean phenomenol-
ogy (whispering that transcendence must remain contingent 
upon subjectivity). Taking quite the wrong turn, though purely 
for investigative purposes, we’ll follow the local theorists of 
rhetorical agency as they drop right into the rabbit-hole of 
human interiority. While we’re in free-fall (through a chamber 
still echoing with ever so many rumors about the subject’s dis-
cursive construction), we, too, may begin to wonder why even 
transcendence shouldn’t be socially determined, after all.
Philosophizing for the Living by Getting Rid of Their 
Materiality
Unfortunately, what Sartre is offering rhetorical theory with 
the one, existentialist hand is the same as what he’s taking away 
with the other, phenomenologist hand. He’s observing, as is 
well known, that social productions are to be overcome when 
they exacerbate the material constraints upon human freedom. 
But then he’s insisting they’re to be overcome through the force 
of an interiority lacking in any material dimension at all. To 
grasp that the project of the existential Sartre is trivialized in 
the project of the phenomenological Sartre, we’ll review the 
steps through which the latter repurposes such tenets as he’s 
taken over from Edmund Husserl. For Sartre proposes to bring 
philosophy back to earth by etherealizing it. As a result, it’s a 
retro-fitted, de-corporealized kind of phenomenology, carried 
over from Sartre, which the existential-transversal theorists are 
now parlaying into the study of rhetorical transcendence.
Husserl’s major contribution, reportedly, is to have opened 
the way to the things themselves. But his first step has been to 
get rid of the things themselves, lest they complicate his open-
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ing the way to them. So he brackets all “questions of fact,” even 
questions concerning the “evidence for one’s own existence as a 
particular person” (Williams and Kirkpatrick 16–17). Husserl 
is then addressing only the “intended” or “intentional” objects 
of consciousness. These are always thoughts figured as objects, 
without regard to whether they correspond to anything exist-
ing independently of the thinker. Indeed, the “things” to which 
Husserl refers are, in every respect, inherent to “the content of 
a person’s thought” (Coates). And then Sartre remains “essen-
tially in agreement” with the “phenomenological program” as 
laid out by Husserl (Williams and Kirkpatrick 17). He takes for 
granted, in other words, that the category of “object” is exclu-
sively filled out by objects of intention. All he discards is the 
Husserlian premise that there’s some sort of transcendental ego 
whose task is to intend the objects themselves.
But what else, if not an “I,” shall there be to intend all those 
objects? Sartre’s response is to point out that the question 
would block the way to the answer:
nothing shall constitute contents of consciousness 
into intended objects, for the important reason that 
consciousness has no contents. All content is on the 
side of the object. Consciousness contains neither 
transcendental ego nor anything else. It is simply 
a spontaneity, a sheer activity transcending toward 
objects…a great emptiness, a wind blowing toward 
objects. (Williams and Kirkpatrick 20–21)
In that case, however, the hard-boiled Sartre, the one rolling 
up his sleeves against the “practico-inert,” must be saying the 
opposite of what the Husserlian Sartre has in mind (see Camp-
bell 4).
Sure, if the objects are already there, with all of the con-
tent on their side, then that sounds like a version of philosoph-
ical realism: objects are real, and objects are everything. Mean-
while, if consciousness is content-less, then that sounds like a 
refutation of subjectivism. Yet the only objects that can possi-
bly be left in the picture are intended objects, in short, ideas. 
So, if ideas are everything, and if they’re already there, then 
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this is, in fact, idealism, and quite the subjectivist idealism at 
that. Thus we arrive at the explanation as to why these existen-
tial-transversal theorists of rhetorical agency, having founded 
their views upon a no-thing inherited from Sartre, would keep 
forgetting that human embodiment does count for something, 
anyway.
The Two Styles of Transcendence
It’s no wonder that, in the tradition following from Sartre, 
everything looks immanent to subjectivity. True, “immanence” 
is regularly contrasted with “transcendence,” as if these are 
mutually exclusive or diametrically opposed. Yet writers such 
as Schrag, Hyde, and Turnbull do understand, and all too well, 
that transcendence itself can be described as immanent: as 
enclosed within consciousness. So these existential-transver-
sal theorists, what with their belonging to an assemblage for 
shoring up rhetorical transcendence, are faced with an embar-
rassing predicament. Given their commitment to life (exis-
tence, authenticity, responsibility, and the like) they have to 
keep showing that speech really can make things otherwise. 
Then again, given their commitment to Sartrean phenomenol-
ogy, they have to concede that transcendence, as a sub-routine 
within a socially-conditioned consciousness, might, in reality, 
just be shoring up whatever would have needed transcend-
ing to begin with. Their current exit strategy, i.e., from out of 
this double-bind, is to claim that there must be two styles of 
transcendence. There’s an ordinary transcendence that stays 
“immanent” within subjectivity, but there’s also an extraor-
dinary transcendence that irrupts into rhetorical transaction 
from nowhere.
So here’s a statement from Grøn and Overgaard (2007) to 
contextualize the manner in which philosophers today can try 
to rescue transcendence from the very clutches of immanence:
One prominent trend has been to conceive of…the 
movement of transcendence as being constitutive of 
subjectivity…Recently, the seemingly opposite point 
has been made: subjectivity is to be understood from 
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the transcendence of the other that breaks subjectiv-
ity open. (4)
Of course, transcendence as “constitutive of subjectivity” refers 
to the humble factory-work that normally goes on inside 
human interiority, with immanence as subjectivity’s default 
condition. But that’s hardly enough in a world where rhetoric’s 
will to matter has turned into the will to make transcendence 
matter. Here, the transcendence that breaks subjectivity open 
must be conceptualized as coming from outside of immanence, 
the problem becoming that of wishing such an “outside” into 
existence.
So far as concerns rhetorical theory, the synergy between 
those two philosophical trends is most clearly instantiated in 
Calvin Schrag’s The Self after Postmodernity (1997), where com-
municative interaction is said to be informed sometimes by an 
ordinary, constitutive, Sartrean transcendence, and sometimes 
by an extraordinary, irrecuperable, Lévinasian transcendence. 
In the writing of Lévinas, to be sure, the opposition is between 
“rhetoric,” which is by nature oppressive, and conversation, 
which is inexplicably receptive (70). Obviously, the rhetorical 
theorists can’t settle for exactly that, not even when they’ve 
found it “prudent” to side with Lévinas, the philosopher who 
has so fully addressed the relation between speech and tran-
scendence (Schrag 100, 114, 137–8). Yet it’s the same libretto 
(enlivened differentially by the fancy footwork) in Schrag, 
Hyde, and Turnbull as in Lévinas. Always, there’s a miraculous 
intervention keeping rhetoricity transcendent despite itself. It’s 
this unmotivated intercession from beyond, meriting the label 
of fideism, which we should hold not simply to characterize, 
but indeed to vitiate the existential-transversal account of rhe-
torical agency.
To begin with, writers like Schrag, Hyde, and Turnbull 
would readily accept that there can be a (limited) sort of tran-
scendence within immanence, for their basic position can be 
formulated casuistically enough: “Radical transcendence oper-
ates transversally, and…the grammar of transversality replaces 
that of universality” (Schrag 130). Yet there’s still the task of 
protecting the whole mechanism (grammar, transversality, and 
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all) from those who could show it to be socially determined 
in the first place. And it’s on this count that Schrag in partic-
ular sounds intractable: we can hardly expect genuine, authen-
tic, radical transcendence to arise from “internal” or immanent 
critique, which latter would of course recirculate the immedi-
ately-given constraints upon subjectivity (126–129). Instead, 
the only critique adequate to the self after postmodernity will 
be “external,” calling for a certain leap of faith.
The Fideistic Appeal
So let’s consider the allure which Lévinasian phenomenology 
must hold for a thinker like Schrag. We’ll turn to an argument 
quite central for Lévinas:
When I perceive objects, I am their condition of 
manifestation, and they consequently appear as my 
creations. In contrast, my encounter with the Other 
is not conditioned by anything in my power, but can 
only offer itself from without, as an epiphanic visita-
tion.  (Zahavi 144)
That’s to inaugurate the recent trend of splitting transcendence 
into two different styles. There’s an ordinary, workaday tran-
scendence, as is to be found in most other phenomenology, 
and yet there is, in addition, an extraordinary, radical transcen-
dence, the “absolute experience” of which “is not disclosure but 
revelation” (Lévinas, qtd. in Zahavi 144).
Similarly, though not by coincidence, Schrag is also having 
to split transcendence into two. One of its styles, the Sartrean, 
is forever to risk recuperation into social logic. And the other, 
the Lévinasian, is forever to be protected by fideism. That’s how 
Schrag can help rescue communication from immanence-in-
disguise, that is, from the workaday kind of transcendence 
constructed by Husserl and Sartre, and then presupposed by 
writers like Jurgen Habermas.
Henceforth, communication will be animated by that 
excessive, uncontainable kind of transcendence so often regis-
tered, no matter how dimly, in the religious. And then the self 
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(or agent) after postmodernity can be conceptualized in terms 
of that openness to radical alterity presented as theology in 
Augustine, but reclaimed for philosophy in Kierkegaard and 
Lévinas.
Schrag’s task, therefore, is to establish a fideistic, Lévina-
sian exit from immanence-in-disguise. And here’s a passage in 
which he begins doing so, declaring that what’s
no longer at issue is a transcendence-within-imma-
nence, a transcendence within the economies of the 
human subject understanding itself in its discourse, 
action, perception, and communal involvements, but 
rather transcendence…understood as residing on the 
other side of the economies of human experience. 
(114)
Isn’t it paradoxical to maintain that our merely human inter-
actions can be animated by some power residing on the other 
side of everything? Well, if that’s paradoxical, says the existen-
tial-transversal theorist, then so be it: the “grammar of faith is 
the grammar of paradox” (120). In that case, however, commu-
nication must be more or less synonymous with grace. For a 
transcendence so paradoxical as that (flouting our own “con-
figurations of experience,” our own “forms of life”) would have 
nothing to do with us at all (Schrag 138–139).
The real mystery, however, is as to why the existential-trans-
versal perspective on agency, with its concern for life, respon-
sibility, conscience, questioning, and the rest, would be appeal-
ing to the grammar of paradox rather than to the structure 
of human embodiment. Thus we, as assemblage-theoretical 
investigators, find ourselves in the position of having to rein-
force a certain stance on agency by recorporealizing it, and all 
on behalf of some of the local theorists themselves. Yet there’s 
no reason, not even in this case, to posit any miracle: we can 
instead deploy an additional affordance of the existential-trans-
versal perspective as such.
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Correcting Forgetfulness through a Material Phenom-
enology
As it turns out, the other existential-transversal writers do 
have an ally who could help protect transcendence from social 
determination. It’s the phenomenologist Michel Henry, whose 
outlier status may well be due to his recalcitrant treatment of 
transcendence as immanent. Yet Henry introduces an under-
standing of embodiment which (while correcting the generally 
idealist forgetfulness of materiality) ought to allow the other 
local theorists to see that rhetorical transaction really doesn’t 
need to access any extrinsic, faith-based resources in order to 
effect genuine social change.
In his translator’s introduction to Material Phenomenology 
(1990/2008), Scott Davidson portrays the late Michel Henry as 
articulating a “nonbiological concept” of “life” as a “transcen-
dental auto-affectivity” (ix). Here, it’s the pioneering work of 
Husserl (and, by implication, of Sartre) that becomes the target 
of critique: “There are many problems with Husserl’s account 
of intersubjectivity, but for Henry all of these problems can…
be traced to Husserl’s decision to promote transcendence over 
the immanence of life” (Henry, Material, xiii). The analysis 
thus identifies the fatal limitation for not just Husserlian, but 
very much of post-Kantian thinking, a tradition in which even 
something so central as materiality has to be hypothesized 
rather than experienced.
In marked contrast to Schrag, Hyde, or Turnbull, Henry 
maintains that transcendent responsibility is grounded in 
human embodiment, preceding intersubjectivity and persisting 
within it. Indeed, the “intersubjective community…is joined 
together not through a shared perception of the world…but 
through the pathos of life” (Henry, Material, xiii). For, accord-
ing to Henry, “there exists a more fundamental mode of being, 
immanence, which is the origin of all transcendence whatso-
ever” (xi). And this philosopher offers an uncompromisingly 
gapless account of immanence, where “an affection of life by 
life” becomes the “condition for any actual existence” (Wil-
liams, “Critical Contrasts,” 266). In this view, “affect B” isn’t 
transcendentally “caused by external cause A, or determined by 
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condition A.” For example, it’s not that empathy is transcen-
dentally constructed by consciousness. Instead, life inheres or 
insists in the affects of life, such that “affect B” is “determined 
by affect B.”
As for the question of responsibility, Henry’s answer will, 
as always, be that it’s animated by pathos. This pure affectivity, 
primitive and invisible as we might take it to be, is accessible 
to us all, linking us regardless of our sociality. Indeed, much of 
Henry’s “political and ethical work” is to “re-establish the pri-
mordial status of life as auto-affection,” to “revalue affects —
suffering, alienation, bewilderment — in political debate,” and 
to contest the wrongful as “carried by the distinctions, goals 
and implications of the turn away from life” (Williams, “Criti-
cal Contrasts,” 274).
We might then say that Henry is holding forth the clearest 
promise for de-subjectivizing rhetorical agency. In respecifying 
transcendence as immanent before consciousness (though, by 
implication, still operating transversally — in the auto-affectiv-
ity linking all of the existential selves) he neither ties it to any 
“historical idea,” nor invites it into the world by fiat, but rather, 
refers it to human corporeality (Beauvoir, qtd. in Gothlin 54).
Borrowing now from Michel Henry’s Philosophy and Phe-
nomenology of the Body (1965/1975), we can do our part to 
restore the corporeality that’s otherwise missing from the exis-
tential-transversal perspective. Because Henry’s argument may 
be misconstrued if quoted too aphoristically, we’ll view one of 
the relevant passages at length:
Man is not essentially an historical being. He is always 
the same. Since it is here a question of the body…it 
will be objected that the human body presents…char-
acteristics which have varied throughout the course 
of history…However, this is not the original body, 
but various ways in which man represents this body 
to himself and behaves toward it. What is historical 
are the cultural or human objects and the different 
human attitudes related thereto. But the ontological 
basis which founds both objects and attitudes is indif-
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ferent to this evolution; the latter always presupposes 
the ontological foundation. (4)
Thus Michel Henry really is advancing a philosophy for the liv-
ing human being, not for the cerebrating subject of the social, 
or the transcendental jackalope, or some similarly neo-Kantian 
construct. Whereas other contemporary thinkers assume that 
consciousness must be the (grounding) determination of mate-
riality in re-presentation, Henry views consciousness as the 
(figural) continuation of materiality by other means.
At this point, having worked hard enough at it, we can say 
we’re in a place where rhetoricity, if it ever does conduce to the 
life-affirming (even for no necessary reason), must be access-
ing an agency that’s intrinsic to the human being to begin with. 
This is an agency which arises not from conventionality or soci-
ality or identity, but instead from a claim upon existence which 
inheres, irreducibly so, in everyone’s embodiment. After all, in 
this particular landscape, if nowhere else, the agent’s impera-
tive is to ek-sist, which means to “stand out” against absence.
Lewis R. Gordon (2006) makes that point quite clearly. He 
argues that, for persons of color, what precedes even the prob-
lem of representation (including in the political sense) is the 
task of emerging beyond “indistinction” — of coming to stand 
out as present, visible, participating in the world (20). Yet Gor-
don also emphasizes that this is the task not just for certain, 
specially-designated social groups, but for everyone. It’s our 
sharing in ek-sistence (and, let’s add, in the original body, this 
latter’s condition of possibility) that’s actually connecting us all.
So, yes, as Schrag or Hyde or Turnbull ought to agree, 
this is the sort of sharing that unifies us by way of a transver-
sal linkage, passing through any number of social or cultural 
or historical compartments. But transcendence now begins 
with auto-affection. It’s authorized by the original body, and 
it’s manifested (as Guattari would say) in these “instinctual 
demands” that travel everywhere, right along with the existen-
tial selves who transport them.
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Rhetorical Agency and the Existential Self
Let’s rejoin the now-recorporealized company of Sojourner 
Truth, who has carried her speech (the claim “I am a woman’s 
rights,” plus the package made up of race, gender, work, mind, 
biblical precept, and embodiment, as well as the metaphor of the 
pint and the quart) all the way into the existential-transversal 
landscape of agency. Clearly, in a place like this, there’s nothing 
pivotal about the “I” of “I am a woman’s rights,” for the human 
claim to exist is already universal. Meanwhile, the “woman’s” 
can hardly be central, since it’s never the original body, but 
only the latter’s secondary determinations that will have any 
gender. As for the “rights,” they, too, must refer to something 
peripheral, to those collectively-held values that keep coming 
and going with every shift in the social. This time, therefore, 
it’ll be the “am” which is salient. In that case, let’s start ask-
ing how communication about an “am” could ever, even as far 
back as 1851, afford an opportunity for certain existential and 
ethical imperatives to come into contact, to begin interacting 
synergistically, and then to give rise to just the sort of rhetori-
cal agency that would conduce to genuine social change.
For an approach to an answer, let’s consider that, from the 
existential-transversal perspective, Sojourner Truth’s famous 
speech must be designed to connect certain forms of social 
identity (or of essence) by demonstrating these always already 
to be linked at the level of the original body (or of existence). 
We do know, from the work of Michel Henry, something about 
that original body, and now we need to find out something 
about those forms of social identity. If we turn to the work of 
the historian Nell Irvin Painter, we’ll soon see that, in this case, 
the two most relevant social identities are those of feminist and 
abolitionist.
In the following passage, Painter is explaining the historical 
significance of Sojourner Truth’s message, her statement. She 
writes,
One of only a few black women regulars on the fem-
inist and antislavery circuit, Truth…was the pivot 
that linked two causes — of women (presumed to be 
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white) and of blacks (presumed to be men) — through 
one black female body. (Sojourner Truth, 171)
Upon reflection, we realize that the passage is already demy-
thologizing the presumption that Sojourner Truth’s rhetori-
cal agency could derive from her social identity as a woman, 
or even as a black woman. So far as concerned the mid-nine-
teenth century status quo, someone who wasn’t white couldn’t 
be a woman, anyway, not in the public forum. Perhaps such 
a figure might be a female, or maybe a quasi-woman, but not 
much more than that. Besides, as Painter does explain in detail, 
not even the feminists of the day could have arrived at any 
consensus on black women’s social identity. Some of the most 
important such activists were then advocating gender-egalitar-
ianism exclusively within the familiar constraints of race and 
class. In recognizing the interests of white women only, these 
(non-abolitionist) feminists would effectively frame all others 
as non-women. So it’s not that Sojourner Truth could just show 
up at some feminist convention of 1851 and already be, for 
example, a woman.
Meanwhile, in the speech that we’re studying, the speaker is 
front-stage and center, submitted to all sorts of scrutiny — and 
not by just anyone, but specifically by those seeking to work 
out the rights of gender. Could her self-disclosures then be 
for the patriarchs (so very few of whom would be attending, 
or even attending to, any woman’s rights convention of 1851)? 
Of course not: her speech must, instead, be for the undecided 
among the feminists, those still wondering whether it’d be an 
error to allow an abolitionist like Sojourner Truth (threaten-
ing, by association, to bring along with her the “blacks” who 
are “presumed to be men”) into the women’s movement at all 
(Painter, Sojourner Truth, 171).
Under such circumstances, even the gender of the speak-
er’s voice becomes an issue. After all, the historical Sojourner 
Truth is known for speaking in a voice so “robust” and “deep” 
that “that some of her enemies” have “suspected” she’s “a 
man” (Campbell 12). But, in that case, we’re left with a figure 
even less categorizable as a woman than before. It’s perplex-
ing enough that being black disqualifies the speaker from any 
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self-evident status as a woman. And now there’s the very tim-
bre of her voice to take into consideration.
So we’ve arrived at a puzzle. It’s unclear how Sojourner 
Truth, this difficult quantity, could possibly accomplish what 
the historian Nell Irving Painter would claim, that is, by 
becoming the “pivot” that links the “feminist” cause with the 
“antislavery” cause (Sojourner Truth 171). And that’s to say 
nothing of what the rhetorical theorist Karlyn Kohrs Campbell 
would claim, i.e., with respect to the speaker’s stepping up to 
lead a monolithically black-and-feminist onslaught against the 
patriarchy.
To be sure, a commentator like Schrag, or Hyde, or Turn-
bull might wish to respond that the speaker is benefiting from 
her ineffable Otherness, which must be introducing some radi-
cal (consciousness-raising) transcendence into the mix. Never-
theless, the more tenable existential-transversal answer would 
be that our exemplary rhetorical agent must, in the very pro-
cess of speaking to the question of equal rights, have annihi-
lated the presumption that social identity could matter in the 
first place.
On Pivoting, Transcendence, and Emergence
Indeed, if we retain from the Frances Dana Gage account of 
the speech whatever is corroborated in the Marius Robinson 
account, we find that the Sojourner Truth who speaks in 1851 
is, in some respects, outside all of the then-salient social cat-
egories, and yet, in some other respects, inside all of them, 
too. Thus it becomes evident that she must be dramatizing, 
in her own person, the capacity of the existential self not only 
to exceed any of the contemporary essences, but also to pass 
through them (transversally) along the way.
To begin with, the speaker describes a seeming state of 
diremption among the salient socio-political groups, with the 
implication that any genuine change would require some rec-
onciliation among those alienated parties. In the process, how-
ever, she also reveals herself to be exempt from that sort of par-
tisanship, and all on account of her not belonging (at least not 
intrinsically so) to any of the factions in question. Indeed, in 
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portraying division or alienation as a secondary condition, as 
an effect or outcome of social relations, she’s suggesting that 
there might very well exist a form of connection or consub-
stantiality that’s prior to any collective determination whatever.
According to the Robinson version of the speech, which his-
torians and biographers do consider quite reliable, Sojourner 
Truth observes that “the women are coming up blessed by God 
and a few of the men are coming up with them. But man is in 
a tight place, the poor slave is on him, woman is coming on 
him, and he is surely between a hawk and a buzzard” (Painter, 
Sojourner Truth, 126). Meanwhile, according to the less reliable 
Gage, what the speaker says is this: “Well, chilern, whar dar is 
so much racket dar must be somethin’ out o’ kilter. I tink dat 
‘twixt de niggers of de Souf and de womin at de Norf, all talkin’ 
‘bout rights, de white men will be in a fix pretty soon” (Camp-
bell 9). So where’s the state of socio-political diremption that 
we’re seeking? Well, it’s disclosed in the separation of the terms 
“man,” “woman,” and “slave.”
On the one side, there might perhaps be “man” and, on 
the other side, there might perhaps be “woman” and “slave” 
(folded into a sort of phalanx). Even so, while we can see that 
“man” and “slave” form one clear-cut binary, just as “man” and 
“woman” form another, we cannot see any clear-cut relation 
between “slave” and “woman.” The hawk is a different entity 
from the buzzard, and, yes, each of the two may be mount-
ing its own assault. But it’s not that “man” is having to contend 
with a hawk-buzzard, or with an alliance between buzzard and 
hawk.
Indeed, the men, the slaves, and the women are described 
as occupying separate compartments within the social. The 
distance is geographical as well as ideational; it’s literal, phys-
ical, regional, and not only cultural and political. The men are 
everywhere, so there’s no need for the speaker to specify their 
location. But “de niggers,” come to think of it, would be quite 
definitively in “de Souf.” And “de womin” — the feminists —
would be quite definitively “at de Norf.” At this moment, 
then, it’s diremption wherever we turn. It’s alienation betwixt 
the (white) men and the (white) Northern feminists, and it’s 
alienation between the (black) Southern slaves and the (white) 
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men, and it’s also, though independently, alienation among the 
(white) Northern feminists, the (black) Southern slaves, and, of 
course, the (white) men, too.
Nevertheless, as we reflect on the state of separation 
depicted in both the Gage and Robinson versions of the 
speech, we realize that the speaker has presented herself as 
missing from all of the social classifications at issue. While 
the white men, the black slaves, and the white women each 
belong to some prepared-for place, the speaker doesn’t. After 
all, the place of the white men is everywhere, unlike the place 
of Sojourner Truth. Yet this speaker is not a slave, for she has 
famously been “freed by New York law” some twenty-five years 
earlier (Campbell 8). Furthermore, she can’t be one of “de nig-
gers of de Souf,” since she isn’t even where they are. To the con-
trary, she’s up North, and among the “regulars on the feminist 
and antislavery circuit” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 171). But, 
then again, the North is the place of “de womin,” and the jury’s 
currently out as to whether the speaker fits into that category.
We must conclude that nobody, at the present moment, 
can say whether Sojourner Truth is a slave or not a slave, a 
woman or not a woman, or even, for that matter, a man or not 
a man, what with her voice so “robust” and so “deep” (Mabee 
and Newhouse, qtd. in Campbell 12). That’s what it must mean 
for someone, circa 1851, to be constituting a liminal site. But 
regardless that it’s impossible to assign Sojourner Truth to any 
of the contemporary categories, here she is, anyway. And if 
she’s still affirming the possibility of some consubstantiality or 
connection with her auditors, then she must be declaring that 
everyone here can be conjoined in a manner somehow inde-
pendent of any collectively-determined identity.
That’s quite as we should expect in a world like the one 
we’re visiting now. For the whole point of theorizing rhetorical 
transaction from within the existential-transversal frame is to 
construct speech as accessing transcendence (and in an trans-
versal manner, at that). In this instance, what needs to be over-
come is, on the one side, the category of gender and, on the 
other side, the category of race, and Sojourner Truth is over-
coming these by not belonging to either.
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But that’s only because our exemplary rhetorical agent, if 
she’s ever to become a pivot between the feminist movement 
and the abolitionist movement, has initially to speak as a per-
son, and only later on as a woman and/or an African-Ameri-
can. To do that requires her to clear away any presumptions, on 
the one side, as to her gender identity and, on the other side, 
as to her racial identity, leaving in the middle (front-stage and 
center) only her ontologically prior claim to exist as a human 
being. That’s how she’s to dramatize that just any other exis-
tential self, whether currently essentialized as a woman, or an 
African-American, or something else, can also precede, occupy, 
and transcend its given social positioning. Indeed, while it’s 
clear from both Robinson and Gage that the speaker does tes-
tify from personal experience, we are still to discover, if we tri-
angulate carefully enough, that the autobiographical references 
have nothing to do either with black or with being female.
To begin with, if we rule out of consideration all those 
emblems of femininity that are (a) so routinely sutured to 
Sojourner Truth’s statement (the mother’s grief, the thirteen 
children, the part about not being “helped into carriages”) and 
yet (b) so conspicuously absent from the Robinson version, 
appearing only in the fictionalized, melodramatic version from 
Gage, we find that the speaker’s claim, her advocating on behalf 
of the disenfranchised, cannot turn on her status as a woman.
According to Robinson himself, the speaker never includes 
any verification as to her gender identity at all. True, her strat-
egy is to keep emphasizing that she’s not a man, so that she 
consistently proceeds by negation:
I have as much muscle as any man, and can do as 
much work as any man. I have plowed and reaped 
and husked and chopped and mowed, and can any 
man do more than that?…I can carry as much as any 
man, and can eat as much too…I am as strong as any 
man that is now.  (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 125)
But if we isolate the key terms — muscle, work, plowed, reaped, 
husked, chopped, mowed, carry, eat, strong — we realize, as 
would so many a woman of the nineteenth century, that they 
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have only to do with being an embodied person authenticating 
her claim to existence.
So, having dismissed the possibility that Sojourner Truth’s 
gender might be speaking before she does, we’ll inquire into 
the possibility that her race might be exerting priority over her 
humanity. We do notice some markers of race in the Gage ver-
sion of the speech, saturated as it is with dialect. But there’s no 
time like the present to recall that the dialect is bogus:
Truth did not speak in the language that Gage 
attributed to her; even her most powerful arguments 
and apt metaphors were by this language deformed, 
even ridiculed. Note, too, that this is the only extant 
text or fragment in which Truth uses the n-word.  
(Campbell 13)
Consequently, if we, as investigators of the Gage account, agree 
to discount the fabricated dialect, we really can’t hear any 
blackness at all.
Meanwhile, Robinson’s account contains exactly no linguis-
tic traces as to the speaker’s racial identity. His Sojourner Truth 
doesn’t sound even slightly black, not by any criterion of 1851. 
Instead, she sounds like anybody else, for she’s speaking the 
“standard English” which, as Campbell divulges, so often char-
acterized her public communication (Campbell 12).
More intriguing yet, if there’s any hint in Robinson as to 
Sojourner Truth’s racial identity, it’s — at most — that the 
speaker is an “emancipated slave,” which still doesn’t tell us any-
thing much. Here, we can refer to the work of Frederick Dou-
glass, Sojourner Truth’s colleague on some of the same speak-
ing tours. In Chapter 7 of his Narrative (1845), Douglass recalls 
helping the Irish laborers with their work on the docks. He’s 
asked whether he’s “a slave for life,” and this is for him to dis-
cover the reality of indenture. That’s a practice in which almost 
anyone of less-than-modest means — say, an Irishman — might 
end up as a temporary slave, though perhaps for years at a 
time. So, for Marius Robinson to report on the speaker as an 
“emancipated slave” isn’t, after all, for him to label her by race.
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By now, we must rule out any linguistic markers that would 
define the speaker either as female or as black. So we can no 
longer maintain that her rhetorical agency would emanate 
from some social identity leaking through her words. But, in 
that case, if we’re eliminating or suspending so much of the 
language of the speech, then what’s left for us to talk about? 
Well, it’s not as if we’re abandoning everything that’s linguistic 
about the speech. We’re simply noting that, if Sojourner Truth 
is speaking without foregrounding either her race or her gen-
der, then she can’t be speaking like an identity politician. It’s an 
existential, rather than ideological content that she’s communi-
cating.
At this stage, our exemplary rhetorical agent has disclosed 
herself as a person, as standing, so to speak, prior to the social 
categories of “woman” and “black.” From this point on, she can 
almost effortlessly shift into either or both of those social cat-
egories, but while remaining herself in the process. And when 
she does shift into this or that familiar identity, what will be 
already be there, populating the categories of the day? The 
answer is that an array of other existential selves will already 
be there. These will be all of the persons, whether in the imme-
diate audience or elsewhere, who are as capable as Sojourner 
Truth of stepping into all sorts of social identities, but without 
thereby doffing their personhood. So, collectively, the speaker 
and the audience will constitute the entire populace of the exis-
tential-transversal world, and then Sojourner Truth will speak 
for everybody in the same breath as she speaks for herself.
In sum, if Sojourner Truth really is a rhetorical agent, her 
auditors (existential selves, every last one of them) will recog-
nize that “the signs to be interpreted” in her message, “however 
connected to still other signs,” are “nevertheless trying to con-
vey something true” (Grondin 58). They will grasp her state-
ment as an “event of speaking” in which “someone” is “saying 
something to someone” (Schrag 22). While the someone who 
does the saying will not be interchangeable with the someone 
who does the listening, and while the selves engaged in the 
transaction will, in any case, be “emergent” rather than fixed, 
each of the participants will nevertheless be an “I,” a somebody 
(Schrag 22, 26). And all of them will be linked through some-
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thing prior to, and independent of, any socially-determined 
identity, something inherent in an irreducible (because emer-
gent) “am.” It’s the human claim to exist, a claim which, even 
as it differentiates every speaking self, also hybridizes every “I” 
with the self of its other.
The Rhetorical Agent and the Original Body
Yet the question remains as to the mechanism(s) through which 
an exemplary rhetorical practitioner — having, as it were, pre-
empted her own reduction to race or gender — could affirm the 
link between herself and her interlocutors. Surely the answer 
will have to concern human corporeality, which is, as Michel 
Henry would say, auto-affectively included within any social 
identity to which a listener may belong. Yet we shouldn’t jump 
to conclusions as to what the audience members would witness 
in fixing their disparate gazes upon the speaker.
For, when we ourselves scrutinize the intersection between 
our two sources, Robinson and Gage, all that comes into view 
is what Michel Henry calls the original body, which isn’t a mat-
ter of the speaker’s race or gender, or even of the merely verbal 
signs through which she’s announcing her existence. Indeed, 
while Gage and Robinson together assure us that the original 
body is quite actively involved in this transaction, they also 
confirm, each of them in a different way, that it cannot disap-
pear into symbolization.
As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell points out, Gage does dwell on 
Sojourner Truth’s conversion of physicality into a non-verbal 
rhetorical device. So here’s the passage from Gage, including 
that reporter’s authorial intrusion: “‘Look at me! Look at my 
arm!’…and she bared her right arm to the shoulder, showing 
her tremendous muscular power” (Campbell 10). Nell Irvin 
Painter analyzes the scenario as follows:
Gage shines a spotlight on Truth’s body: a massive, 
towering figure straining upward…undressed and 
on display…Gage describes Truth’s disrobing a part 
of her body. The naked limb is a mighty right arm, 
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the arm of a worker, the arm of a powerful woman. 
(Sojourner Truth 171)
According to Gage, at least, Sojourner Truth doesn’t vanish 
into some epistemic wrinkle, or into the recesses of the sign. 
We know it because Sojourner Truth is bypassing representa-
tion, baring her non-linguistic arm, and during no less than 
the process of affirming her existential claim.
Now, if we have read from Annemarie Mol (2002), we 
might remember that even arteries can acquire a gender, 
maybe a race as well, and we might concede that Sojourner 
Truth’s arm could quite possibly, at some ontically subsequent 
moment, take on just those determinations. We might further 
appreciate that Sojourner Truth’s arm does seem distinguished 
from that of someone who’d never lifted a finger. But how can 
this be the arm of a woman, or of a black woman, or of a black 
woman who’s a worker, before it’s the arm of a person?
It’s as a person, then — not as a social identity — that 
Sojourner Truth is speaking, and it’s the original body that’s 
manifested in her speech. Not everyone in the audience will be 
a black woman used to performing manual labor, or inclined to 
identify with the speaker on that basis. Yet everyone will have 
a share in the original body, whether instantiated by an arm, a 
face, or something else. If it’s an arm, though, the arm will be 
enough like Sojourner Truth’s for everyone to have something 
in common. Proprioception alone (returning us to Guattari’s 
conception of the “instinctual” demand) will mean that the 
speaker’s incarnation can’t be dismissed as theatricality, written 
off as signification, for this is now a body just as real as mine.
Yet Sojourner Truth’s original body precedes any particu-
larly “social” attributes (any blackness, femaleness, whiteness, 
maleness, workerliness), just as it precedes any of the verbal 
signs wrapped around it. Therefore, if Gage is affirming that 
Sojourner Truth bares her arm as part of the performance, 
then Gage is affirming that there’s a layer to rhetorical agency 
which, though palpable, cannot be represented. Not even Gage 
can do more than gesture towards it, and only in an indication 
that redoubles, rather than interprets, the exemplary speaker’s 
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gesture: Here’s this material existence which we’re, all of us, 
sharing.
And then, if we do continue triangulating, we’ll discover 
that an unrepresentable embodiment is participating in the 
Robinson version of the speech as well. For, just as soon as 
we allow that account back into the archive, we discover some 
additional evidence that the original body, the one which 
Sojourner Truth is manifesting in her speech, cannot be black, 
or female, or both. Robinson verifies, even more clearly than 
does Gage, that Sojourner Truth becomes a rhetorical agent by 
virtue not of her social visibility but of her irreducible embod-
iment. So here is the preface to his version of Sojourner Truth’s 
statement:
One of the most unique and interesting speeches of 
the Convention was made by Sojourner Truth, an 
emancipated slave. It is impossible to transfer it to 
paper, or convey any adequate idea of the effect it 
produced upon the audience. Those only can appreci-
ate it who saw her powerful form, her whole-souled, 
earnest gestures, and listened to her strong and truth-
ful tones.  (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 125)
And, in that case, we need to ask what’s happened to Sojourner 
Truth’s blackness and/or femaleness now.
As we’ve found earlier, the speaker’s racial and gender iden-
tity aren’t anywhere in the speech as Robinson presents it. But 
they’re not even in the editorial preface to the speech, consider-
ing that “emancipated slave” could, in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, refer to an Irishman. As for the speaker’s gen-
der, well, the only traces are metadiscursive. They belong to 
the reporter’s “her” and “she,” which don’t in the least impinge 
upon the argument. In short, all we are being given to under-
stand in Robinson’s introduction is that you’d just have to share 
in the original body — in that unrepresentable “form” which 
exists before any socially-recuperable content — to grasp what’s 
happening in the transaction. It’s the form of any person who 
is armed, so to speak, with some human corporeality. So it’s 
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the original body, auto-affectively shared by everyone, that 
emerges out of indistinction in Robinson’s account.
From this perspective, what goes for race and gender goes 
for “mind” as well, explaining the functionality of the pint-and-
quart analogy. In both the Gage and Robinson versions of the 
speech, the speaker is portrayed as satirically engaging the 
question as to whether women and African-Americans should 
qualify for equal rights on the basis of their intelligence. But 
any bona fide argument along those lines would overlook that 
one’s fundamental claim is already self-validating. So, on the 
existential-transversal view, the metaphor of the pint and the 
quart would be to eradicate the preoccupation with “intellect,” 
leaving the audience in direct contact with the original body, 
for whom “mind” or “intelligence” is peripheral, anyway.
In short, the rhetorical agent to whom we can attribute 
this famous speech isn’t essentially black, or female, or both. 
To the contrary, she’s essentially human, mobile, and emergent. 
She’s as human, mobile, and emergent as her interlocutors, all 
of whom, sharing the original body of the existential self, are 
able, just like her, not only to take on but also to transcend any 
socially-given identities.
A Re-Corporealized Transversality
By now, the Sojourner Truth speech is less about patriarchy, 
pure and simple, than about the relation (or not) between race 
and gender. Yet we still need to find out how this speaker could 
ever emerge as a “pivot” between the “antislavery” movement, 
populated primarily by men, and the “feminist” movement, 
populated primarily by women (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 171). 
This practitioner couldn’t very well be a pivot beforehand, hav-
ing, as it were, no self-evident leverage in either social camp 
to begin with, not at a time when “women” are “presumed to 
be white,” and “blacks” are “presumed to be men.” So she must 
be converting herself into a pivot during the rhetorical trans-
action itself.
Let’s examine the process through which Sojourner Truth 
manages to express her own personhood in just such a man-
ner as (transversally) to link the socially recognizable figure 
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of the black person with the socially recognizable figure of the 
woman. Certainly, it’s in order to effect such a connection that 
the speaker is working “race” and “gender” into the speech to 
begin with. As it turns out, the avenue for transcendence opens 
up not at either of those sites, but, rather (and once again) at 
the site of biblical precept. We know it because both Robinson 
and Gage portray the speaker as continually referencing Jesus.
It’s true that Christ is associated with the very religion 
which happens, circa 1851, to be the most prevalent within 
the social dispensation. But, in addition to that, and separately 
from that, Jesus is emblematic of the existential self, which is 
why you don’t have to be black and/or female to respond to 
Him. For Jesus acts as an existential-transversal collector, and 
as an existential-transversal separator, too. He gathers what’s 
prior about the existential self, distantiating all of that from 
what’s secondary about sociality. By the same token, Jesus 
bespeaks, at one and the same time, such definitively existen-
tial-transversal preoccupations as finitude or lack, the origi-
nal body, ek-sistence, revolution, emancipation, the absolute 
if counter-rational rejection of arbitrary constraint, and, above 
all, the reality of transcendence.
In that case, “biblical precept” functions primarily as a 
vehicle for bringing Jesus into the conversation. And then 
Jesus (sharing the original body, too) becomes a middle term, 
a mediator, translating the speaker into existential commensu-
rability with her auditors — black, white, feminist, abolitionist, 
whatever. This is how Sojourner Truth demonstrates, in per-
son, that anybody can be an advocate simultaneously for wom-
en’s rights and for African-Americans’ rights. After all, if she is 
concerned for African-Americans and women, then she (like 
Jesus, and like the followers of Jesus) must existentially be not 
only an African-American but also a woman, emerging as such 
because of her concern for anyone.
What is, shall we say, crucial about the interchange is that it 
redistributes the speaker’s care, quite in keeping with the thesis 
which Elaine Scarry (1985), evidently another of these existen-
tial-transversal thinkers, advances with regard to the workings 
of mediation more generally. But it’s Sojourner Truth’s own 
claim to exist, and to share in the personhood of her auditors 
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(who, again, might accidentally be positioned within just any 
social classification), that familiarizes everybody with the new, 
blended category of the “black female.” It’s a category, after all, 
which any other existential self may enter or exit as readily 
as she can. That, finally is how the speaker becomes a “pivot” 
between the initially-alienated constituencies. For she’s at least 
doubled the set of agents who, in their consubstantiality both 
with black people (plus abolitionists) and with women (plus 
feminists), are prepared to accept this transversal advocacy for 
extending equal rights to everyone.

6. 
Materiality in the Material-Semiotic 
Landscape
Researchers from any workspace other than the existen-
tial-transversal ought to be left perplexed at the idea that rhe-
torical transcendence could be scaffolded upon so little as an 
original (human) body accompanied by an (authentic) existen-
tial claim. But we’ll move on to the fourth landscape of rhe-
torical agency. It’s the material-semiotic perspective, where 
rhetoric’s will to matter has become the will to make materi-
ality matter. Here, the practitioner involved in rhetorical trans-
action won’t necessarily possess either an original body or an 
existential claim. Instead, this will be an actor that can take on 
all sorts of properties and/or functionalities, depending on the 
specific assemblages in which he, she, it, they, or we might be 
implicated. So the rhetorical agent in question must be an inef-
fable participant: a term whose concrete, though not necessar-
ily physical materiality forever exceeds the semiotic relations 
by which it’s contextualized.
A Parable of Materiality-and-Relationality
The terms “material” and “semiotic” may sound ubiquitous, 
but relatively few commentators within rhetorical studies have 
adopted any material-semiotic approach as such. The label, as 
we’ll employ it, comes from the actor-network theorist John 
Law (2009). While the “material” part does, roughly speak-
ing, refer to objects, tools, things, corporealities, the “semiotic” 
part refers to relationships. In this context, “semiotics is not 
limited to signs,” for it’s “the study of order building or path 
building and may be applied to settings, machines, bodies, and 
programming languages as well as texts” (Akrich and Latour 
259). Unfortunately, so far as concerns the study of rhetorical 
agency, the genuinely material-semiotic treatments can be dif-
ficult to recognize, especially if they eschew labels like “mate-
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rial-semiotic.” But a good example — worth keeping in mind as 
a parable — is Carmen Werder’s “Rhetorical Agency: Seeing the 
Ethics of It All” (2000).
Werder discovers that agency (here known as “persuasion”) 
ripples across networks which are themselves under construc-
tion — that is, by all sorts of “rhetorical” agents, rather than 
by human actors alone. In her case study, agency turns out 
to be an internally-variegated alliance, where intentionality, 
influence, authority, disparate social roles, technological affor-
dances, persons, and power, including of the “physical” kind, 
are assembled in such a manner as to produce some genuine 
social change (Werder 20).
As the story goes, Werder is tasked with administering a 
certain writing proficiency examination, the latter proving to 
be quite a “bad test” (15). In urging the adoption of a better 
form of assessment, she struggles to exert some power, author-
ity, and influence, getting nowhere in the process. But then she 
becomes a consultant to a committee, joins a task force, vis-
its thirty-two departments, meets with follow-up focus groups. 
Over time, she finds herself hooked up within a network reach-
ing so far that the important decision makers get folded into it 
too. Meanwhile, among the participants, there’s an "economics 
professor” who almost coincidentally drafts a successful recom-
mendation “for replacing the exam” (17). Yes, it’s been a matter 
of putting “people in conversation,” and of working “sophisti-
cally,” as by “analyzing the situation and taking advantage of…
kairotic moments.” On the other hand, as we should also note, 
the kairos and conversationality have themselves joined forces 
with some non-trivial materialities (witness the badness of the 
test that really has “to go”), and with some shared values, and 
even with some free choice (16).
Now, the replacement of the undesirable state of affairs by 
something better is evidence of social change, and Werder has 
played an indispensable role. Yet it’s not Werder but her cyborg 
that has done the persuading — which isn’t to imply that the 
latter’s co-constituents could all be cut from the same cloth. 
For example, since Werder (singled out, from among myriads, 
for inspection) is not an economist, and since the economics 
professor is not a writing program administrator, they cannot 
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be identically interested. Even so, these disparate stakehold-
ers have performed what the rhetorical theorist Clay Spinuzzi 
would call some “net work,” some mutually-beneficial “trans-
lation,” producing certain “composite goals differing from the 
existing ones,” and together generating a new materiality (16, 
88).
Assemblaging, Stratification, and Circulating Refer-
ence
Shadowing the trail followed by agents like Werder, we’ll start 
investigating the production of rhetorical materiality — partic-
ularly of the kind that materializes transcendence. We’ll soon 
team up with Sojourner Truth, who, in turn, will be connect-
ing certain disparate collectivities, such that rhetorical agency 
(some of it hers) begins to ripple from one end of the alli-
ance to the other. But, before that, there are two more assem-
blage-theoretical constructs for us to internalize, and these 
involve stratification and circulating reference.
Let’s recall that, for Deleuze, both “reterritorialization” and 
“deterritorialization” refer to social processes that may lead to 
coherence despite heterogeneity. A complementary, though still 
Deleuzean frame for thinking about the problem of coherence 
is to view it as “stratification,” where territories, or strata, stand 
for “historical formations…made from things and words, from 
seeing and speaking, from the visible and the sayable, from 
bands of visibilities and fields of readability, from contents and 
expressions” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 88). But “contents” 
aren’t limited to meanings, ideas, and the like, for they include 
the materiality of social interchange, which latter becomes an 
“intermingling of bodies reacting to one another.” Meanwhile, 
“expressions” aren’t limited to linguistic utterances, for they 
bespeak the relationality of social interchange. Indeed, the say-
able, readable “words” include not only “statements,” but also 
“acts,” which might very well be other than symbolistic.
So, here in the material-semiotic world, social interac-
tion takes place within and between strata. Further, it involves 
terms (bodies, words, etc.) that are both irreducible to relations 
(structures, discursive formations, and the like) and separable 
132 | belikian // rhetorical agency 
from them. After all, “it is not impossible to make a radical 
break between regimes of signs and their objects” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, ATP, 7). As a result, social interaction often gives rise 
to entirely new realities, such as by effecting “incorporeal trans-
formations attributed to bodies” (88). We can just look around 
to see that this is what’s happened, for example, to Gandhi, 
mutating from (a) some provincial gadfly in South Africa, to 
(b) a bona fide figurehead for Indian national independence. 
It’s in many ways the same Gandhi, yet the one undergoing the 
incorporeal transformation has become multiplied in the inter-
action among all sorts of “contents” and “expressions.”
Having glanced at the import (and composition) of Deleuz-
ean strata, we’ll turn to the concept of circulating reference, 
which is a Latourian way of describing the material-and- 
semiotic communication taking place among radically dispa-
rate agents. Latour’s (1999) illustrations concern the work of 
a small group of researchers, soil scientists who are studying 
the border between the forest and the savanna in an Amazo-
nian province. The results will be circulated, passed along in 
ladder-like chains of reference, with ramifications reaching 
potentially everywhere. At any rate, some parts of the savanna 
become remediated as they mingle with scientific practices, 
with concepts, with bits and pieces of equipment. They give 
rise to moisture samples, botanical samples, other sorts of sam-
ples, entering into articulation with color codes, charts, photo-
graphs, numbers, words. But reference is occurring incremen-
tally, and it’s taking place in both directions.
As Timothy Webmoor (2007) explains, Latour’s scientists 
“transubstantiate or translate a given piece of soil into a code 
on a Munsell soil chart.” The result is that a segment of col-
or-code “takes the place of the original situation” (Latour, Pan-
dora’s, 67). So we might already notice the affinity between 
Deleuzean stratification and Latourian circulating reference. 
There are terms in relation at every ladder-like point between 
the savanna and the finished article, but all of the terms are 
detachable from all of the relations.
Even so, Latour’s insight is that it’s not the fault of the 
savanna, or of the soil, or of the pedologist, or of the sample, 
or even of the code, if some reader skims the scientific arti-
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cle without scrutinizing the quite traceable linkages underlying 
its construction. After all, each locus of activity (for example, 
that tiny chunk of the continent in question) is now positioned 
to talk back to any agents who might wish, traveling down the 
ladder of reference, to interview it for themselves. Thus, on 
the Latourian account, circulating reference is communication 
which, coming or going, links those participants who are actu-
ally (not to say theoretically) interacting.
We can see that both Latourian circulating reference and 
Deleuzean stratification are operative even in the interaction 
studied by Carmen Werder (2000). There, communication is 
the interaction among staff, faculty, documents, values, poli-
cies, practices, perspectives, and many other participants, all of 
them becoming connected in a chain of incremental articula-
tions, of interstitial mediations. Meanwhile, communication in 
Werder’s case study is also a matter of the collaborative reali-
ty-building that can be performed by agents from all sorts of 
assemblages, territories, quasi-worlds. And, precisely because 
Werder is reporting on none other than rhetorical agency, rhe-
torical agency itself must be stratification, and circulating ref-
erence, too.
So, capitalizing on these ideas from Deleuze and Latour, 
let’s agree that any participant acting within or between strata 
will not only belong to a chain of mediations, but also function 
as a circulating referent. Such a participant can as easily shore 
up certain local realities (as when a bit of color code contrib-
utes to a finished scientific article) as enunciate or transport 
certain local realities (as when the same bit of color code really 
does embody a piece of the savanna). Thus the work of the cir-
culating referent is indeed the work of the material-semiotic 
rhetorical agent, whose imperative, again, is to make materi-
ality matter.
In what follows, we’ll start construing rhetorical material-
ity, the kind folded into rhetorical agency, as produced in the 
communicative interaction among participants who, though 
initially coming from different collectivities, gradually become 
implicated in the project of making things otherwise than they 
are. We’ll treat our representative speaker, Sojourner Truth, as, 
in some respects, a resident within some quite separate strata 
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(biblical precept, race, and gender) but, in some other respects, 
as an envoy, traveling among territories and connecting them. 
More specifically, we’ll frame her as a circulating referent, cre-
ating linkages among her disparately-interested religious, abo-
litionist, and feminist constituencies, and helping establish an 
assemblage for materializing some genuine social change.
Entering at Biblical Precept
As we’ll recall from the social-structural world, it’s a “mira-
cle” for even an exemplary rhetorical agent to be able to speak 
at all (Campbell 8). But we can now disaggregate the miracle, 
including by adopting a material-and-semiotic perspective on 
the steps through which a Sojourner Truth might be produced. 
Certainly, to report on everything would require that we leave 
most of it out. So that’s what we’ll do during the rest of our 
visit to the material-semiotic landscape of rhetorical agency.
If we wanted to go back to the beginning, we could describe 
our prospective rhetorical agent as plasmatic — as “not yet for-
matted, not yet measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged 
in metrological chains, and not yet covered, surveyed, mobi-
lized, or subjectified” (Latour, Reassembling, 244). But let’s 
save time, picking up at a moment just before this anticipa-
tory being (who, like any other term without a relation, is only 
in an ante-chamber to agency) has started belonging to any 
assemblages to speak of. How, then, can such a proto-speaker 
ever emerge into agency, ever acquire a relation of her own? 
The answer will, of course, have to do with stratification(s), 
and with circulating reference(s), and with incorporeal trans-
formations(s).
As it turns out, our — shall we say — larval practitioner 
is transported all the way out of the antechamber, and all 
the way into a Christian assemblage of the earlier nineteenth 
century, two or three decades before she materializes at the 
famous women’s rights convention of 1851. Initially, she’s 
thrown amidst a family of Dutch-speaking African-Americans, 
enslaved, living in upstate New York. But the young Isabella, 
whose “earliest religious instruction” comes “from her mother,” 
makes “a sanctuary on an island in the middle of a stream,” 
6 :: materiality in the material-semiotic landscape | 135
where she goes “to talk with God and repeat the Lord’s prayer” 
(Painter, “Difference,” 143). In 1826, Jesus appears to her, and 
she experiences “a conversion.” Her son Peter is “sold South,” 
yet, with the aid of some Quakers and a pair of Dutch law-
yers, she wins a court case for his return (“Difference” 143; see 
also Painter, Sojourner Truth 32–37). Around this time, she is 
“freed by New York law” (Campbell 8). She embraces Meth-
odism, becoming friends with a teacher, the Methodist Miss 
Grear, and she helps found “the Kingston Methodist Church” 
(Painter, “Difference,” 143; Sojourner Truth 27). So it’s already 
the case that the mother, the religious instruction, the conver-
sion experience, the conscientious Quakers, and the Method-
ists are constituting at least some of Isabella’s rhetorical agency, 
since they’re effectively formatting her for the stratum of bibli-
cal precept.
In 1828, our prospective rhetorical agent goes off to New 
York City with the Grears, who, like herself, are “Methodist 
perfectionists” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 27). Yet her “religious 
sensibility” has become as “syncretic” as that of other “country 
people” in the region (25). It blends “beliefs and habits from 
animist West Africa and pagan Europe, the Calvinist Dutch 
Reformed Church and the Arminian Methodists,” to which are 
“added the enthusiasms of the Second Great Awakening, when 
Methodist-style camp meetings” remediate many of the “Pres-
byterians and Congregationalists” as well. As we can see, the 
terrain is heterogeneous. Yet Isabella is hybridizing many of its 
local patches, as by belonging to them all.
By now, there is, in New York, a white Methodist church 
for Isabella to attend, and, after that, a Zion African church, 
established by black Methodists who have “experienced racial 
discrimination” at the other place of worship (Painter, “Dif-
ference,” 143). Either way, Isabella has become folded into a 
Methodist assemblage, the latter’s “dominant relation” tak-
ing the form of an intense interest in salvation (Baugh 36). In 
fact, Isabella herself starts preaching, Methodist-style, at “camp 
meetings,” effecting “many conversions,” and earning “great 
respect in various Methodist circles” (Painter, “Difference,” 
143). Clearly, she’s no longer plasmatic. Instead, she’s a circu-
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lating referent, and already shoring up the stratum of biblical 
precept.
Yet our exemplary speaker, though belonging to a major-
itarian stretch of the terrain, belongs to some minoritarian 
stretches as well. For she’s joined the Latourettes, a “dissident 
Methodist” couple whose own “disciples” are always “itiner-
ant preachers,” never fully “connected with any formal church” 
(Painter, “Difference,” 144). And now we have an explana-
tion as to Sojourner Truth’s anomalousness among the “nine-
teenth black woman spiritualists,” who did tend to “seek bib-
lical authorization or acceptance from others regarding” their 
“ministry” (King, Essence, 137–39). It’s not that she’s a colossal 
individual too authentic to need allies. It’s that her pathway has 
linked her with a collectivity actively supporting the work of 
the itinerant, dissident, even unauthorized preacher.
Then, through none other than these dissident if still Meth-
odist Latourettes, our representative rhetorical agent is intro-
duced into the “Christian” enough “commune” led by one 
emphatically apocalyptic Matthias (Painter, “Difference,” 144–
45). Isabella remains his “supporter” for a decade, until the 
“kingdom” founders, right around the time of a major eco-
nomic recession. She’s homeless. But, on the other hand, she’s 
an experienced speaker, a competent preacher, and an apoca-
lyptic Christian, all of it picked up through her interaction with 
other participants in the stratum of biblical precept. That’s why, 
in 1843, when God speaks to her, “commanding her to quit the 
city and take a new name,” Isabella can turn into “Sojourner 
Truth” (145–146). But what is the truth that this itinerant must 
be telling? Well, since she does take to the road in a year that 
is the very “apogee of Millerism” (a Christian movement apoc-
alyptic enough to embrace her), we can be sure that it’s a truth 
about the imminent destruction of everything.
So our exemplary rhetorical practitioner proves capable of 
speaking not only among the Methodists but among the mil-
lenarians, too. She’s linked up with as material-semiotic an 
agencement as any actor-network (and/or media-ecological) 
theorist could envision. For the Millerite message, which cre-
ates tangible linkages among “hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple,” from “Maine to Michigan,” is being spread through “a 
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series of widely-distributed periodicals,” as well as through “the 
teachings of scores of itinerant preachers” holding forth at “fre-
quent and massive camp meetings” (Painter, “Difference,”146). 
And Sojourner Truth herself finds “a ready welcome” when she 
speaks at these gatherings “by the score” (146, 149).
To be sure, biblical precept must be a stratum where race 
and gender don’t matter. Our evidence is that Sojourner Truth 
(whom some might categorize as an emancipated slave, a black 
person, a woman) not only meets no resistance, but actually 
receives a ready welcome. Perhaps that’s because, back then, 
“Agency and independence gained through studying Christian 
doctrine,” and “active participation in women’s groups com-
bined with their religious faith” did help so “many women to 
emancipate themselves from society’s oppressive gender con-
ventions” (King 120). And, yes, it does seem that, for Sojourner 
Truth at this juncture, there’s some of almost everything: reli-
gious faith, doctrine, active participation, independence, and 
agency.
But where are the “women’s groups”? The answer is that 
they’re someplace else, located within another cyborg entirely. 
Indeed, this present assemblage is actively excluding the essen-
tially political, and Sojourner Truth is caught up in the work 
of exclusion. For she’s concentrating exclusively on material-
izing salvation. She’s helping both to de-realize gender and to 
un-produce race, all of it in the interest of shoring up biblical 
precept.
We’ll pursue the point by examining Sojourner Truth’s cur-
rent audiences more closely. These include “farmers and work-
ing people” (Painter, “Difference,” 150). Among them, too, are 
“camp meeting followers, adherents of strenuous, evangelical 
religion, utopian communitarians, and devotees of spirit rap-
pers and water cures” — as well as many who oppose slavery. 
Still, with respect to the question of salvation, they’re a little on 
the single-minded side. They’re all expecting the “literal end of 
the world,” and “momentarily” at that, especially since they’ve 
been hearing from William Miller himself (for more than a 
decade by now) that the Second Advent of Christ is to take 
place during this very year of 1843 (146). We can infer that our 
speaker’s tidings, whose function is to unify these “agitated” 
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evangelicals, won’t have to do with any merely human agency, 
just as we can infer that nobody in this stretch of the stratum 
can be thinking of race or gender as paramount considerations.
Let’s say, therefore, that Sojourner Truth, our exemplary 
rhetorical agent, must, for now, be heralding an eventuality 
which is to sidestep race, gender, and everything else, all in 
one fell swoop. And let’s add that she’s addressing an auditor 
who may be described, in terms borrowed from John New-
ton’s “Amazing Grace,” as the sanctifiable wretch: one whose 
personal experience matters only as the scaffolding for salva-
tion. Certainly, Sojourner Truth’s own task can be differenti-
ated from that of other African-American religious leaders of 
the day. For, while she’s doing her part to link “hundreds of 
thousands,” she’s helping to enact what is, as everybody knows, 
a temporary assemblage, unlike those urban networks, those 
support systems for lasting social change, then under con-
struction by sermonizers such as Samuel Eli Cornish (Painter, 
“Difference,” 146; Hodges 2010). As a referent still circulating 
within the stratum of biblical precept, the rhetorical practi-
tioner whom we’re studying is, at present, limited to ushering 
everyone, regardless of their social positioning, into the divine-
ly-constituted Liberia that will, “momentarily,” be everywhere 
(Painter, “Difference,” 146).
Crossing over to Race
We’ve discovered that our exemplary rhetorical agent is in no 
position, not as yet, to insert any “black women into women’s 
reform” (Painter, “Difference,” 140–141). But our next mate-
rial-semiotic step will be to investigate another incorporeal 
transformation, that through which our circulating referent, 
long since formatted for the stratum of biblical precept, gradu-
ally becomes formatted for the stratum of race as well.
Having established a “reputation” as a “gifted preacher and 
singer,” Sojourner Truth finds the Millerites happy to “recom-
mend her good preaching” even to their non-Millerite “breth-
ren” (Painter, “Difference,” 146). So, through “invitations 
extended,” Sojourner Truth starts traversing (what else but) 
“a Millerite network” on Long Island, crossing over from New 
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York, to Connecticut, and then on to Massachusetts. To be 
sure, it’s no parting of the ways. It’s just the pursuit of what Ste-
ven Johnson (1997) would call a “link” or trail of “association” 
(112), or what the material-semiotic researchers would call a 
partial connection — referring, actually, to the opposite of a dis-
interested connection (see Strathern, 1991; Mol, 2002). In any 
case, our exemplary rhetorical agent now follows a trail that 
leads, across the partial connection of preacherliness, all the 
way to the “utopian Northampton Association,” where, “for the 
first time,” she encounters “Garrisonian abolitionism” (Painter, 
“Difference,” 146).
Indeed, the brethren to whom Sojourner Truth is being rec-
ommended belong to a stratum in its own right, a collectivity 
where religion is no “dominant relation,” merely another plank 
in the activist’s platform (Baugh 36). The activist in question 
might very well be a clergyman, considering that, in this sec-
ond stratum, “gender” isn’t so much absent as occluded. Even 
then, his task would be to fold salvation into social justice, not 
to promote it as an exit strategy. Furthermore, where Sojourner 
Truth is going now, the dominant relation involves not social 
justice in general, but abolitionism in particular. Therefore, to 
enter this new stratum as a bona fide participant, instead of a 
tourist, our exemplary rhetorical agent will have to start rein-
forcing the materiality of race, without whose political reality 
there couldn’t, in the middle of the nineteenth century, be any 
concerted anti-slavery movement to begin with.
This second stratum, its inhabitants so preoccupied with 
skin color, is another of these alliances, networks, or cyborgs. 
It’s a mesh within which are linked the slaves, the free black 
persons, and, last but not least, the anti-slavery activists — who 
do have to make “race” matter, if only as an expedient for liber-
ating the slaves. For, while slavery and blackness can, in point 
of fact, be detached from one another (just ask any inden-
tured Irishman of the mid-nineteenth century), the abolitionist 
movement of the day needs to suture them, so that the move-
ment itself, insofar as it’s a regime of signs, can lay claim to a 
non-ambiguous referent.
Let’s now scrutinize the manner in which Sojourner Truth 
actually makes the transition into the stratum of race. She 
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hasn’t been invited on the basis of her blackness, abolition-
ism, femaleness, or feminism, but only because of her “good 
preaching” — which heretofore has been exclusively to prepare 
the sanctifiable wretch for the end of the world (Painter, “Dif-
ference,” 146). Nevertheless, she stays, and for several years, at 
the Northampton Association, that noted hotbed of anti-slav-
ery activism. This means that our circulating referent must, in 
the interim, have acquired some abolitionist credentials to go 
along with her millenarian qualifications.
If so, then we should be looking for the allies who make 
possible the integration of the preacherly Sojourner Truth into 
the abolitionist Northampton Association. There might be 
several such allies, but we’ll focus on one in particular. This 
is David Ruggles, by now perhaps the most important “black 
radical abolitionist” of all, and a fixture, here in this collectiv-
ity “dedicated to antislavery issues” (Hodges 38; King, Essence, 
137). He’s “content in Northampton,” where he conducts his 
“antislavery efforts” with the support of an entire network of 
“white allies” (Hodges 176, 187). He not only organizes “meet-
ings of black Americans” but also works closely with the “white 
abolitionists in the area,” for he’s directly linked with William 
Lloyd Garrison (Hodges 180, 183, 185). And, yes, David Rug-
gles can definitely help integrate Sojourner Truth into a domi-
nant relation to which she’s never yet belonged.
It’s David Ruggles who’s exactly “the right person of color 
to help Sojourner Truth” gain some credence at Northampton 
(Hodges 183). It’s David Ruggles, not Sojourner Truth, who 
has been urging “blacks to find freedom” for all these many 
years, and it’s David Ruggles, not Sojourner Truth, who has 
such “very good relations with Garrison” (183). So David Rug-
gles will “surely” have to “approve of Truth for white abolition-
ists to trust her” (Hodges 184). This is because the white aboli-
tionists will otherwise have no reason to trust her, not until she 
can show that she, too, has “embraced abolitionism” (Painter, 
“Difference” 147). Lest we forget, the anti-slavery activists, who 
have all sorts of entanglements to contend with, can simply 
look around to see that not all of the black people are on their 
team. For one thing, during the period 1790–1860, there are, 
in Larry Koger’s (1995) turn of phrase, quite a number of “free 
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black slave masters.” For another, as David Ruggles actually 
reports, some of the enslaved persons themselves have been 
rejecting offers of enfranchisement (Hodges 187). So the abo-
litionists at Northampton can’t expect just any African-Ameri-
can, not even a preacher, to be an abolitionist as well.
Yet our exemplary rhetorical agent becomes translated, 
and with some rapidity, into an abolitionist, starting when 
David Ruggles discovers in her a “potential convert to anti-
slavery” (Hodges 183). For Ruggles exerts a “major impact 
on Truth’s developing abolitionism,” as when his “mentoring” 
produces some new-for-her “abolitionist views and methods” 
(183). Thus it comes about (in 1844, at one of these “meet-
ings of black Americans” which Ruggles has been organiz-
ing) that Sojourner Truth, after so many years of testifying as 
a  Methodist-and-Millenarian, makes “her first public antislav-
ery address on the practical workings of slavery in the North” 
(Hodges 183–84).
From now on, Sojourner Truth is no longer just a preacher. 
She is, in addition, an “antislavery lecturer,” and as enmeshed 
in the project of abolitionism as in the prospect of salvation 
(King, Essence, 137). As Deleuze and Guattari might say, it’s an 
incorporeal transformation — a shift converting our selected 
speaker into a circulating referent for two different collectivi-
ties at once (ATP 88). As part of the process, Sojourner Truth 
has had to become black, whether or not she’d been black 
already. And lest it seem counterintuitive to think of Sojourner 
Truth as acquiring a race, we’ll consult the historical record for 
corroboration.
For, strangely enough, Sojourner Truth emerges from the 
Northampton Association not only as the well-trained lec-
turer, but also as the “illiterate, former slave woman” (Camp-
bell 9). Starting in the mid-1840s, she portrays herself as the 
unstudied innocent, just as she begins using “her body in 
ways” that women who are not “actresses” would never dare 
(Painter, “Difference,” 155 ff.). She’s adopted just the sort of 
racialized identity she’d previously have flouted. So this ethos 
of the “slave-woman victim” must have arisen from the col-
laboration between, on the one side, Sojourner Truth and, on 
the other side, the Ruggles contingent at Northampton, that 
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training-ground not for just any activist, but for the anti-slav-
ery activist in particular (157). Our exemplary rhetorical agent 
herself must have helped design a new, strategic persona, an 
appeal to precisely those auditors who’d be all ears for the 
underdog but distrustful of the revolutionary.
Yet, if this speaker is, all of a sudden, harping on her “race,” 
it’s not in the interest of anyone’s personal aggrandizement. It’s 
to render visible that very blackness, that victimhood of the 
slaves, without which abolitionism would have no discernible 
object. At this time, the question of race isn’t a self-evident 
matter of fact. Instead, it’s a controversial matter of concern 
(see Latour 2008). The abolitionists, including Sojourner Truth 
and David Ruggles, are among those trying to settle the contro-
versy, which has, in the years preceding the civil war, become 
entangled with the metaphysics of slavery. Is slavery — as sanc-
tioned by skin color — to be read as an evil, as a necessary evil, 
as a lesser evil (in comparison to emancipation), as a blessing 
in disguise, or what? Clearly, the abolitionists would prefer to 
read slavery as an evil. Yet the more pragmatic approach, at 
least for now, is to read slavery as an evil for the slave.
That’s not the only option in town, not even among the 
abolitionists. For example, in his own Narrative, Frederick 
Douglass takes care to emphasize that slavery is an evil not 
simply for the slave, but also, believe it or not, for the slave-
holder — and, by extension, for the nation to which the slave-
holder belongs (see especially Chapters VI and VII). Yet, so 
far as concerns the abolitionists more generally, the last thing 
they’d need is another of these self-made men, another Freder-
ick Douglass unwittingly to imply that any agent with enough 
gumption could simply emancipate himself. That’s why the bet-
ter strategy is to keep dramatizing that slavery, while it may 
yet prove an evil for the slaveholder, is definitely an evil for the 
close-to-hapless slave.
To say so is consistent with an explanation from the histo-
rian Nell Irvin Painter. At this time in the United States, even 
“free blacks” exist in “a conceptual limbo”: they’re “unseen or 
uninteresting or distasteful,” plus they’re too un-hapless to elicit 
empathy (Painter, “Difference,” 154). Under the circumstances, 
to stand for something in particular, to acquire a clear-cut ref-
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erent, the anti-slavery cause must render its object both black 
enough and disempowered enough to matter. If anti-slavery 
arguments are to take hold, then they will have to be advanced 
by a practitioner embodying abolitionism, blackness, and vic-
timhood simultaneously.
At present, there aren’t many candidates qualified for 
that role. Let’s consider the predicament of Sojourner Truth’s 
numerous “black women contemporaries in feminist aboli-
tionism,” most of them routinely overlooked, and ask, “Why 
this invisibility?” (Painter, “Difference,” 147–48, 155–56). 
The answer is that they’re too “free,” too unvictim-like, to be 
seen — whether in the middle of the nineteenth century or 
today (“Difference,” 154). And who else is available to be mate-
rializing the requisite blackness, namely, that of the slave-as-
victim? It can’t be the actual slaves, whose own visibility has 
yet to be brought into being (except, of course, when they rise 
up in one of these bloodbaths, these Nat Turner-style insurrec-
tions, thereby sending quite the mixed message for the anti-
slavery cause).
But, during this period, “Southern” servitude does function 
as the very “symbol of American slavery” (Painter, Sojourner 
Truth, 8). It’s the “metaphorical slave South,” so “familiar…by 
dint of having so often been described,” that encapsulates all 
the oppression which the Northern abolitionists are contesting, 
and then it’s the blackness of the Southern slave that, in turn, 
emblematizes the metaphorical slave South (9). So there’s the 
solution: the antislavery movement needs to come up with an 
envoy abolitionist enough to convey the abstractions, but vic-
tim enough — metonymically Southern enough — to literalize 
them, too.
And that’s what the radical abolitionists, our exemplary 
rhetorical agent among them, do understand. It’s Sojourner 
Truth herself who is, as one says, positioned to link the ambig-
uously privileged abolitionists of the North with the clearly 
marginalized slaves of the South. For this is a speaker who 
materializes the arguments of the abolitionists while also mate-
rializing the experiences of the slaves. She does so by enacting 
blackness-and-victimization in a newly-emergent, specifically 
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abolitionist form, and this is how she goes about reterritorial-
izing race.
Still, it’s not as if Sojourner Truth is, during this next incor-
poreal transformation, to exchange identities, switching from 
highly-trained lecturer to “slave-woman victim” (Painter, “Dif-
ference,” 157). It’s not, for example, that she’s to become “two 
different persons or one person divided into two” (Mol, Body, 
80). Instead, as Annemarie Mol might observe, the subject of 
our investigation is to emerge as more than one but less than 
many (80). She’ll retain her function as a circulating referent, 
but, from now on, it’ll be for more than one collectivity at a 
time. As an abolitionist at home among the Christians, as a 
Christian at home among the abolitionists, she’ll speak for the 
stratum of biblical precept and also for the stratum of race.
From Race to Gender
Is our exemplary practitioner henceforth empowered to say 
just anything among just any group of interlocutors? No, of 
course not, and this is because she is perceived as belonging on 
the abolitionist track of the “feminist and antislavery circuit” 
(Painter, Sojourner Truth, 171). The problem, from a materi-
al-semiotic perspective, is that she hasn’t been properly format-
ted, at least not as a circulating referent for gender, for which 
reason she’s still not positioned to enunciate anywhere near 
enough feminism. That’s because the women’s rights movement 
of the day is heterogeneous: some of its members embrace 
feminism without endorsing abolitionism. These more con-
servative feminists, having established a Troy of their own, are 
unwilling to let some abolitionist (and, by association, patriar-
chal) gift-horse of a Sojourner Truth into the camp.
Let’s consider, as a case in point, what actually happens 
when, in 1850, Sojourner Truth, wandering off the abolition-
ist reservation, goes ahead to address a women’s rights conven-
tion in Worcester, Massachusetts (see Fitch and Mandziuk 19). 
It’s an important gathering, the “first such meeting of national 
scope in the United States” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 114). 
According to the available evidence, Sojourner Truth seems to 
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have spoken there “primarily as a preacher” (115). Yet it isn’t 
preacherliness that saturates the fallout from her appearance.
For, in response, the conservative feminist Jane Swisshelm 
editorializes, in her influential Saturday Visiter, that “The con-
vention was not called to discuss the rights of color, and we 
think it was altogether irrelevant and unwise to introduce 
the question” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 123). There, in a nut-
shell, is the impasse that our exemplary practitioner is facing 
until 1851, when she “first” gains “prominence as a feminist” 
(Painter, “Difference” 140). It’s as if she’s become so closely 
affiliated with the abolitionism of the abolitionists, and with 
the blackness-and-victimization of the slaves, that, no matter 
what she says, she’s heard as speaking for “the rights of color” 
anyway.
To appreciate the material-semiotic delicacy of the situa-
tion, let’s recall that, around this time, “women” are “presumed 
to be white,” and “blacks” are “presumed to be men” (Painter, 
Sojourner Truth, 171). But what goes for the “blacks” also goes 
for the abolitionists, and all the more so. It’s not, as the exam-
ple of the Garrisonian abolitionists might show, that the abo-
litionists are universally unsympathetic towards feminism; it’s 
just that too many of them are. Indeed, the most politically-in-
fluential version of abolitionism might yet turn out to be the 
kind purposing to emancipate the slaves without emancipating 
the women. So, at present, the women’s rights activists can’t be 
sure which abolitionism a speaker like Sojourner Truth would 
bring along into the heart of their movement. That alone is 
enough to explain why a Jane Swisshelm would think it so 
“irrelevant and unwise” for the women’s movement to squan-
der its resources on the “rights of color,” and all at a time when 
feminism still needs to territorialize itself (Painter, Sojourner 
Truth, 123).
Meanwhile, the trend within abolitionism looks to be that 
of alienating gender, and precisely as a stratagem for consol-
idating race. Regrettably, William Lloyd Garrison himself has 
been left marooned by the rest of the abolitionists, including 
within his own organization, the national Anti-Slavery Society. 
Thus, in 1840, with the election of three abolitionist women 
(Lydia Maria Child, Lucretia Mott and Maria Weston Chap-
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man) to the executive committee of that Society, many among 
the abolitionist non-women have objected. Sure, they’ve been 
objecting to Garrison’s uncompromising radicalism, but that’s 
an umbrella term already covering his “support of women’s 
rights” (Wyatt-Brown). Some of the more “religious abolition-
ists,” those who wish to continue working through the conven-
tional political mechanisms, have broken away to form the Lib-
erty Party. But others have departed to form the American and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in which women are “denied the 
vote” (Venet 15). This latter, incidentally, is an organization one 
of whose annual reports is issued on May 6, 1851, three short 
weeks before Sojourner Truth gives her famous speech at the 
women’s rights convention. In other words, just anybody at this 
time can see that a counter-feminist abolitionism is abroad and 
expanding its sphere of influence.
What’s more, among the very most counter-feminist of 
the secessionists, those forming the American and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society, is one Samuel Eli Cornish. He’s our exam-
ple, mentioned above, of the various African-American activ-
ists laboring among the urban populations of the day. Now, 
there’s no impeaching this figure (this journalist, publisher, 
minister, community leader) on the basis that he’s lacking in 
the requisite abolitionist credentials. Yet it’s not the moderate 
Liberty Party that Cornish joins after his break with the Garri-
sonians. Instead, and (at the very least) symbolically taking his 
own constituency with him, he joins the other, more conser-
vative organization, where women are denied the vote. That’s 
how he helps convey that not even the black abolitionists can 
automatically be expected to join the feminist team. No won-
der so “many feminist abolitionists” would come “to advocate 
women’s rights after experiencing frustration” in their antislav-
ery work (Painter, “Difference,” 148). But, then again, Samuel 
Eli Cornish does embody that mid-nineteenth century move-
ment to shore up race by separating it from gender.
So far as concerns an important contingent among the 
beleaguered feminists, the commonsensical reaction is to 
respond in kind, but from the other direction (shoring up gen-
der by separating it from race). We see this vector operating in 
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the first-hand report of Frances Dana Gage, albeit in passages 
overlooked by the rhetorical theorist Karlyn Kohrs Campbell:
old Sojourner…sat crouched against the wall…Again 
and again, timorous and trembling ones came to me 
and said with earnestness, “Don’t let her speak, Mrs. 
G. It will ruin us. Every newspaper in the land will 
have our cause mixed with abolition and niggers, and 
we shall be utterly denounced.” (Painter, Sojourner 
Truth, 167)
Despite her tendentiousness, Gage captures the dynamics accu-
rately enough. After all, this is a time when someone like Jane 
Swisshelm can opt, in her editorials, to portray the women’s 
rights movement as “a small boat in choppy waters,” a vessel 
which “may carry woman into a safe harbor,” but which “is not 
strong enough to bear the additional weight of all the colored 
men in creation” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 123). From the per-
spective of many such feminists, the cause cannot afford any 
tarring with the brush of abolitionism.
But this, in the period just before her famous speech, looks 
inauspicious for Sojourner Truth, who becomes quite the locus 
of anxiety. Following “her stay at Northampton,” her “name” 
has started “appearing sporadically in newspapers,” but only 
“as an antislavery lecturer” (King, Essence, 137). That’s her 
label in 1850, at the Old Colony Anti-Slavery Society meeting 
in Plymouth, Massachusetts (Fitch and Mandziuk 18). As for 
those newspapers, they do include the Liberator, the Anti-Slav-
ery Bugle, and the National Anti-Slavery Standard (Campbell 
11, 17). That’s because she’s “actively” working with “many abo-
litionists,” including on “tours for the American Anti-Slavery 
Society” (Fitch and Mandziuk 18). For example, she appears, 
with “other distinguished abolitionists,” on an “antislavery” lec-
turing “tour” in Western New York (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 
116). And when she addresses an audience in March, 1851 
(immediately before rematerializing at the women’s rights 
gathering in Akron), it’s an “antislavery convention” that she’s 
attending. So, yes, everybody understands what Sojourner 
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Truth has been doing for abolitionism. But nobody can tell 
what she might yet do to feminism.
At this juncture — between 1850 and 1851 — there’s a 
choice for the women’s rights activists more generally. It’s either 
to collaborate with an alliance between the radical abolitionists 
(Sojourner Truth included) and the anti-slavery feminists, an 
alliance tainted, after all, rather more insidiously by the invis-
ible privilege of the patriarchs than by the visible blackness of 
the slaves. Or else it’s to trust in a conservative feminism that 
takes women’s interests to heart. For, while the abolitionists 
can’t expect just any black person to be good for abolitionism, 
the feminists can’t expect just any black person to be good for 
women’s rights.
Earlier, we’ve found that it must certainly have taken some 
allies to facilitate Sojourner Truth’s incorporeal transformation 
from an apocalyptic into an abolitionist. Now we’ll notice a 
parallel with respect to her production as a feminist, and spe-
cifically of the kind that can insert “black women into wom-
en’s reform” (Painter, “Difference,” 140). Clearly, this speak-
er’s rhetorical agency must be contingent upon, heritable from 
whichever pathways she follows into the women’s movement. 
Yet the difference between Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical agency 
in 1850, when she’s rebuffed by the bona fide feminists, and in 
1851, when she’s accepted by them, is finally a matter of scale. 
In 1850, her rhetorical agency, though as real as ever before, 
isn’t so big or important in the stratum of gender as it is else-
where. But in 1851, the speaker is not only a religious activist, 
and an antislavery activist, but a women’s rights activist, too. 
This means that somebody or something must, in the interim, 
have hooked her up, helping rescale what remains, nonetheless, 
her own rhetorical agency.
For how is it, according to the material-semiotic perspec-
tive, that agency can ever be resized, or an agent made equal 
to a task of which she isn’t already capable? The answer is that 
scale is always the “achievement” of the actors themselves, 
since “action,” a “property of associated entities,” is always per-
formed by “Agent 1 plus Agent 2 plus Agent 3” (Latour, Reas-
sembling, 185; Pandora’s 182).
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Rescaling the Envoy
If we scrutinize the activity currently taking place around our 
exemplary rhetorical agent, we find that the support system for 
rescaling (and redistributing) her rhetorical agency comprises 
quite a number of disparate actors, practices, and artifacts. Not 
all of these are purposing to maximize the rhetorical agency 
of Sojourner Truth. Yet, in collaborating to create a bridge 
between race and gender, many of them are resizing that rhe-
torical agency, anyway. For simplicity, let’s consider the materi-
al-semiotic roles played, first, by one exemplary actor, second, 
by one exemplary practice, and, finally, by one exemplary arti-
fact.
We’ll identify the exemplary actor as Parker Pillsbury, 
who, right around 1850, is known all over the Northwest as a 
minister and social reformer. In addition to his abolitionism, 
he’s fully involved in the women’s rights movement, which is 
why he can eventually help draft the constitution of the fem-
inist American Equal Rights Association (1865), and serve as 
vice-president of the New Hampshire Woman Suffrage Associ-
ation, and — with Elizabeth Cady Stanton — co-edit the wom-
en’s rights newsletter The Revolution. At this moment, though, 
we’re interested in Pillsbury’s functionality as an actor trans-
porting Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical agency into the stra-
tum of gender. It’s a reminder that agency can be constrained 
and enabled by one and the same mechanism. For Pillsbury’s 
response to the conservative feminists is to reframe, to reme-
diate, what’s just happened in 1850, at that women’s rights con-
vention in Worcester, where Sojourner Truth has wandered off 
the circuit’s abolitionist track. He does so in the very pages of 
Jane Swisshelm’s newspaper, that mechanism for separating 
gender from race.
To recognize that Pillsbury’s contribution counts as an 
event, a material-semiotic achievement, let’s link that interven-
tion to a pairing of concepts from rhetorical studies proper. 
Specifically, let’s read Pillsbury, in his commentary on the fall-
out from the Worcester convention of 1850, as turning the 
tables on Swisshelm and her followers, leaving them saddled 
with the burden of proof — exactly as if they (in proposing 
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that the rights of black women henceforth be excluded from 
the rights of women) are the ones calling for the unwarranted 
innovation. After all, or so Pillsbury insinuates, the default 
position, the status quo for abolitionists and feminists alike, 
is that the rights of colored women are necessarily included 
in the rights of women. And now, all of a sudden, here’s this 
disruptive proposal, from Swisshelm et al., that we start fix-
ing something that isn’t broken, as by showing these “colored” 
ladies the door (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 123). So that’s how 
to interpret the interchange taking place between Pillsbury and 
Swisshelm, late in the year 1850, and in the pages of the Satur-
day Visiter. It’s the emergence and resolution of a controversy 
as to who it really is that’s advocating the needless departure 
from the way that things already are.
Yet Pillsbury is now writing into the record a state of 
affairs more self-evident than it may seem: “That any woman 
has rights, will be scarcely believed. But that colored women 
have rights, would never have been thought of, without a spe-
cific declaration” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 123). All that’s hap-
pened at Worcester, on Pillsbury’s account, is that someone 
has finally gone ahead and uttered a “specific” articulation, an 
innocent “declaration,” a Deleuzean enunciation of that fem-
inist-and-abolitionist truth, all aimed at a general public that 
simply wouldn’t have “thought of ” it. Certainly, there’s been no 
introduction, into the woman question, of the color question. 
Instead, there’s been an unfolding of the latter from the former.
So, by writing the state of affairs into the record to begin 
with, Pillsbury is, in effect, constituting a trajectory for abo-
litionism and feminism to share. He’s placing a chronotopic 
stepping stone just a little ahead of Sojourner Truth, making 
possible another of her incorporeal transformations. He’s pav-
ing her way from Worcester, where she’s been rebuffed as a 
mere spokesperson for race, to Akron, where she’s to emerge, 
in addition, as a feminist, that is, as a circulating referent for 
gender. His interference then facilitates a multiple territorial-
ization, simultaneously of abolitionism (spreading into the 
women’s rights movement) and of feminism (infiltrating the 
anti-slavery cause).
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But it’s time for us to consider the material-semiotic role 
of just one exemplary practice. This latter might not sound 
like much, for it’s simply that of participating, in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, at women’s rights meetings. Yet a 
practice which facilitates a link between abolitionism and fem-
inism needn’t be dismissed as trivial. In this case, the practice 
gains much of its specificity from the interaction between our 
exemplary rhetorical agent and one Marius Robinson. Robin-
son, both a clergyman and a noted abolitionist, is not only the 
editor of the Anti-Slavery Bugle but also, together with his wife 
Emily, the personal friend and host of Sojourner Truth (Baker; 
Painter, Sojourner Truth, 119). Besides, like Parker Pillsbury, 
Robinson has been acquiring some feminist credentials of his 
own. That’s how he can help create the conditions under which 
Sojourner Truth may give her speech in the first place.
What’s remarkable, though, is that our exemplary rhetori-
cal agent seems, as of 1850, to be reacting with surprise at the 
prospect that she, an abolitionist lecturer, might be able to par-
ticipate in the women’s rights movement as well:
Truth learned of the May 28, 1851, Ohio women’s 
rights convention in Akron from Robinson. The sub-
ject interested her. She had spoken at the 1850 wom-
en’s rights conference in Worcester, Massachusetts.  
(King 137)
So, at this very moment (even as she’s being criticized, in the 
feminist press, for her unsanctioned appearance at Worcester), 
our protagonist is discussing her nascent feminism, not with 
just anybody, but with a fellow abolitionist, Marius Robinson, 
who invites her to an important women’s rights convention at 
which he himself will be the secretary.
It’s not, of course, that Robinson is the only actor to have 
helped articulate Sojourner Truth with the practice of speak-
ing up at women’s rights meetings. We might adduce the role 
played by none other than Frances Dana Gage. She officiated 
as president for the convention in Akron, and she granted 
our exemplary rhetorical agent permission to speak, and she 
published the fictive rendition of the speech which is, by now, 
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“more frequently cited” than the Robinson version (Campbell 
17). Still, the main inference to draw is that, in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, even to encourage someone’s participa-
tion at women’s rights meetings can be to help materialize her 
rhetorical agency.
What remains to be clarified is why there should be any dif-
ference between the outcome of Sojourner Truth’s practice in 
1850, when she risks a journalistic drubbing from conservatives 
like Jane Swisshelm, and that of her practice in 1851, when she 
goes back to speak before an audience once again including the 
Swisshelm contingent. Oughtn’t the practice lead to much the 
same results in each instance? Well, no: this second time, the 
practice will be operationalized not by the under-scaled sort of 
agent who jumped the track at Worcester, but, instead, by an 
upgraded agent who is supported — indeed, transported — by 
her allies. Just as it’s taken certain actors and practices to con-
vert her into a spokesperson first for salvation and second for 
abolitionism, it now takes certain others to convert her into a 
spokesperson for women’s rights as well. These others include, 
as we’ve seen, the abolitionist-and-feminist Marius Robinson, 
who is ensuring that Sojourner Truth gain a hearing among the 
feminists, certainly those whose testimony he’ll record in his 
role as secretary. So Robinson is, in effect, carrying our exem-
plary rhetorical agent along in her transition from race to gen-
der, making it possible for her, in the long run, to insert “black 
women into women’s reform” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 140).
Having considered the contributions (to Sojourner Truth’s 
most recent incorporeal transformation) of just one actor and 
just one practice, we can address the contribution of just one 
artifact. Frankly, the selection of an artifact will be arbitrary, 
though we’re guided to our choice by no less than Campbell’s 
(2005) canonical essay on rhetorical agency. There, we learn 
that Sojourner Truth’s most “famous line” echoes “a recur-
ring theme,” of “women’s antislavery discourse, where “female 
slaves” are “given voice” through the question, “Am I not a 
woman and a sister?” (Campbell 12, 17). Campbell under-
lines the point by referring us to the illustration of an “anti-
slavery token” from 1838. If we retrace her steps, cycling back 
to Phillip Lapansky’s “Graphic Discord” (1994), we find close 
6 :: materiality in the material-semiotic landscape | 153
to thirty comparable depictions, all having to do with female 
slaves. They come from the pages of books and broadsides, and 
from etchings and engravings and woodcuts and lithographs, 
and even from the surface of a pin cushion. But the artifact on 
which we’ll concentrate, situating it not as unanchored signifi-
cation but as circulating reference, is the anti-slavery token.
We find that the artifact reads “AM I NOT A WOMAN 
& A SISTER,” and that it features the image of a “female sup-
plicant”: a slave who is kneeling, clasping her hands, looking 
upward in prayer (Lapansky 206, 208; also see Campbell 18, 
Painter, “Difference,” 156, and King 139). In the nineteenth 
century, this figure would be accompanied by “the writings of 
early female activists,” a category emphatically including “Afri-
can Americans” (Lapansky 206). Additionally, she and her affil-
iated supplicants 
adorned countless abolitionist books, pamphlets, 
newspapers, periodicals, broadsides, letterheads, and 
printed ephemera. They were also replicated in hand-
icraft goods and even…chinaware, tokens, linen, and 
silk goods sold by the antislavery women at their 
annual fund-raising fairs.
So it turns out that the anti-slavery token, together with all 
sorts of other co-constituents, is indeed participating in a 
material-semiotic network. The latter is an alliance, an assem-
blage in which antislavery tokens and silk goods are folded into 
practices (like that of holding annual fund-raising fairs), prac-
tices which are, in turn, operationalized by actors (such as anti-
slavery women). And what is it that all these moveable parts 
are accomplishing? Well, at the very least, they’re producing an 
agencement — an agency — for translating an abolitionist into a 
feminist. Even the antislavery token, by helping to enact some 
commensurability between the interests of the abolitionists and 
the interests of the feminists, is helping to format Sojourner 
Truth for the stratum of gender.
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And A’n’t We a Meshwork?
When Sojourner Truth does come to speak at the women’s 
rights convention of 1851, she will (constitutively) be knotting 
together such filaments as are already there. That’s her role in 
materializing an incorporeal transformation so massive that, as 
a result, the sanctifiable wretches, the abolitionists, the femi-
nists, the slaves who are “presumed to be men,” the clearly 
female supplicants, the whole lot of them together, can belong 
to a single, heterogeneous collectivity (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 
171). True, it’s only while we are in the material-semiotic land-
scape that we can see things this way. For we’re in a world 
whose imperative is to make materiality matter, rather than let 
it disappear into subjectivity, or conventionality, or transcen-
dence.
From a material-semiotic perspective, then, it proves quite 
manageable to explain how Sojourner Truth’s (triangulable if 
hypothetical) speech of 1851 would actually work. We know 
there’s a central claim — namely, that the speaker is a wom-
an’s rights activist — accompanied by a cluster of themes and 
images: biblical precept, race, gender, and all the rest. So we 
could unfold the functionality of the speech simply by revis-
iting, connecting, and (not to forget) separating the kinds of 
arguments adumbrated in the preceding chapters.
For the sake of illustration, let’s notice that adopting such 
a perspective would readily allow us to study the manner in 
which, say, rhetorical subjectivity might be reconfigured with 
the aid of rhetorical conventionality. We could, for example, 
begin with the shared value of Christian love, which could be 
shown finally to connect Sojourner Truth with practically all 
of the key players (radicals and conservatives alike) among the 
abolitionists and feminists of the mid-nineteenth century (see 
Bogin and Yellin, 1994; Painter, 1994; King, 2006).
But the main stipulation, in this or any other material-se-
miotic endeavor, would be for us to flatten our ontology, and 
all the way down. That’s how the salient co-constituents of rhe-
torical agency (i.e., subjectivity, conventionality, transcendence, 
and materiality) and also the salient participants in rhetorical 
transaction (e.g., Christian love, Sojourner Truth, abolitionism, 
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antislavery tokens, feminism) could surface not as alternative 
proxies for some underlying social logic, but, instead, as irre-
ducible, unassimilable equals.
However, we might go further yet, pushing our materi-
al-semiotic perspective so very far that, undergoing its own 
incorporeal transformation, it emerges as an assemblage-the-
oretical vision proper. It’d be well worth our while to under-
stand how the rhetorical transaction we’ve been investigating 
(Sojourner Truth’s triangulable if hypothetical speech of 1851) 
might involve the shifting of terms into a new relation. Mean-
while, it’d be no merely arbitrary choice to settle on the mate-
rial-semiotic approach as the best of the four candidates for 
theoretical development. That’s because, under present condi-
tions, the other options (i.e., the social-structural, the rhetor-
ical-humanistic, and the existential-transversal) are coloniz-
ing one another, with all of their terms and relations appearing 
increasingly isotopic. We’ve seen as much in Campbell’s canon-
ical essay of 2005, where rhetorical agency looks to be not only 
promiscuous, but also protean, paradoxical, and paper-thin. In 
short, it’s in the material-semiotic landscape alone that terms 
and relations can be described thickly enough to stay separable.
So, in anticipation of an ending, we’ll return to that condi-
tion of diremption, or triremption (discussed in the chapter on 
the existential-humanistic version of rhetorical agency) where 
the salient terms are (white) man, (black) slave, and (white) 
woman. Now, if Sojourner Truth is to insert black women into 
women’s reform, she’ll have to find some rhetorical means for 
(a) extracting these terms out of any relations that have been 
keeping them apart, and for (b) transporting them into a rela-
tion where they’re indisputably drawn together. What, then, 
would be an assemblage-theoretical explanation for the man-
ner in which the protagonist proceeds?
In her speech of 1851, our exemplary rhetorical agent is 
constitutively (that is, productively) shifting the three terms 
into very different relations than before. On the one front, leav-
ing woman where it is, she makes slave matter as a near-syn-
onym for woman, with the result that the blackness of the 
slave-victim counts as an attribute of the woman-victim, too. 
On the other front, leaving slave where it is, she makes man 
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matter as a near synonym for sanctifiable wretch, so that abo-
litionism proper, increasingly purified of its association with 
patriarchy, takes on an association with salvation instead. 
Henceforth, the terms slave and man can belong to Christi-
anity, to abolitionism, and to feminism, too — since the reli-
gion as such (with its presumption that we, the lot of us, are in 
perpetual need of redemption) does stretch out to include so 
many of the women’s rights activists to begin with.
By now, if Sojourner Truth is coming along to say that 
she — a preacher, a (former) slave, a black person, and an abo-
litionist — is a woman, or a woman’s rights, then she is bring-
ing along with her, into the heart of gender, not only the 
sanctifiable wretch and the black, victimized slave, but also 
the increasingly redeemable man. So it’s true that our exem-
plary rhetorical agent is inserting “black women into wom-
en’s reform” (Painter, Sojourner Truth, 140). But that’s not the 
half of it. She’s also inserting white men, and black men, and 
Christians into women’s reform. For, in this altered dominant 
relation, “woman” itself is becoming realized, enacted, mate-
rialized as a hybrid, so that everybody can have a chance to 
enter the fold, joining the movement for women’s rights. Yes, 
it’s like Spartacus, with the difference that there’s no colossally 
authentic individual in sight. There’s only an internally-hetero-
geneous assemblage, an alliance where subjectivities (or identi-
ties), shared values, existential claims, original bodies, agents, 
practices, artifacts can, all of them, play a part.
When we adopt an assemblage-theoretical (including mate-
rial-semiotic) approach, we no longer need to generate rhetor-
ical agency by fiat. Instead, we can study rhetorical agency as 
a network effect (a production of the cyborg, by the alliance, 
for the assemblage). Even so, there is an important observa-
tion to add with regard to the material-semiotic perspective, 
though applicable to the social-structural and rhetorical-hu-
manistic perspectives, too. This is that not even what Nathan 
Stormer (2009) has called the will to matter can explain why 
(rather than how) it matters if some exemplary rhetorical agent 
ever does help to build certain materialities, or to deploy cer-
tain shared values, or to (re)constitute certain subjectivities, 
thereby making things otherwise than they are. The very ques-
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tion returns us to the problem of the rhetorical agent, whether 
construed as a structural subject, a whole person, an existential 
self, an ineffable participant, or something else. Let’s keep it in 
mind during the next chapter, which concludes our investiga-
tion into a four-folded and traveling rhetorical agency.

7.
 Agency in the Rhetorical-Theoretical 
World
The preceding study has taken us into four distinct land-
scapes of rhetorical agency. These discrete paradigms are the-
oretical-and-practical workspaces for the production of subjec-
tivity, of conventionality, of transcendence, and of materiality. 
While each locale does offer an indispensible contribution to 
our thinking about rhetorical agency (highlighting structural 
constraints, or shared values, or authentic claims, or variegated 
networks), each models the rhetorical agent in its own, propri-
etary way. So, although there are several options for theoriz-
ing the connection between rhetorical transaction and genuine 
social change, the choices aren’t, all of them, available in the 
same place.
In the social-structural landscape, rhetorical subjectivity 
is being assembled out of terms that always dissolve into their 
relations. The rhetorical agent is a structural subject perpetu-
ally reproducing its own “unavoidable” condition (Campbell 
3). It’s an agent quite incapable, other than by theoretical fiat, 
of speaking in such a way as to make any difference, an agent 
attached as closely to the state as is a barnacle to a ship. But, 
then again, the interiority of speakers and listeners cannot be 
other than collectively contextualized. For that reason, it’s per-
fectly appropriate for there to be a social-structural paradigm, 
where the local theorists and practitioners can continue manu-
facturing all manner of constraints upon the structural subject.
In the rhetorical-humanistic landscape, rhetorical conven-
tionality is being assembled out of at least some terms that 
don’t merge with their relations. True, the rhetorical agent is a 
whole person, routinely finessing certain traditionally-held val-
ues that come from who knows where. Nevertheless, in deploy-
ing such guidelines, the whole person can promote some gen-
uine social change, if only by helping the group recover its 
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longed-for coherence. Thus we should applaud the existence 
of the rhetorical-humanistic world, whose inhabitants do keep 
producing a form of rhetorical conventionality serviceable 
enough for any whole person to keep redirecting.
Meanwhile, in the existential-transversal landscape, rhetor-
ical transcendence is being assembled primarily out of terms 
that don’t reduce to their relations. For better or worse, the 
rhetorical agent is the existential self, reducing half to lack, 
loss, or absence, and half to quite the occasionalist corpore-
ality. To be sure, the occasionalist half might yet give up the 
ghost, now that there is no longer any “self-sufficient agency 
that can qualify as intentional,” and now that “choice” is “objec-
tively co-caused at the crossroads of chance and determinacy 
(Massumi, qtd. in Hall 120). Even so, the existential self does 
give itself “reasons” for being, regardless that it doesn’t initially 
“have” any (Beauvoir 12). That’s justification enough for us 
not merely to cherish but actually to rehabilitate the existen-
tial-transversal landscape, the only world in which an existen-
tial self could thrive to begin with.
In the material-semiotic landscape, rhetorical materiality 
is being assembled entirely out of terms that remain separable 
from their relations. The rhetorical agent is an ineffable partic-
ipant, forever making things otherwise than they are, and yet 
forever morphing into all sorts of other ineffable participants. 
Nobody here can say exactly why any of this activity should 
be going on, or under what circumstances (or to what extent) 
it should ever be stopped. So it does appear that the ineffable 
participant of this landscape ought to stay in close communi-
cation with the existential self from the other, existential-trans-
versal world. This would be so that the former sort of agent can 
sometimes borrow, from the latter, the “reasons” that neither 
could possibly have in the first place (Beauvoir 12). However, 
its ethical slightness notwithstanding, the material-semiotic 
perspective does warrant our protection, since it’s a preserve 
for all the resources empowering the ineffable participant to 
materialize everything, even transcendence.
So it’s not only that each of the four landscapes persists, 
each in its own way, as a factory for producing a four-folded 
rhetorical agency. It’s also that each persists despite the per-
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sistence of its others. Meanwhile, there’s no theoretical justifi-
cation for stapling such paradigms together. To the contrary, 
it’s incumbent upon us to inculcate the incommensurability 
among the four perspectives, so that rhetorical agency can stay 
irreducibly four-folded.
Now, one might think, given the sophistication with which 
rhetorical functionality is being studied, that we’re cognizant 
enough of the complexity, the reputed perversity of rhetori-
cal agency. Yet rhetorical agency is becoming less multiple all 
the time. For theory seems bent on suturing the landscapes, on 
assembling a certain rhetorical world, on manufacturing a sin-
gular — Thomas Rickert (2013) would prefer “ambient” — home 
for all four types of rhetorical agent simultaneously. That’s the 
blueprint for a concentration camp, its blended atmosphere too 
toxic for any meeting among the ineffable participant, the exis-
tential self, the whole person, and the structural subject, all of 
whom do need to be left in their own ontologies.
No More Homogenization Now!
Let’s underline the exigency by examining some of the recent 
work on rhetorical materiality, reading the results in the man-
ner of a cautionary tale. After all, as we’ve seen in our trav-
els, rhetorical materiality is already folded into rhetorical 
agency, for which reason the ongoing effacement of rhetor-
ical materiality — or, alternatively, the suturing of the materi-
al-semiotic landscape to its others — can serve as an allegory 
for what’s happening to the rest of rhetorical agency as well. 
So we’ll reflect on two equally sophisticated contributions. One 
affirms that rhetorical practices should certainly be concep-
tualized as materially irreducible. The other affirms that our 
thinking about rhetorical functionality has certainly moved 
beyond the naive view in which any tangible signifier can only 
ever be the figure (the notionally material trace), while ideol-
ogy must always be the constitutive ground. Nevertheless the 
very authors advancing these claims are among those currently 
assembling a single rhetorical world, a concentration camp for 
all sorts of theorists and practitioners at once.
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Here’s the contribution of Ronald Walter Greene, a scholar 
who “perhaps more than any other” is “committed to think-
ing the problem of rhetoric’s materiality” (Trapani 344). In an 
essay of 1998, Greene chastises Michael Calvin McGee for hav-
ing developed a “fragmentation thesis” that effectively “keeps a 
materialist rhetoric locked into a logic of representation” (34). 
McGee’s claim is that the rhetorical utterances around us must 
surely mirror the fragmentation that characterizes our multi-
ply distributed sociality more generally. In that case, as Greene 
explains, McGee’s error is to have inculcated a view in which
Rhetorical practices do not exhibit their own positiv-
ity, their own unique place in the structure of every-
day life, their materiality does not resist but simply 
reflects what we already know: that we live in a frag-
mented culture. (34)
We may discern the prescience of Ronald Walter Greene when 
we grasp that the complaint still applies today, and to no less 
than the approach promoted by Ronald Walter Greene.
To be sure, Greene (1998; 2009) has become adamant as to 
the sheer pointlessness, in theorizing rhetorical materiality, of 
invoking concepts like representation, influence, coercion, sus-
picion, and so on. He maintains that power operates autono-
mously, silently, through constitutive-and-productive articula-
tions, in short, materially, rather than at the level of ideation. 
But let’s note a rejoinder from William Trapani, which is that 
Greene himself, in one of his works, “inadvertently smuggles 
in an unreconstructed notion of communication as mediation 
and thus risks losing the very prospect of a new ‘materialist 
rhetoric’” (Trapani 345). Whether inadvertently or otherwise, 
Greene does persist in reinstating the very notion of represen-
tation (communication, mediation, and so on) that he has so 
vociferously contested.
For example, Greene (2009) is the one who can continue 
to write, and always about rhetorical materialism, passages like 
this, wherein rhetoric’s materiality is framed as that of some 
delivery system, dutifully channeling the interests of the status 
quo: “The need to govern the rhetorical subject is due to how 
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a generalized rhetoricality infuses capitalism with its dynamic 
energy to produce and appropriate the social wealth of com-
municative labor” (61). So, in Greene, rhetorical materiality 
isn’t irreducible, after all. It’s reducible to capitalism’s needy 
automatism. Although capitalism is nowadays governing the 
subject by other-than-symbolistic means, it’s still expressing 
itself perfectly, if not through signification, then through the 
rhetorical materiality that it’s so definitively appropriated.
Here, the point is that even if Greene is correct (about the-
ory’s need to acknowledge rhetoric’s irreducible positivity), it 
wouldn’t yet help for him to be correct, since not even Greene 
is clear as to how rhetorical materiality could resist, rather than 
simply reflect, what we already know. In this instance, we can 
be sure we’re living in a capitalist society. And that, accord-
ing to Greene, is what rhetorical materiality tells us, too! But 
where, in that case, is rhetoric’s material difference, its irreduc-
ible heterogeneity?
Maybe it’s in the contribution of Christian Lundberg, also 
representative of the scholars committed to thinking the prob-
lem of rhetoric’s materiality. In his “On Missed Encounters: 
Lacan and the Materiality of Rhetoric” (2009), Lundberg char-
acterizes the two most salient versions of “the materiality of 
rhetoric thesis” as inadequate (162). Theorizing about rhetor-
ical materiality, he says, has led to certain “advances,” but these 
don’t quite register the “irreducible plurality and specificity of 
rhetorical events, texts, and practices” (161, 163). One of the 
advances has been “beyond an object-centered view of rheto-
ric as durable effect against an ideational bias” and “toward an 
ever more expansive view of discourse constituting the subject” 
(163). Another has been “beyond the critical categories of rep-
resentation and interpretation” and “toward attention to logics 
of power and articulation that produce reality.”  But that’s not 
all there is to the advances.
In Lundberg’s view, the latest advance looks to be that of 
folding the other two advances together, as by recruiting “artic-
ulation theory” to serve as a “principle” of order — a principle 
“mediating the divide between the order of discourse and the 
order of reality by reading them as simultaneous” (Lundberg 
163). And what bothers Lundberg is the seamlessness presup-
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posed in this convergence, hence his lamentation that the two 
advances, especially when blended, can only conduce to the 
effacement of rhetoric’s “irreducible plurality and specificity” 
(161).
By reading Lundberg a little against the grain, we begin to 
see that he’s protesting too much. In celebrating the advance 
“beyond an object-centered view of rhetoric as durable effect” 
he himself is dismissing the possibility that objects, things, 
corporealities might yet have some materiality of their own 
(Lundberg 163). For him, it’s not even the object, only talk 
about the object that matters. Meanwhile, in celebrating the 
advance “beyond the critical categories of representation and 
interpretation,” he himself is dismissing the possibility that sig-
nification can matter, either (161). For he’s the one agreeing 
that the “logics of power and articulation” can “produce real-
ity” all by themselves, i.e., that it’s no longer meaningful to dif-
ferentiate between the map and the territory (163). So of course 
to fold together the two advances is to leave out any irreducible 
plurality and specificity. It’s to render everything (events, texts, 
practices, objects, durable effects, and so on) epiphenomenal to 
an all-encompassing social totality.
But what is Lundberg’s own suggestion for re-admitting 
rhetoric’s irreducible plurality, specificity, and heterogene-
ity? Well, it’s to refer rhetorical materiality to a linguistic loop. 
Technically, the argument is that rhetoric remains material 
because, on the one side, rhetoric is animated by a material 
drive that operates out of awareness, and because, on the other 
side, rhetoric is the material trace left in signification — insin-
uated into “practice” — by the material drive itself (Lundberg 
162).
To begin with, there would appear to be two sorts of mate-
rial available for reworking by the material drive. But the one 
sort is linguistic, comprising such symbolizations as are con-
tinually reconfigured during the ordinary, trope-deploying 
processes of communicative interchange. And the other sort 
is linguistic, too, comprising the extraordinary content of the 
unconscious, which is only the “reservoir of all the possible 
metonymic associations potentially inhering in a signifier by 
way of past usage” (171). So far, Lundberg’s rhetorical material-
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ity is divided neatly between tropes which are familiar because 
they’re new, and tropes which are uncanny because they’re old. 
Of course, there’s still the question of the material drive that’s 
animating these processes of signification. Oddly, not even the 
material drive can matter. Its functionality is limited to that of 
reshuffling all those representations, some of them brand-new, 
the remainder second-hand.
Thus the approaches of Greene and of Lundberg are com-
parably flawed, though in opposite directions. Greene theorizes 
rhetorical materiality too reductively (as whatever might be left 
after the vacuuming-out of all linguisticality), and Lundberg 
theorizes rhetorical materiality too expansively (as whatever 
might turn out, once again, to be linguisticality in disguise). 
Either way, rhetorical materiality, like all the rest of rhetorical 
agency, is theorized in a manner that effaces its internal het-
erogeneity.
On Keeping Difference Different
In reflecting on what both Greene and Lundberg have to say, 
we can still arrive at a couple of clues as to where to find rhet-
oric’s disappearing heterogeneity. The clue from Lundberg is 
that rhetoric should be theorized as speaking with the aid of 
such objects, things, corporealities as are “durable” enough to 
stick in the gears of any social machine bent on generating 
everything in its image (163). Indeed, to trivialize the dura-
ble and the object-oriented, as by moving beyond them, would 
be a step in the wrong direction. We should therefore, as even 
Lundberg suggests, consider rolling back this notion that rhe-
torical materiality can somehow be captured in a reading of 
“the order of discourse and the order of reality…as simultane-
ous.” Similarly, the clue from Greene is that rhetoric should be 
theorized as speaking with its own, resistant positivity (always 
telling us something different from what we already know), 
even if Greene hasn’t actually theorized it that way.
Indeed, the problem uncovered above may be simply that 
the rhetorical theorists keep forgetting where they are. Perhaps, 
for example, Lundberg and Greene have come to think they’re 
wandering around the one rhetorical world, when they’re actu-
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ally perambulating within the social-structural perspective (an 
environment-and-imperative where rhetorical subjectivity is 
the dominant term, and everything else a satellite). Perhaps 
these writers are trying to study rhetorical materiality with 
the aid of resources which are only good for studying rhetor-
ical subjectivity. Perhaps this sort of misprision could be min-
imized were more of the local theorists to take seriously the 
commitments ordering their own, provincial paradigm.
Yet the four alternative frameworks are already there, even 
if they do have to be understood in their own terms. Any 
attempt to blenderize them, or to staple them together, would 
be rhetorical-theoretical imperialism. Let’s, therefore, leave the 
landscapes alone, so that all those local theorists and practi-
tioners can keep making their idiosyncratic contributions to a 
four-folded rhetorical agency. But, in that case, if the four par-
adigms ought indeed to be kept apart, we’re left with the ques-
tion as to how resources from all four of them, crossing the 
abysses between, could ever become reconciled in rhetorical 
transaction.
A Fluctuating Rhetorical Agent
Perhaps we could assemble a theorist-and-practitioner of quite 
another stripe, a participant who’s capable of bringing some 
radical alterity into each and every landscape, even when the 
locals aren’t up to the task. We could add a fifth figure to the 
list of those belonging to the category of “rhetorical agent,” 
arriving at a metaphor, at a model for the interlocutor on call. 
Holding a quadruple passport, claiming citizenship in all quar-
ters of the rhetorical-theoretical world, she could show up in 
any of the perspectives, always importing tidings from else-
where.
A traveler like that could draw any local agent’s attention 
to connections (as between here and there), to linkages that, 
if not for her reminding presence, might seem impossible to 
detect. These would remain partial connections, as Marilyn 
Strathern (1991) or Annemarie Mol (2002) would say, and 
therefore partial separations, too. But they’d still be connec-
tions. Doubtless, such a traveling rhetorical agent would be a 
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messenger, an ontological drifter, maybe a sophist. And there 
is just such a model in the work of Michel Serres, the ally of so 
many a material-semiotic theorist. He has a book about it —
Angels: A Modern Myth (1995). As for the angels populating 
the book, they’re of the kind that “fluctuates between the col-
lective and the individual,” bearing “relationships” (293, 295).
Admittedly, the angels haven’t yet borne enough relation-
ships. Often, they’ve settled for bearing only selective, elitist 
relationships, those echoed in “the cry in the desert,” in “the 
burning prophecy or the psalm,” in “the rustling of crossed 
wings,” in “the coded message, transported, delivered, received 
and deciphered,” in “emphatic words and speeches,” in “writ-
ten law, sign, meaning,” in “the signified and the signifier,” in 
“speech, language, commentary and interpretation” (Serres 
284). So the angel of the past — and here one might think of 
the steganographic angel posited, in the fifteenth century, by 
Johannes Trithemius (see Kolata), or of the mediological angel 
adduced so much more recently (see Debray) — wouldn’t have 
been such a good model for any traveling rhetorical agent.
Yes, but even the angels are undergoing remediation. They 
are becoming freed up to traverse all manner of “paths” and 
“interlacings,” and their work is now that of “unceasingly draw-
ing up the maps of our new universe” (Serres 293). Indeed, 
they’re heralding the annunciation, when “word” becomes 
“flesh” (295). This is no idle auspication. For, as Serres implies 
elsewhere, communication needn’t continue reducing to some 
(let’s say, Kantian, Husserlian, Sartrean) tomb for a “petrified 
linguistic body,” its “tongue and nostrils parched with dialec-
tic,” or even to some perseverative ritual whereby the referent 
keeps disappearing into the signified (Connor 162).
The way that Serres actually puts it, though, is that the 
angels, the fluctuating, relationship-bearing angels coming up 
today, are
individual and multiple; messengers that both appear 
and disappear; visible and invisible; constructive of 
messages and message-bearing systems…spiritual 
and physical; of two sexes and none; natural and 
manufactured; collective and social; both orderly and 
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disorderly…intermediaries and interchangers; intel-
ligence that can be found in the world’s objects and 
artefacts. (296)
Come to think of it, that’s what we’ve been hearing all along. 
We’ve been hearing it from our exemplary rhetorical agent, the 
preacher who’s accompanied us from beginning to end, bear-
ing with her those difficult relationships that produce a four-
folded rhetorical agency.
So there’s a model, a metaphor. With our help, the travel-
ing rhetorical agent, that fluctuating angel, might come to col-
lect all of the items on agency’s checklist, filling her knapsack 
with unassimilable supplies, bundling these into the form of 
the communicative artifact. Her own speech would be a gift for 
carrying around, for unfolding within any collectivity suscep-
tible to the rhetorical will to matter. After all, while humans 
can’t be the only agents in town, they still need assistance in 
their own right. And what else, if not the intervention of their 
allies, could impel them to make things otherwise?
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